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The writer attempts to establish whether the transition from a conventional 
training delivery process for traction drivers to a simulator enabled process has 
been effective. This evaluation of effectiveness is based on a study of Iarnród 
Éireann’s system that was implemented by the author. Evidence is contained 
within four supporting strands, i.e., the change in relevant operational risk that 
was calculated using ex ante and ex post runs of Iarnród Éireann’s risk model, the 
internal rate of return on the financial investment necessary to effect the change, 
the results of an operator attitudinal study and the findings of an independent 
expert audit. 
The author has established that simulation is an effective training medium for 
railway traction drivers, when implemented correctly. The attributes of the system 
and the use cases that resulted in this finding are described in the thesis. The 
writer also presents additional value-adding training objectives that could increase 
the Internal Rate of Return of such a project. The study affirms that the verisimili-
tude requirements of a simulator system are a function of the training goals and 
the nature of the skills being developed. Design features and use strategies can 
mitigate for the potential negative effects of simulator operation. 
The findings have industry-wide relevance for those tasked with providing 
effective training to the 133,000 train drivers within the European Union. 
Railway operating companies in Europe are equal opportunity employers. Drivers may be of 
male or female gender. In an attempt to improve legibility of this thesis, the use of phrases 
such as s/he, her/him and her/his has been avoided. 
To avoid unnecessary political correctness and pedantry, the terms Ireland, Irish, State, and 
Government are applied in the context of the Republic of Ireland. 
A comprehensive two-part glossary of terms, together with a list of acronyms, is provided at 
the start of this thesis. These terms are used routinely and are formatted in italics on the first 
occasion that they appear in the body of the text. 
Unless qualified by citation, the views expressed herein are those of the writer solely. 
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Glossary of Terms (A) - Railway and Simulation Domains 
Absolute Block This signalling principle permits only one train to be in a block 
section at a time. (Moloney) 
Accident An accident is defined as an abnormal operation that has resulted 
in damage to equipment and/or harm to people. (Hughes) 
Adhesion Adhesion is the friction between a wheel and the railhead. It must 
be sufficiently high to prevent slipping under acceleration (power) 
and sliding under deceleration (braking). Traction units 
incorporate creep control devices to maximize adhesion during 
acceleration and also wheel slide devices to minimise stopping 
distances. (Moloney) 
Approach Release These signals are implemented to ensure that drivers comply with 
the speed limit for the route ahead. Approach released signals 
control traffic flow at junctions and display stop aspects by default. 
This aspect will clear when the train reaches a specified strike-in 
point, providing the signal is not being held at danger by the 
occupation of track circuits on a conflicting route. (Moloney) 
Aspect This is the visual information provided by a fixed line side signal 
or by the CAWS equipment. A four aspect colour light signal can 
display one of: (i) Green (proceed), the next signal is showing a 
proceed aspect (green or double yellow); (ii) Double yellow 
(preliminary caution), be prepared to find the next signal at yellow; 
(iii) Single yellow (caution), be prepared to stop at the next signal; 
(iv) Red (danger), stop. (Moloney) 
Automatic Half Barrier Automatic half barriers are activated by the passage of trains and 
do not require manual intervention. When operated by an 
emergency operator in local-control mode, the barriers will not 
operate by either right or wrong direction traffic movements. They 
display steady yellow and flashing red lights to advise road users. 
The barriers span only half of the public road. (Moloney) 
Automatic Train Protection Automatic train protection enforces maximum line speed and 
compliance with signals. After providing a warning, it applies the 
brakes if the train is operating outside of the defined braking 
curve. The system has two override facilities; a bypass switch to 
permit a faulted unit to take traction, and a ‘running release’ 
function to permit normal movements in non-fitted depots and in 
locations on the running line where the normal distance between 
the impedance bond and the associated stop signal is inappropriate. 
The latter override facility allows trains to draw up to a stop signal 
that is positioned at the end of a platform and for station work to 
be completed efficiently. (Moloney) 
Automatic Warning System The automatic warning system is an in-cab warning or advisory 
system that requires driver acknowledgement of restrictive signal 
aspects to avoid an emergency brake application. In Ireland, it is 
only fitted on Translink lines and on the traction units that operate 
over them. (Moloney) 
 The extended AWS refers to any situation where the AWS 
equipment is used to warn drivers of anything other than the 
aspects of signals. Extended uses can be organised into four types 
(i) Permanent speed restrictions, (ii) Temporary and emergency 
speed restrictions, (iii) Level crossings, and (iv) SPAD indicators, 
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depot magnets and AWS cancellation boards for wrong direction 
movements. (McLeod et al.) 
Continuous Automatic Warning System This is an in-cab signalling system, used on track 
circuited lines that detects signal codes in the rails by means of 
vehicle-mounted pick up coils. Lineside signal aspects are 
continuously displayed and the system requires driver 
acknowledgement of more restrictive signal aspects on the aspect 
display unit to avoid an emergency brake application. The driver 
can act upon less restrictive signal aspects before he catches sight 
of the fixed lineside signals. This facilitates fluency in driving. 
This warning system is used in Ireland. (Moloney) 
Controller Area Network - Bus (CAN-bus) A controller area network bus is a communications 
highway that allows controllers and devices to communicate with 
each other without a host computer, over a single or dual wire 
system. The concept was commercialised in the mid 1980s in the 
automobile industry. 
 The CAN-bus facilitates communications between subsystems, 
i.e., it receives feedback from multiple sensing devices and 
integrates this information to control actuators. Information and 
commands are transmitted sequentially, i.e., only one string of 
binary information is transmitted at a given time. Messages are 
prioritised, security-tagged, framed and, in the event of failure, are 
retransmitted as soon as the bus is free again. A receiving module 
is receptive to all of the information being transmitted but 
responds to the information that is addressed exclusively to it. 
(Moloney) 
Consist A general term to describe the formation of a train. (Moloney) 
Crew A (train) crew is a group of expert specialists, each of whom have 
specific role positions. They perform brief events that are closely 
synchronised with each other and repeat these events across 
different environmental conditions. (Roop et al.) 
Critical Incident A critical incident is a human error or equipment failure that, if not 
corrected, leads to an undesirable outcome. An accident is the 
consequence of a critical incident which, because it was 
uncorrected, progressed to an undesirable outcome. (Arnstein) 
Defensive Driving This is the antithesis of aggressive driving. This driving style 
avoids the use of maximum braking capability by observing and 
responding early to anticipated and unexpected events. (Moloney) 
Degraded Working/Conditions Degraded conditions prevail when the complete range of 
operational safeguards are unavailable, usually because of 
equipment failure, e.g., failure of the SCE, failure of the CAWS or 
signal failure. Rather that cease operation, the system is permitted 
to continue functioning by putting additional processes in place 
and by transferring additional responsibility onto the operator. This 
term includes conditions of reduced visibility, inclement weather, 
low adhesion conditions and degraded yard conditions etc. (Moloney) 
Dependency The term dependency relates to a situation where the probability of 
failure of supposedly independent components is not, in fact, 
independent. Human error dependency exists wherever the 
probabilities of human errors are linked together more closely than 
if they were random events. In such cases, the probability of 
failure is greater than that calculated multiplicatively or 
additionally by ‘and’ or ‘or’ conditions. (Greenstreet Berman) 
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Desk Simulator This type of simulator is able to simulate the general vehicle logic 
and layout. They are often equipped with a touch screen computer 
that simulates the equipment located at the rear of the original cab, 
in the engine compartment or on the outside of the train. This type 
of simulator is not enclosed within a cab. (Schmitz and Maag) 
Detection Detection equipment provides proof that points are locked 
correctly in the required position. Detection must be achieved 
before the protecting signal will clear. The system detects the 
presence of trains by means of track circuit occupation or by axle 
counter imbalance. (Moloney) 
Detonator A small disc-shaped device, designed to be placed on the railhead 
for protection or emergency purposes. It detonates when a train 
passes over it. Drivers respond accordingly. (Moloney) 
Distributed Interactive Simulation This allows operators to be trained while the influences and 
interactions with other people and systems are simulated. It offers 
the advantage of providing increased psychological fidelity. With 
modern communications, simulators do not have to be in the same 
location as they can be connected to each other by means of local 
and wide area networks. This type of simulator system is 
particularly useful in distributed systems, e.g., naval, military or 
railway activities, where actors are separated by space. (Hardt and White) 
District Traction Executive The role of the title holder (in Ireland), sometimes referred to as  
Traffic Executive, is equivalent to the driver standards manager (in 
Britain). He is a functional specialist who coaches, counsels and 
trains respective operating grades. Those in the District Traction 
Executive grade are involved exclusively with drivers, and those in 
the District Traffic Executive grade are involved with guards, 
signalmen, depot staff and crossing keepers. (Moloney) 
Driver Only Operation Driver only operated trains are operated exclusively by the driver. 
Other staffs, where provided, are engaged in non-operational 
matters, such as on-train catering or ticket checking. (Moloney) 
Driver’s Reminder Appliance The driver’s reminder appliance is depressed by drivers when their 
train is stopped at a stop signal or station. Activation of the device 
prevents the traction unit from taking power until reset. It is pro-
vided to prevent SASPADs, that is, starting against a signal at 
danger. (Moloney) 
Driver’s Safety Device See Safety Critical Equipment 
Emergency Situation A current, unforeseen situation or unplanned event which has a life 
threatening or extreme loss implication and that requires 
immediate attention, for example, a fire or an obstruction on a line. 
(Railway Safety Approved Code of Practice) 
Emulator See Software interface of cab 
Essential Realism Essential realism is not the realism or fidelity that might be 
regarded as essential for improved face validity. Rather, it is the 
amount of realism that is essential for the particular training 
requirements under consideration. (Parkes) 
Event A specific operational or technical occurrence in the course of a 
drive. There could be several events in a single drive. An event is 
also referred to as a situation. (Schmitz and Maag) 
Footplate Driving cab. (Moloney) 
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Full Cab Replica Full cab replica simulators are able to simulate the vehicle’s logic 
and behaviour. They incorporate a full cab that is equipped with a 
touch screen computer(s) that simulates the equipment located in 
the engine compartment or on the outside of the train. If the 
simulator is installed on a motion system, the driver gets an 
accurate feeling of the train’s behaviour. (Schmitz and Maag) 
Full Mission A full mission simulator is based, not only on the look and feel, 
but on the functional operations that the simulator can perform. 
(Anon., 2007) 
Geo-specific A geo-specific visual database is a highly accurate depiction of a 
real route. By contrast, a geo-typical visual database is inaccurate 
although it includes typical infrastructure, cultural artefacts and 
cues, signalling and signage elements that are familiar to the 
driver. A geo-typical route does not represent a real route with 
which the driver is familiar. (Anon.) 
Home Signal A home signal is the first stop signal on the approach to a signal 
box. This does not apply on Track Circuit Block lines. (I.É.) 
Hot Box Detector A hot box detector (HBD) is a wayside detector for alerting the 
controlling signalman that an axle box is operating at an excessive 
temperature. The equipment generates an audible warning and 
print out. (Moloney) 
Independent Brake The independent (or locomotive) brake-handle controls the appli-
cation of the locomotive brake. It does not affect the brakes on 
trailing vehicles. (Moloney) 
In Rear In rear, is the area through which a train has travelled before 
reaching a given location. In advance, is the area through which a 
train will travel after passing a given location. (Bailey) 
Integrated Definition for Function Modelling (IDEFØ)  This process is used to model the 
manufacturing or service delivery functions of a system, and to 
illustrate the connectedness of the subsystems. The inputs, 
controls, outputs and mechanisms that are necessary to perform 
each function, are represented by a set of arrows that impinge with 
that particular function. The model is hierarchical in structure; 
lower and more detailed levels of the model are decompositions of 
higher levels. (Moloney) 
Interlocking The logic equipment by which routes that conflict are prevented 
from being set at the same time. (Bailey) 
Latency Latency is the time lag between information processing and 
presentation. It is greater for networked simulators that use a 
central server. It can reduce simulator realism and increase the 
likelihood of sickness. (Hardt and White) 
Normal Operation(s) The operation of the railway in the way in which it was designed 
to operate, including planned peak periods. (Railway Safety Approved Code of 
Practice) 
On-Train Monitoring and Recording The on-train monitoring and recording (OTMR) sys-
tem is a data recorder that is fitted in the cab of a traction unit for 
recording a defined set of parameters or functions, such as speed, 
position of train, brake cylinder pressure, use of the horn and notch 
position etc. It is analogous to an aircraft’s black box. (Moloney) 
Operator (simulator) The operator of the simulator is the person who is driving the 
simulator, i.e., the trainee. The operator of the simulator is just one 
Page XIX
use case. See User (simulator) for lines of demarcation with other 
stakeholders. (Moloney) 
Out-of-Course Working The term out-of-course working refers to abnormal or non-routine 
train working. The term includes diversionary routing (mainline 
and shunting manoeuvres), e.g., a train from A to B can go via 
routes C or D; a suburban or freight train can be placed in the 
running loop to clear the route for an express train; a train can be 
moved from the up main to the down main under shunting signals; 
a train can be stopped because the failure of another train or an 
infrastructure failure or obstruction or other exceptional cause, as 
well as passenger emergencies. (Moloney and Tuohy) 
Overlap It is a region of safety in advance of a stop signal. It is provided in 
the design of the signal scheme plan to cater for events of minor 
overruns that are caused by poor driver judgment. The length is 
dependent on the line speed. It is usually 180 metres in length but 
in some areas where speeds are very low; there may be no overlaps 
at all. (Moloney) 
Overspeeding The term overspeeding applies to any situation where the train 
exceeds the current authorised speed. This includes the train 
moving when it should be stationary. (Independent Transport Safety and 
Reliability Regulator) 
Permanent Speed Restriction  A permanent speed restriction (PSR) is imposed due to track 
curves or other permanent infrastructure conditions that are present 
on a particular track section. (Andersen) 
Permissible Speed The permissible speed is the maximum permitted speed for a track 
section as shown in the Working Timetable. (Moloney) 
Pilotman A pilotman is a person who is appointed to oversee the passage of 
trains over a double line during single line working, or over a 
single line or a bi-directional line during a failure of equipment. 
(I.É.) 
Placements Placements are representations of real world objects that can be 
placed within the virtual environment to enrich the vista provided 
to the operator. The vista presented to the operator is designed to 
elicit particular responses, e.g., the presence of a static van 
adjacent to the line should act as a visual cue that trackside 
workers are in the vicinity. Placements can be incorporated readily 
within a scene by a simple ‘cut and paste’ process. (Moloney) 
Presence It is the ability of an operator to suspend disbelief in the simulated 
environment. (Wallis, Tichon and Mildred) 
Protection Protection procedures are used by the train crew when a train 
derails, fails, is obstructed or is involved in an accident or other 
exceptional incident. They are enacted to protect the failed train 
and any other train that may come into conflict with it. (Moloney) 
Push/Pull Train A push/pull train formation consists of a control car at one end and 
a suitably equipped locomotive at the other end. The driver 
operates the train from the leading cab, which may be either on the 
control car or on the locomotive. This saves shunting at terminal 
stations. (Moloney) 
Reliability Reliable methods or processes produce the same results 
consistently. (CAS) 
Reversible Line Reversible working is not regarded as normal operation; it is 
implemented as a result of system degradation. (Moloney) 
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Running Signal A running signal controls the movement of trains en route along a 
running line. (Bailey) 
Safety Control Equipment The term safety control equipment (SCE) is used to describe the 
totality of the locomotive deadman’s equipment and the vigilance 
equipment. In Britain, it is called the driver’s safety device (DSD). 
(Moloney) 
Scenario The actual configuration of a drive, e.g., the sequence of events, 
the choice of the routes, specific train settings and weather 
conditions etc. (Schmitz and Maag) 
Section Signal A section signal is a stop signal that controls the entrance to a 
block section. (Moloney) 
Shunter A shunter is any person who performs shunting duties, e.g., 
marshalling trains, conducting low speed movements or setting 
routes manually in yards. (Moloney) 
Signal Box The term signal box includes any mechanical, relay based, or 
integrated electronic control centre. It also includes an Emergency 
Control Panel or Personal Computer Electronic Control Point 
which is open. (Moloney) 
Signaller A signaller is a person who is involved in controlling the 
movement of trains. In different countries, signallers are variously 
called controllers, signalmen, planners and dispatchers. (Wilson and 
Norris.) 
Signalman The term signalman (Ireland) is used interchangeably with 
signaller (Britain). The term is gender neutral. (Moloney) 
Signal Passed at Danger This term specifically applies to situations when the train passes 
the signal without the signalman’s permission. It excludes 
instances when the train passes a danger signal with the 
signalman’s permission, e.g., for assistance purposes or when the 
signal is defective. (Moloney) 
Simulation A simulation is a situation or environment which is produced but 
not necessarily by a machine. It is further defined as any device, 
process or created environment used to represent the actions or 
functions of the real equipment under operational conditions, for 
training or assessment. (Railway Safety Approved Code of Practice) 
Single Line A single line is used for traffic movements in both directions. 
(Moloney) 
Software Interface of Cab A simulator using a software interface of cab equipment 
representing the real driving desk on screens. Trainees operate a 
software representation of the desk, i.e., the handles and buttons 
etc., with standard computer interfaces (mouse and keyboard). 
(Schmitz and Maag) 
 The term emulator is also used to describe this type of equipment. 
Emulators can have the full functionality of a simulator but have a 
different MMI. (Moloney) 
Starting Against Signal SPAD An SASPAD, at type of Signal Passed ad Danger (SPAD) occurs 
when a train is (re)commencing its journey after being detained at 
a signal at danger, e.g., where the train is stopped at a station to 
facilitate traffic activities and the section signal is at danger. When 
the driver is notified that the station work is completed, the driver 
may set off and pass the signal at danger. (Davies and Downes) 
Station The term station includes a terminal, depot, halt or yard. (I.É.) 
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Stop Signal A stop signal is any main signal which can display a stop aspect or 
indication. (I.É.) 
Tail Lamp The term tail lamp includes integral red lights on traction units and 
rolling stock. Their presence signifies train completeness. (Moloney) 
Temporary Speed Restriction Temporary or emergency speed restrictions are imposed by the 
engineering department when the condition of the line does not 
permit operations at normal speeds. These are normally 
communicated to drivers by means of a Weekly Circular or Shed 
notices. (Andersen) 
Token The term token includes any single line token or train staff. (I.É.) 
Track Circuit Assistor A track circuit assistor is provided on certain trains to improve the 
operation of track circuits and, hence, train detection. Trains with 
low axle loadings cannot be guaranteed to operate track circuits. 
(Moloney) 
Track Circuit Block The safety of trains operating on a track circuit block section of 
line relies on the use of track circuits or other means of automatic 
train-absence detection, e.g., axle counters. The controlling 
signalman does not use block instruments. (Moloney) 
Track Circuit Operating Device The track circuit operating device (Geismar bar or clip) is placed 
on the line to provide signal protection in an emergency situation. 
It operates track circuits and reverts signals to danger. (Moloney) 
Traction Unit The term traction unit refers to a locomotive, multiple unit, self 
propelled rail vehicle or road/rail vehicle when operating in rail 
mode. (I.É.) 
Train The term train includes locomotive hauled rolling stock, light 
locomotive(s), self propelled rail-vehicle(s) and road/rail vehicle(s) 
when they are operating in rail mode. (Moloney) 
Trainee A trainee is an individual who is undergoing instruction and 
training. This term applies to those engaged in the formal 
classroom element of the driver training process and also to those 
who are developing their driving skills by operating as a second 
man on the footplate. For the purpose of this thesis, the term is 
extended abnormally to include qualified drivers who are engaged 
in refresher training. (Moloney) 
Train Performance Display (TPD) The train performance display provides supplemental 
information to the simulator operators and users (drivers and 
instructors). It provides a number of graphical and textual displays 
that can be used to assess drivers’ performance, e.g., line 
curvature, in-train forces, gradients and brake applications. (Ward, 
Tyler, and Wilson and Eichinger) 
Train Radio Train radio systems are permanently installed in the cabs of 
traction units for communicating with signal boxes. The train radio 
head can be used in conjunction with hand-held portable 
communication devices, such as guard-driver and shunter-driver 
systems. The system used in I.É. is similar to the CSR system used 
in Britain insofar as it supports discrete communications between 
parties. (Moloney) 
Translational Study A translational study helps to make findings of basic scientific 
research useful for practical applications. Such studies are carried 
out in the medical, behavioural, and social sciences. Translational 
research fosters a multidirectional, multidisciplinary and seamless 
integrative approach to achieve research outcomes. The activity 
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covers all research between the laboratory and the respective 
community of practice. There are two areas of research translation. 
One area involves the application of discoveries generated during 
research in the laboratory to studies of humans and behaviour; it is 
action based research. The second area is aimed at enhancing the 
adoption of best practices in the community. (Moloney) 
User (simulator) This term excludes the simulator operators, i.e., those undergoing 
training. It includes the railway management, communities of 
practice, observers, instructors and training managers etc. (Moloney) 
Validation The assurance that a product, service, or process satisfies the 
criteria of the stakeholders. (Moloney) 
Vigilance Device or System A vigilance device (system) is provided in driving cabs as an aid to 
maintain drivers’ vigilance. Task linked vigilance systems accept 
direct evidence that the driver is actively controlling the train. 
Modern vigilance systems are speed linked; higher train speeds 
require more frequent cycling. (Independent Transport Safety and Reliability 
Regulator) 
Virtual Reality Virtual reality is characterised by the illusion of participating in a 
synthetic world through an immersive and multi-sensorial 
experience, instead of external observation of that environment, 
i.e., when the user is immersed in a virtual world, he cannot see the 
real world around him. (Coelho et al.) 
Wheel Slide Protection (WSP) Wheel slide occurs during braking when a wheelset loses grip with 
the rail. Prolonged wheel slide causes wheel flats. Electronic WSP 
equipment is fitted to modern traction and rolling stock. It detects 
and controls the rotation of wheels that are sliding when the 
vehicle is in braking mode. This equipment operates automatically 
and is customised to optimise the performance on specific 
vehicles. (Moloney) 
Wheel Slip Wheel slip occurs when a powered wheelset loses grip with the rail 




Glossary of Terms (B) - Psychology and Human Factors Domains 
Ability Ability refers to the hypothetical construct that underlies 
performance in a number of tasks or activities. Ability is usually 
thought to be a relatively stable characteristic or trait that is innate. 
(Tendick) 
Active Failure An active failure is an error that could be an immediate and direct 
cause of an incident, e.g., a SPAD. (HEL) 
Affective Domain The affective domain consists of behaviours corresponding to 
awareness, interest, attention, concern, responsibility, social skills, 
ability to listen and respond to others, and the ability to 
demonstrate those attitudinal characteristics or values that are 
appropriate to the field of activity. (Moloney) 
Attention The concentration of mental resources on particular physical or 
mental events. (Palmeri) 
 It is the concentration and focussing of mental effort. (Nichols and Cobb) 
Automaticity The level at which some mental tasks are performed, i.e., 
effortlessly and with little thought or without the allocation of 
conscious attention. This is in contrast with deliberate, action-
demanding and conscious controlled cognition. (Palmeri) 
Behaviourism Behaviourism is the science of observed behaviour. The science 
was advanced by John Watson who believed that behaviours could 
be measured and changed through conditioning using 
reinforcements and punishment. (Moloney) 
Behaviourist (theories) These are theories of learning that aim to develop cue-response 
chains through repeated practice of well-defined skills and 
contexts. (Wallace et al.) 
Boredom Boredom is an individual’s response to a monotonous situation. 
(Dunn) 
Chance This is analogous to fate and is defined as risks that have such low 
probabilities that estimations cannot be assigned. (Arnstein)  
Cognitive Tasks Cognitive tasks are performed in situations that require judgement 
and decision making. (Allen et al.) 
Cognitivist Cognitivism is a theory of learning that espouses the idea that 
learning is a conscious rational process. People learn by making 
models, maps and frameworks in their mind. Cognitive theories of 
learning aim to develop effective responses to well-defined 
situations. They focus on the cognitive aspects of learning, such as 
the progression from declarative knowledge about a skill to the 
procedural knowledge of skill performance. This is what Nonaka 
and Takeuchi refer to as the process of internalisation. (Wallace et al.) 
Cognitive Task Analysis This is a technique that allows the train-driving task to be analysed 
to identify aspects that place heavy demands on cognitive 
resources, e.g., attention, simultaneous capacity, alertness and 
perception. The use of CTA facilitates the identification and 
circumstances of future error causation mechanisms. (Moloney) 
Cognitive Skills Learned behaviour that allows an individual to operate on 
information, gained from the environment, in order to guide 
subsequent physical action. (Shepherd) 
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Competence Competence is the ability to undertake responsibilities and to 
perform activities to a recognised standard on a regular basis. 
(Hughes) 
Constructivism Proponents of this approach suggest that learning is not just a 
direct result of listening to a teacher. The students have to organize 
and develop what they hear and read. Learners use current or past 
knowledge to construct new ideas or knowledge. A Socratic 
instructional style is used during which the mentor translates the 
information to be acquired into a format that is appropriate to the 
student’s present state of understanding. This was a major theme 
of Bruner (1996). (Moloney) 
Crew Resource Management This is the effective use of all available resources, such as crew 
members, equipment, systems and supporting facilities, to achieve 
safe and efficient operation. (Joint Aviation Requirements - Operations) 
 It is a set of teamwork competencies that allow the crew to cope 
with situational demands that would overwhelm an individual 
crew member. (Mitsopoulos et al.) 
Crisis A crisis is defined as an unexpected event or a potentially life-
threatening chain or combination of events that causes uncertainty 
of action and time pressure. This can range from a hazardous or 
‘hairy’ event to a major crisis. It is a novel, unfamiliar situation. 
(Catchpole) 
Critical Thinking A thinking process that is characterised by careful and exact 
evaluation and judgement. (Reader’s Digest) 
Cues Cues are events which prompt some actions or responses. (Evans) 
Culture Culture is an aspect of the way things operate in an organisation. It 
is almost invisible to the people working there. (Hale) 
 It is an organisation’s personality. (Moloney) 
Distraction Distraction creates a loss of attentional control. (Anon., undated) 
Distributed Cognition Distributed cognition is based on the idea that cognition is 
distributed over the person and the person’s environment. It is 
based on the fact that some information is available in the head 
and other information is extracted from the situation. With the 
AWS, for example, information on the status of a restrictive signal 
just passed must be retained in the driver’s head. The CAWS, by 
contrast, is a memory aid which distributes cognition back into the 
context of the cab environment. (Halliday et al. and Moloney) 
Error An error is the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired 
ends. (Reason et al.) 
Evaluation Evaluation is the process of gathering information to ascertain the 
effectiveness and efficiency of training programmes to make 
informed improvements to the training process, i.e., is the training 
process doing what it is supposed to? (Atkins et al.) 
Experience Experience is a measure of whether the individual has recently had 
sufficient exposure to, and practice of, the range of tasks to acquire 
the skills and knowledge required to complete those tasks to the 
level noted in competence standards. Specific industries require 
different criteria against which to measure the appropriate levels of 
‘sufficient exposure’, ‘practice’ and an appropriate ‘range of 
tasks’. (Wright et al.) 
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Experience (a wry definition) Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it. 
(Chambers) 
Expert This is the 5th and final stage of skills learning. Experts can cope 
with unusual and unanticipated events. (Wallace et al.) 
Expertise Expertise is the manifestation of exceptional abilities or skills in 
some domain. (Palmeri) 
Far Transfer This refers to real life skill application where the context is novel 
and has not been addressed in training. Principle-based lessons, 
also called far transfer, are designed to teach tasks that have more 
than one correct outcome. These tasks require the worker to adapt 
guidelines to various job situations. Railway training is of the near 
transfer variety. (Clark and Mayer) 
Fatigue The term includes physical (resulting from heavy protracted 
physical labour) and neurobiological (biologically determined) 
sleep-awake rhythm entities. (SWOV) 
Feedforward Control This control mechanism attempts to standardise work practices by 
using prescriptive rules and procedures, backed up by inspectors 
who monitor behavioural compliance and impose sanctions on 
deviants. (Moloney) 
Field Dependence The inability to pick a target out of the environment, e.g., picking a 
red signal aspect out of the surrounding environment. (Drummond) 
Hazard Perception (HP) Hazard perception includes the process of discovering, recognising 
and responding to potentially dangerous situations. (Engström et al.) 
High Workload In a high workload situation, the demands placed upon an 
operator, are close to reaching the limitations of human 
performance. (Anon.) 
Human Error Human error means that an action or a decision made by the 
human was the cause, or a contributing factor, that led to an 
accident. This definition also includes the human’s failure to make 
a decision or to take action. (FAA) 
Human Factors Human factors are the environmental, organisational and job 
factors and human characteristics which influence behaviour at 
work in a way which can affect health and safety. (HSE) 
Incremental Transfer Learning Incremental transfer learning views skill learning as occurring 
through task performance in a progression of contrived 
environments, such that, each task is more complex and 
demanding than the previous. In this sense, learners are considered 
to be incrementally transferring to contexts more and more similar 
to those which will eventually be encountered in real life. (Wallace et 
al.) 
Knowing-Doing Gap A knowing-doing gap is created when individuals know the correct 
course of action to take but choose to exercise a different one. 
(Moloney) 
Learning Learning is the process of modifying existing knowledge, skills, 
habits or action tendencies. It is also knowledge or skill that is 
acquired by instruction or study. (Gagnè) 
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) Line oriented flight training is a complete training 
process that utilises a full mission simulation for aircraft pilot 
training programmes. The simulation includes accurate modelling 
of the systems of a specific type of aircraft, its handling 
characteristics, ground facilities, navigational aids and airports. In 
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addition to systems’ knowledge, handling skills and operating 
skills, LOFT also includes decision making, leadership, 
management and resource management training. This training 
facilitates the transition from flight simulation to operational 
flying. LOFT consists of entire flights, during which various 
operational or technical problems are managed by the crew in real 
time. Full operational documentation, pre-flight planning and 
normal aircraft operating practices are used throughout. There is 
no direct instructional input during the actual LOFT session unless 
negative learning begins to occur. At the end of the LOFT 
exercise, the instructor acts as the facilitator of a debriefing 
discussion on how the exercise developed and what lessons could 
be learned from the experience. (Croft; Moloney) 
Miscalibration The calibration process is characterised as the weighting or 
balancing of the results of an assessment of task demands and an 
assessment of one’s own skills resulting in the recognition of a 
balance or an imbalance. Miscalibration occurs when the 
assessment is inaccurate. (Kuiken and Twisk) 
Mistake A mistake is categorised as doing the wrong thing, believing it to 
be right (planning error). (Halliday et al.) 
Monotony A monotonous environment is one that is lacking in stimuli. An 
individual’s reaction to monotony is called boredom. (Nichols and Cobb) 
 A situation is monotonous if it remains unchanged or if it changes 
in a repetitive and predictable way. (Dunn) 
Multitasking The term multitasking refers to the performance of a number of 
tasks concomitantly. Multitasking places demands on the actor’s 
attentional skills, cognitive processing capability and motor 
responses. In certain cases, the actor must prioritise the sequence 
and timing to carry out the tasks. (Moloney) 
Near Transfer This term refers to real life skill applications where the context is 
similar to those encountered in training. It is the transfer of a skill 
from an instructional environment to one where the conditions 
have been anticipated during instruction. (Wallace et al.) 
Negative transfer This term has two distinctively different meanings. In the aviation 
domain, it refers to situations where trainees are exposed to 
training scenarios that have a high likelihood of a negative 
outcome, i.e., a ‘crash’ in a simulator. Such learning is regarded as 
being detrimental to confidence building. (Catchpole et al.) The second 
and more common usage relates to the necessity for simulator 
behavioural congruence with the real vehicle. It is believed that if 
the model is inaccurate, inappropriate behaviours are learned. 
(Moloney) 
On-the-Job Training (OTJ) On-the-job training facilitates performance development that is 
embedded within the operational context. (Evans) 
Parallel Processing Parallel processing involves the execution of two processes at the 
same time. (Palmeri) 
Perception Perception is the awareness of the external world or some aspect of 
it, through human physical sensations, i.e., sight, hearing, smell, 
taste and touch, and the interpretation of these sensations and cues 
by the mind. (Moloney) 
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Positive Transfer Positive transfer is the degree to which trainees effectively apply 
the knowledge, skills and attitudes, gained in the training context, 
to their job. (Ward, Tyler, Wilson and Eichinger) 
Psychomotor Skills  Psychomotor skills are concerned with manipulative and motor 
behaviour. (Schmid) 
 Psychomotor skills require the ability to complete a task using a 
combination of thinking (cognition) and coordinated muscular 
movements. (Moloney) 
Recall Recall is the ability to memorise, store, or retrieve data and 
information accurately. It can be directly useful in passing 
examinations but is only a prerequisite for success in acquiring and 
using other faculties. (Schmid) 
Rule A rule is a prescribed guide for conduct or action. Depending on 
the context of the action, it may not always be capable of 
application at which stage a derogation or local instruction is 
applied. (Moloney) 
Schemata Schemata are models that suggest the relationships that exist 
between objects. They determine how the learner interprets the 
task to be learned, how the learner structures and understands the 
information, and what knowledge the learner acquires. Synonyms 
include scene, scenario, model or theory. (Moloney) 
Skill Skill is the ability to choose and perform the correct techniques, 
successfully and regularly, with the minimum of effort. We get our 
natural ability from heredity but we have to learn and use 
techniques to develop our innate abilities. The term implies some 
coordinated physical or cognitive activity to achieve a goal. The 
term also implies a degree of flexible or adoptive performance. 
(Moloney) 
 Skill is the ability to do specific things without necessarily being 
able to understand the process by which one does them. Skills can 
be divided into manual and mental skills. The correct execution of 
skill-dependent actions is controlled mainly by automatic 
processors. (Schmid) 
Stress Stress is a cognitive state which is part of a wider process 
reflecting a person’s perception and adaptation of the demands of 
the environment. (Nichols and Cobb) 
System Accident A system accident must have multiple failures, and these failures 
are likely to be in reasonably independent units or subsystems. 
They start with the failure of a component, e.g., failure of a part or 
operator error. (Perrow) 
Technical Skills Technical skills are those skills that are related to academic 
courses, e.g., understanding of mathematical principles. (Juhary) 
Training Training is a systematic process of instruction, practice, review 
and examination. It is single loop learning. Atkins et al. 
Training Need The training need is the gap between the training objective and the 
level of proficiency before training occurs. (Hosman et al.) 
Training Objective(s) The level of proficiency that the trainee has to master is referred to 
as the training objective. (Hosman et al.) 
Transfer Transfer relates to the application of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes that are acquired during training, to the environment in 
which they are normally used. (Alexander et al.) 
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Understanding Understanding implies the ability to recognise faulty reasoning, to 
construct hypotheses which go beyond the evidence available, and 
to identify the kinds of evidence which will verify, or falsify, the 
hypothesis. (Newton) 
Utility Analysis A set of statistical procedures is used to assess the financial gain to 
an organisation resulting from the use or implementation of a 
specified human resource management intervention, in this 
particular case, CRM training. (Roop et al.) 
Vigilance Decrement Vigilance is a state of readiness to detect stimuli, appreciate 
context and respond accordingly. It is achieved at the optimum 
level of arousal. Vigilance decrement is defined as a reduction in 
the state of vigilance from the optimal level. (Whitlock) 
Violation A violation is a deliberate deviation from safe operating 




List of Acronyms 
ADU Aspect display unit 
AHB Automatic half barrier 
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable 
ATC Automatic train control (also air traffic control) 
ATP Automatic train protection 
AWS Automatic warning system 
CAI Computer aided instruction (frequently used interchangeably with CBT) 
CAWS Continuous automatic warning system 
CBT Computer based training (acronym is frequently used interchangeably with CAI) 
CCTV Closed circuit television 
CGI Computer generated imagery 
CRM Crew resource management 
CRR Commission for Railway Regulation – see RSC1 
CSD Classroom scenario demonstrator 
CSR Cab secure radio 
CTA Cognitive task analysis 
DAS Data administration station 
DBAG Deutsche Bahn Aktien Gesellschaft 
DFS Detailed functional specification 
DIF Difficulty, importance and frequency 
DMU Diesel multiple unit 
DSD Driver’s Safety Device 
DTE District traction (or traffic) executive 
EBAT Events-based approach to training 
EF(s) Equivalent fatality(ies) 
ETS Electric token system 
FAA Federal Aviation Authority 
FOC(s) Freight operating company(ies) 
FOV Field of view 
GSM-R Global system for mobile communications for railways 
HP(T) Hazard perception (training) 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
HTA Hierarchical task analysis 
IDEFØ Integrated definition for function modelling 
                                                 
1 The Railway Safety Commission (RSC) was renamed as the CRR with effect from 29 February 
2016. 
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IRR Internal rate of return 
IS Instructor(s)’ station 
IT Information technology 
JRE Japanese Railways East 
LMA Limit of movement authority 
MMI Man machine interface 
NRN National radio network 
NTS(s) Non-technical skill(s) 
NWRM Network wide risk model 
OTW Out-the-windscreen (view) 
PCA Passenger communications alarm (also passenger call for aid) 
PF Proportion factor 
PSR Permanent speed restriction 
PRA Post run analyser 
RBTNA Risk based training needs analysis 
ROI Return on investment 
RPD Recognition primed decision (making) 
RSC Railway Safety Commission – see CRR 
RSP Railway Safety Programme 
SA Situation(al) awareness 
SLW Single line working 
SME Subject matter expert 
SMS Safety management system 
SPAD Signal passed at danger 
SPS Scenario preparation station 
SPT Signalpost telephone 
TBT ™ Track builder tool 
TCA Track circuit assistor 
TDMS Train data management system 
TNA Training needs analysis 
TOC(s) Train operating company(ies) 
TPWS Train protection and warning system 
TSR Temporary speed restriction 
VPF Value of preventing a fatality 





Railways are complex and generally-safe service delivery mechanisms (Naweed, 
2014; Merkert, Nash and Smith, 2008; Lindfeldt, 2008 and Peirone, 2005). They 
employ multiple defensive layers: engineered defences, people defences, proce-
dures and administrative controls (Reason, 2000a and Reason, 1997). However, 
railways operate in an aggressive and competitive environment, where commer-
cial success often depending on the exploitation of the benefit derived from ope-
rating at the fringes of normal accepted practice (Rasmussen, 1998). 
To satisfy the service delivery imperative, operating staff must be able to operate 
competently in all contexts. They are the most important, and sometimes the only, 
barrier in the event of a technical malfunction (Kecklund et al., 2001b). Railways 
are bureaucratic control and command organisations that operate on the basis of 
feedforward principles (Reason et al., 1998). Consequently, operators and, most 
relevant to this study, traction drivers, must be trained to apply copious rules and 
procedures to enable them to carry out a comprehensive variety of tasks, in all 
operational contexts. 
Drivers use learning in the cognitive, psychomotor and affective domains. In ad-
dition to learning rules, procedures and technical skills, they also need to learn a 
range of non-technical skills. Many training and development processes concen-
trate on the development of the cognitive domain and technical skills. They are 
delivered using conventional methodologies and are dependent on fortuitous real-
world experiences for effective exploitation. Whereas these processes can provide 
experiential training for normal operations, in general, trainees receive only theo-
retical instruction to prepare them to cope with the other modes of operation. This 
reflected the situation in Iarnród Éireann (I.É.) prior to the introduction of its 
simulator enabled training process. 
I.É.’s management was becoming increasingly concerned about the level of safe 
performance of its drivers. Train crew error was the third greatest contributor to 
I.É.’s primary safety risk and accounted for over 9% of I.É.’s total risk exposure. 
(Sotera Risk Solutions, 2010). The risks associated with SPAD occurrence con-
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stituted 96% of this risk subset. The use of driver training simulators to provide 
experiential training in all operational contexts and to develop all the domains of 
learning was perceived as affording the best opportunity to affect safety improve-
ment. Training simulators facilitate the modification of trainee behaviours through 
the receipt of internal feedback, from the external environment and from mentors. 
However, simulators are expensive to acquire, maintain and operate. Furthermore, 
acquisition costs and the value that is derived from the systems are highly depen-
dent on their appropriateness for and their application to the stakeholders’ goals. 
Consequently, resource allocators invariably question whether such investments 
are justified. 
When conducting his research on this topic, the writer has drawn on his personal 
experience as the Operations Training Officer at Iarnród Éireann (I.É.). His 
research questions are thus: (i) What driver-relevant operational safety benefit, as 
revealed through an analysis of outputs from its risk model, did I.É.’s stakeholders 
achieve when the company changed the training delivery process for its 500 
drivers from the traditional lecture based process to a simulator enabled one, and 
(ii) did the financial value of any resultant change to operational risk justify the 





Railways are long and thin, geographically-dispersed physical entities that require 
relatively complex organisational structures. Management is centralised but those 
who execute management’s policies and procedures are decentralised. The 
managerial task is simplified somewhat through standardisation (Daft, 1995). 
Management of operational subordinates is characterised along the ‘befehlstaktik’ 
principle, i.e., individual initiative and independent thinking are discouraged 
(Maury Hill and Associates Inc., 2007; and Reason et al., 1998). Standardised 
procedures and operational constraints, in the form of prescriptive rules, are 
developed by technical specialists who reside in what Mintzberg (1981) calls the 
organisation’s ‘technostructure’. These are disseminated to the operational staff 
through training interventions. The overall competence of staff is developed and 
maintained through expensive competence assurance processes (Frérot, 2011 and 
RENFE, 2004). The aspiration is that these procedures and rules will be applied 
appropriately and reliably. Only those persons who have been assessed as being 
competent are allowed to occupy relevant operational roles (The Stationery Office 
Limited, 2006 and Office of the Attorney General, 2005a). 
Typically, passenger operating companies provide services 18 hours a day, for 
363 days a year at least (Halcrow Group Limited, 2002). Freight operating 
companies operate on an as-required basis and usually at night time. These 
companies utilise a broad variety of long-life physical assets to produce their 
service offerings. These assets are characterised by different and costly 
technologies. Because of the capital intensive nature of the asset base, the 
associated operating costs and the service delivery commitments, there is an 
economic imperative to utilise the system at near-full capacity. Similarly, there is 
a large human content involved in the service delivery process which is 
characterised by high costs, role demarcation and high levels of responsibility. In 
2009 for example, 712,400 people were employed in railway companies in the EU 
27 (European Commission, 2012); of this, 133,000 were drivers (Schmitz and 
Maag, 2008). As might be imagined, there is fluidity in any workforce of this 
scale, resulting in a requirement to train ca. 11,000 (8·25%) drivers (Danish 
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Technological Institute, CAS and Lloyds Register, 2007). The training 
requirement in I.É. was ca. 7·6% during the period 1998-2005 and this rate was 
incorrectly anticipated to exceed 9% in line with unrealised future business 
growth (I.É., 2004). 
Most European railway organisations are either under direct state control or are 
dependent on their respective states for subventions. Because of these 
relationships, they are unable to make key commercial decisions without referral 
to their benefactors. Whilst these railways are subject to normal commercial 
pressure, governments want to keep passenger fares at a low level whilst, at the 
same time, constraining their financial support. Passenger customers want 
repeated on-time service, good comfort, short journey times and absolute safety 
(Anon., 2008; Baker et al.,2007 and RSSB, 2004b); freight customers want 
reliability, speed, suitable terminal-railway interface and storage facilities 
(Palšaitis and Ponomariovas, 2011). Furthermore, the demand for the rail service 
is price-sensitive. Price elasticities in respect of urban and regional passenger 
travel vary between - 0·4 and - 0·9 (Balcombe et al., 2004); price elasticities in 
respect of journey purpose (business, commuting, shopping or social) vary 
between - 0·4 and - 1·1 (Harris and Godward, eds., 1992). In respect of freight, 
price elasticities vary between -0·03 and -1·23 depending on the types of freight 
being conveyed (Oum, Waters and Yong, 1990). 
As society progresses, it demands ever greater levels of safety, and organisational 
safety objectives move continuously towards zero risk. The public perception is 
that railways are intrinsically safe (Reason, 2000b), so much so, that both I.É.’s 
Performance Obligations (NTA, 2011) and the focus group’s contribution to the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions’ White Paper (DETR, 
1998) fail to declare passenger safety as one of the desirable attributes of rail 
transport. However, this position is incompatible with the views of learned safety 
professionals. Of the twelve business sectors that he scrutinised, Reason (1997) 
ranked railway operations in the seventh highest risk position. 
Managers are near to the strategic apex of the organisation, and can access scarce 
and valuable resources to implement improvement initiatives. Because of their 
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positional responsibilities and role as resource allocators, the burden for managing 
the safety of the system resides with them (Wright et al., 2003). A symbiotic 
relationship exists between managers and operational staff; managers are 
responsible for safety through the competence management process but operators 
are responsible for accident avoidance and prevention. ROGS (2006), Office of 
the Attorney General (2005a), HSE (2003) and HMRI (1996) deem certain rail 
activities as being safety critical. Train driving is included in this determination. 
This means that, as part of the licensing arrangements, all staff involved in such 
work must be assessed regularly and certified as competent against risk-based 
competence standards. Implementation of effective training strategies and 
processes underpin the satisfaction of this obligation. 
This chapter is divided into six sections, dealing with: 
1.1 The Context of the Subject of this Study; 
1.2 Managing Risk and Alternative Approaches to Failure; 
1.3 The Futility of Retrospective Analyses; 
1.4 Writer’s Motivation for Thesis; and 
1.5 Structure of Thesis. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 1.6. 
1.1 The Context of the Subject of this Study 
To understand the context of this thesis, it is fruitful to briefly review the 
historical and financial milieu of I.É, its excellent historical accident record 
together with the worrying prevalence of accident and incident precursors, the 
importance of the operational performance of the traction-driver cohort to its risk 
exposure and the increased emphasis on external regulation (Greiner, 1972). 
1.1.1 The Economic Fortunes of I.É. 
The rail system in Ireland was ubiquitous in the early 1900s (Stanuell, 1910). 
Because of the proliferation of road transport, it has consolidated concomitantly in 
the intervening years into two separate companies; one in the Republic of Ireland 
and the other in Northern Ireland. The remaining portion of the system in the 
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Republic was nationalised in 1945 under the designation of Córas Iompair 
Éireann2 (O’Rian, 1995). I.É. is the railway subsidiary of this group. 
Generally, the demand for rail transport services is derived and strongly correlated 
with the prevailing macroeconomic climate (Goodbody and AECOM, 2011). The 
positive changes that occurred in Ireland’s macroeconomic environment between 
1994 and 2008, commonly referred to as the Celtic Tiger period, helped to 
facilitate a remarkable reversal in I.É.’s fortunes. I.É.’s own efforts to make rail 
travel the mode of choice by offering a better, faster and more comprehensive 
service also contributed to success. The operational and financial results of the 
combination of the benign market and I.É’s efforts are evident in Figure 1. 
 
Source: Annual Reports (Irish Rail, relevant dates) 
Figure 1: Operating costs, revenues and passenger patronage (1989 - 2012) 
The growth in passenger journeys, achieved up to 2008, was forecasted to 
continue at an unprecedented rate into the future (I.É., 2004); necessitating an 
expansion of all components of the system. The training function would have to 
make its contribution towards meeting this challenge by developing the resultant 
                                                 
2 Córas Iompair Éireann (C.I.É.) was a fully integrated company between 1945 and 1987. The 
Transport (Re-organisation of Córas Iompair Éireann) Act (1986) led to the setting up of three 
operating subsidiaries, i.e., Iarnród Éireann (I.É.), Bus Éireann (B.É.) and Bus Átha Cliath 
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enlarged human component. Even though the market conditions were benign, ope-
rating incomes3 had not covered the operating costs since 2000. Not alone was 
I.É. unable to internally fund the ambitious capital projects that were being con-
sidered; it was even unable to maintain the extant system in a satisfactory con-
dition. It was not until after a serious incident4 had occurred at Knockcroghery 
that a commitment was made to provide the necessary level of capital investment. 
This commitment was made on foot of a post-incident review of rail safety by 
IRMS (1998) who noted that the “... shortfall in investment in recent years… is 
now impacting on safety” (p.116). As a result of this, and also the Irish Govern-
ment’s acceptance that I.É. could make a significant positive contribution to the 
nation’s economic wellbeing (NTA, 2016), funding for capital projects and for the 
Railway Safety Programme was provided from the Irish exchequer and from the 
European Regional Development Fund. The RSP is extremely relevant to this 
thesis as, without it, I.É. may not have been able to fund its simulator system. The 
phasing, funding and high level output objectives of each phase are presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Objectives of the Three Phases of the RSP 
Programme Operative period Amount Main expenditure areas 
RSP 1 1999 - 2003 €661 m Physical infrastructure (€600 m), and safety 
culture and procedures (€61 m) 
RSP 2 2004 – 2008 €512 m Physical infrastructure (€444 m), SMSs and 
human performance (€68 m). Funds for I.É.’s 
simulator system were provided in this tranche. 
RSP 3 2009 - 2014 €513 m Physical infrastructure (€443 m), SMSs (€31 m) 
and Human performance (€39 m) 
Total  €1,686 m  
Source: Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport, and Risk Solutions (2013) 
Spending in all areas of the RSP has been subjected to prospective ‘due diligence’ 
reviews and retrospective ‘value for money’ audits by independent subject matter 
experts. Auditors’ comments, in respect of the manner in which I.É.’s simulator 
project was managed, are presented elsewhere in this work. 
                                                 
3 Including state grants or Public Service Obligation (PSO) payments 
4 A broken fishplate caused a derailment of a passenger train on 08th November 1997. 
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1.1.2 Managing with the Available Resources 
Although it fell short of meeting the normally acceptable standard, it would be 
disingenuous to portray the prevailing situation on the Irish rail system as being 
shambolic; it was not! IRMS (1998) recognised the past achievements of 
management and staff, particularly in respect of safe performance during 
challenging times; noting that “Historically the I.É. network has been a safe 
railway, with reportable accidents and levels of casualties that are comparable 
with other European railway networks” (p.116) and, most germane to this thesis, 
that “... training for staff to undertake their jobs is performed adequately in most 
functions” (p.74). However, whilst attesting to I.É.’s historical safety performance 
(see Table 2 for a perspective on the infrequency of multiple fatality train 
accidents), IRMS and I.É.’s management were concerned about the intrinsic 
system safety and the prevalence of accident precursors. Perspectives on the 
frequency of incidents and accidents, and on signal passed at danger rates are 
provided in Table 3 and Figure 2 respectively. 
Table 2: Multiple Fatality Train Accidents (1955 - 1997) 
Date Location Accident type Fatalities 
21.12.1955 Cahir SPAD resulting in buffer strike and derailment into 
the River Suir 
2 
21.10.1974 Gormanstown Runaway train resulting in primary and secondary 
collisions 
2 
31.12.1975 Gorey Train derailment due to underbridge strike 5 
01.08.1980 Buttevant Train derailment due to the purposeful 
disarrangement of the signal - points interlocking 




SPAD resulting in a rear-end collision 7 
Table 3: Historical Incident/Accident Data (1993 - 1997) 
Incident type Number of 
incidents/accidents 
Number of accidents 
resulting in injuries 
Derailments 460 3 
Collisions (all types) 90 4 
Running into obstructions (all types) 102 5 
Train fires 20 0 
Unintentional divides 40 0 
Source: IRMS (1998) 
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Figure 2: SPAD Performances of I.É.'s and British drivers (1990 - 2005) 
Readers should note that when I.É.’s SPAD rate (1990 - ‘97) is normalised to 
reflect the relative sizes of the driver populations, its performance was slightly 
better than the British performance. However, the SPAD rate for I.É.’s drivers 
continued to rise in the years 1998 - 2005, whereas the rate in Britain declined 
dramatically following the accidents at Southall and Ladbroke Grove, and the 
subsequent installation of the TPWS. 
1.1.3 Criticality of the Driver Subsystem 
Signalmen, guards, shunters and platform staff, and the range of subsidiary roles, 
such as pilotmen and secondmen etc., that come into being during periods of 
degraded working, are necessary for the delivery of efficient and effective rail 
services. Traction drivers are instrumental to the service delivery process; they 
operate at the concatenation of critical subsystems. The quality of their 
interactions with the subsystems influences both operational and safety 
performance (Naweed, 2014; and Leveson, Stringfellow and Thomas, 2012). 
Occupation of this junctional position is unique. As well as coping with normal 
operations, when the subsystems become faulted or failed the onus is on drivers to 
operate around the degradation; they are at the coalface (Hughes, 2004). They 
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SPAD rate of British drivers
SPAD rate of Iarnrod Eireann's drivers
Accident at Southall ↑
on 19.09.'97 
Accident at Ladbroke Grove
↓ on 05.10.'99
Introduction of  the 
TPWS (2002 - '03)
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and route features (Tichon, 2007; Kecklund et al., 2001b and Hale, 2000). (See 
also Appendix 1.) On its own, this technical knowledge is insufficient and must be 
combined with personal abilities, judgemental skills and NTSs to enable them to 
operate in a satisfactory manner (RSSB, 2013b; Bonsall and Taylor, 2011; and 
RSSB, 2009b). As they drive along, drivers are constantly subjected to a range of 
visual, audible, tactile and, in some cases, olfactory stimuli (Glendon et al., 2006). 
They need to be aware of the prevailing circumstances and must be able to apply 
suitable learnt and programmed decisions (Tschirner, 2015). They must know, 
near-instantaneously, which stimulus demands a response, recall the appropriate 
response from memory and apply it with minimal delay. The driving activity, 
elaborated using the Integrated Definition for Function Modelling (level 3) 
technique, is presented in Appendix 2. 
Drivers constitute 10·0% of I.É.’s total workforce (I.É.’s Annual Report, 2005) 
and about 12·7% of the population of rail workers in the European Union 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2005); any one of them is capable of 
inflicting damaging contingencies on his employing organisation (CIMA, 2007). 
Railway organisations use competence management systems to safeguard against 
the realisation of this possibility (ORR, 2016). Drivers must be competent in all 
elements of the role that they perform and be able to demonstrate that initial 
competence has been established and maintained for as long as they fulfil the role. 
Definitions of competence abound but the writer favours the one by Bromby et al. 
(2003), namely, “… the ability to perform some task or accomplish something… 
competences reflect the knowledge, skills and the abilities that an individual may 
or may not have in relation to performing a particular task” (p.14). 
1.1.4 The Increased Emphasis on External Regulation 
Railway organisations have a duty of care in respect of all people who are affected 
by every facet of its operation. As a corollary, they must be able to demonstrate 
compliance with a demanding regulatory framework (Office of the Attorney 
General, 2005a). The regulation process has become more formal, rigorous and 
invasive (Little, 2006). In the distant past, there was only one Railway Inspecting 
Officer in Ireland. More recently, IRMS (1998) recommended that “... the 
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capabilities of the present sole Inspecting Officer [should be strengthened]” 
(p.123). Presently, the function is carried out by the Railway Safety Commission5 
and the Railway Accident Investigating Unit (RAIU); staffed by 13 personnel in 
total. Unsurprisingly, the expanded resource base, with its new powers of 
compellability, led Little (2006) to note that “... I.É. has not previously been 
subject to the current level of external scrutiny on safety as is being applied now 
following the enactment of The Railway Safety Act 2005” (p.23). 
1.2 Managing Risk and Alternative Approaches to Failure 
The hazards associated with railway operation are pervasive. They are mitigated 
using engineering and administrative controls but they cannot be eliminated 
entirely (ORR, 2015a). In respect of the train driving task, the engineering 
controls comprise interlocks (e.g. saloon door interlock), advisory (e.g. CAWS) 
and supervisory systems (e.g. ATP), alarms (e.g. TDMS displays) and alerters (e.g. 
vigilance device) etc.; the administrative controls comprise standard operating 
procedures (e.g. in General Appendix), permit to work measures (e.g. certification 
by traction type and route), provision of appropriate training (e.g. basic, refresher, 
conversion or remediation) and safety management systems (e.g. standards) etc. 
The development, maintenance and assessment of drivers’ competence are 
essential to safe and effective operation (ORR, 2016). However, it is insufficient 
to ensure absolute safety as, of itself, competence does not ensure that slips and 
lapses will never occur (RSSB, 2004c). Chambers (2005) believes that while 
“While audits, reviews and testing play an important role, the baseline 
competence of the people doing the work is the best defence against system 
failure” (p.6). This is particularly true during periods of systems’ degradation 
when the engineered defences may be unavailable. In such instances, the 
continued operation of the railway system is entrusted to the human defence layer. 
But, it should also be borne in mind that there is a level of human unreliability 
that is immune to improvement measures (Hughes, 2003; Beaty, 1995 and Smith, 
1993). 
                                                 
5 The RSC was formally established on 1st January 2006 in accordance with the requirements of 
the Railway Safety Act (RSA) 2005. 
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The most distinguishing feature of high reliability organisations is their collective 
preoccupation with the possibility of failure. They expect their workforces to 
make errors, train them to recognise their emergence, and prepare them to recover 
from the errors. Such errors are marginal events that are caused by the same 
mechanisms that generate correct actions for most of the time (Besnard and 
Greathead, 2004). Following the occurrence of an incident or accident, the 
organisation or investigative body may use two perspectives during its inquiry 
into the cause, i.e., a system approach or a person approach (Leveson, 
Stringfellow and Thomas, 2012; and Reason, 2000a). The differences between 
approaches are elaborated in Table 4. 
Table 4: A Comparison of the System Approach versus the Person Approach 
Dimension Person approach System approach 
Focus Unsafe acts, errors and 
violations are perpetrated by 
individuals. 




Forgetfulness, inattention, poor 
motivation, negligence and 
recklessness are the causes. 
“Human error is simply a symptom of the 
[system] failure, not the cause itself” (Edkins 




Other operators, even those 
perceived to be excellent, 
continue to make the same 
mistakes. 
Real causes are identified and remedied; 
preventing recurrence. 
Blame Individual operators at the front 
end of the process (drivers, 
guards or signalmen) are 
blamed. 
Systemic factors are at fault and lessons are 
learned from the event for dissemination to the 
broader community of practice. Querists 
should use the substitution test6 to discern if it 
was a system failure rather than an individual 
failure. Dekker (2012) believes that “the aim 
of safety work is not to judge people for not 
doing things safely, but to try to understand 




Blame, shame and retrain the 
individual. Use the disciplinary 
process. 
Change the prevailing work conditions, e.g., 
provide access to a confidential incident 
reporting and analysis system to surface the 
inadequacies that are apparent to the operator. 
                                                 
6 Mentally substitute the individual concerned in the incident with one of his peers (of the same 
background, training, qualifications and experience) and ask “given the circumstances that 
prevailed at the time, could you be sure that the substitute would not have performed the same 
unsafe act?” If the answer is ‘Yes’, then the blame can be attributed justifiably to the individual 
concerned. If the answer is ‘No’, the system must be examined for a common cause failure 
mechanism (Reason, 1998). 
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Dimension Person approach System approach 
Other ‘Who blundered?’ This 
approach assumes that the 
individual makes a conscious 
choice between safe and unsafe 
behaviour. 
‘How did the system fail?’ Human error is 
expected to occur but the system must be 
robust enough to trap the error. 
Time 
horizon 
Focus on the immediate lead up 
to the accident. 
‘Resident pathogens7’ have not been designed 
or managed out of the system and lie dormant 
until they combine with active failures. 
Defences These reside within the 
individual. 
These reside within the system. 
Based on Leveson, Stringfellow and Thomas (2012) and Reason (2000a) 
Historically, accident investigators leaned towards the person approach but their 
emphasis has changed gradually to the system approach (Kyriakidis, 2013 and 
Woods et al., 1994). The readjustment of the investigators’ gaze, predominantly 
away from those at the ‘sharp end’ to envelop all of the systems’ actors, has 
caused personally risk-averse managers and resource allocators to become more 
attuned to their roles and accountabilities. Wolff and Orr (2009) capture the 
essence of this shift of attribution from organisational to personal responsibility. 
They opine that it is necessary to consider “… the ‘moral quality’ of the source of 
the hazard, which is a matter of how it is created or sustained, and in particular 
whether the cause is in some way the culpability of those charged with ensuring 
our safety” (p.38). 
1.3 The Futility of Retrospective Analyses 
Some organisations, which operate in hazardous environments or with hazardous 
technologies, rely on negative process outcomes that are calculated historically in 
industry-relevant metrics, such as collisions or fatalities per million passenger-
kilometres, to inform their safety management strategy. By their nature, so-called 
high hazard industries, such as railways, encounter a small number of high-
potential and a higher number of low-potential adverse events (Statista, 2017 and 
RSSB, 2013c). Merely counting the number of these events will not provide a 
reliable indication of the system’s intrinsic safety. 
Since there is no frequency or severity patterns associated with such accidents, 
Reason (1997) warns against this retrospective approach because “… the large 
                                                 
7 This is Reason’s (2000) term for the latent triggers that are associated with active failures. 
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random component in accident causation means that ‘safe’ organisations can still 
have bad accidents and ‘unsafe’ organisations can escape them for long periods” 
(p.108). Lauber (in Hall, 1997) captures succinctly the weakness of retrospective 
analyses in his statement that “The absence of accidents does not necessarily 
indicate the presence of safety” (p.2). Risk modelling provides an alternative 
analytical technique to assess prospectively the underlying safety of the system 
(ERA, 2015). 
1.4 Writer’s Motivation for the Thesis 
The writer embarked on this research for vocational as well as academic reasons. 
He held specific responsibility for the operator training function at I.É. for the 
nineteen year period to 2012. Under his direction, a group of fourteen Staff 
Trainers designed and delivered a suite of training programmes. He realised that 
some of the training and education delivery processes that he had experienced 
during his own personal development could be applied beneficially to his work 
situation. Specifically, he came to value practice based learning, and to realise 
that training the basic skills merely was insufficient; non-technical skills (NTSs) 
needed to be developed also. This change in mindset was accentuated by the 
developments that were occurring in the use of electronic tools for training safety 
critical staffs in other hazardous industries. He believed that if training 
effectiveness was to improve in I.É., significant investment would have to be 
made in the function. 
The writer was conscious that, in the past, accident inquiry teams tended to focus 
on the proximate causes of accidents. In more recent times, their attention has 
focussed on those substandard conditions that support, unwittingly and 
unintentionally, the substandard acts which underpin accidents (Heinrich in 
Leveson, Stringfellow and Thomas 2012). An ineffective training process is one 
such substandard condition. It was in the writer’s self interest to ensure that all 
training programmes were fit for purpose, that they developed skills in the 
psychomotor, cognitive and affective domains, and that they were effectively and 
efficiently delivered. Conscious of the weighty burden of this personal 
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responsibility8, the writer persuaded the Board of I.É. to sanction a capital 
expenditure of €4·99 million and associated annual recurrent costs of €150,000 to 
procure, and operate subsequently, a driver training simulator system. This 
investment initiative contextualises this study. The questions that were posed by 
the Board of Iarnród Éireann, which formed part of its due diligence examination 
of the project, facilitated the framing of the research questions for this thesis. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The body of this report is structured into five sections. 
The milieu of I.É., and the context and nature of the traction driving task are 
presented in Section 1 which comprises Chapters 1 and 2. 
Section 2 comprises Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Relevant cognitive psychology 
constructs, and the organisational value and costs that are associated with the 
provision of training, are examined. The general methods that are used to identify 
training needs, and the specific process that was used to reveal the required 
scenarios for inclusion into I.É.’s lesson plan, are discussed. A key success factor, 
i.e., a reduction in SPAD occurrence, is furnished. The section culminates with 
presentations of the simulator enabled lesson plan and associated delivery process. 
The thesis findings are founded on these. 
The manner in which the lesson plan and delivery process were realised is 
discussed in Section 3, comprising Chapters 6 and 7. A general discussion on 
training simulators, culminating in an overview of the options that were selected 
by I.É., is presented. The writer explains the rationale underpinning the key 
choices exercised by I.É. in its procurement specification and also I.É.’s strategic 
imperatives for the project. 
Section 4 comprises Chapters 8, 9 and 10. The study’s constraining context, and 
the consequentially-necessary methodology that was used to answer the 
                                                 
8 This is not a unique stance for people in the writer’s position to take. In a survey by Little (2004), 
50% of the respondents stated that they would worry about their personal liability if a safety 
problem arose as a result of their decisions. 
9 At the ‘final account’ stage of this project, €4·6 million of this amount was spent. 
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fundamental research question, is outlined. Using the perspective triangulation 
approach to assess the project’s outcomes, the writer provides answers to other 
aspects of the research questions. Project findings, relevant to others who may be 
tasked with the introduction of simulation within their own organisations, are also 
presented. 
Section 5 comprises Chapter 11. In this, the writer reviews the approach that he 
used for the study. He also makes suggestions on the possible areas and 
approaches for further research, aimed at improving the reliability and 
generalisability of this study’s findings, and makes his concluding remarks. 
An overview of the thesis, showing the main points contained within each chapter 
and the associated objectives, is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Thesis Overview 
Chapter Main issues within chapter Objectives 
Ch 1: Introduction 1) Commercial and safety 
performances of I.É.; 
2) Accident inquiry approaches; 
3) Retrospective and prospective 
analysis of safety performance; 
4) Personal motivation. 
1) To provide organisational 
and personal contexts; 
2) To propose the use of risk 
models as a means to 
differentiate historical safety 
performance from underlying 
risk. 
Ch 2: The Changing 
Nature and the 
Complexity of Train 
Driving 
1) The changed nature of the 
traction driving task; 
2) The concept of socio technical 
systems. 
To show the relatively 
cognitively complex nature of 
the driving task. 
Ch 3: General 
Cognitive and 
Developmental 
Aspects of Training 
1) Relevant cognitive psychology 
constructs; 
2) Constraints around providing 
experiential training in a live 
operating environment; 
3) The need to provide relevant 
artefacts in the simulated 
environment. 
To illustrate how simulator 
enabled training accords with 
cognitive psychology constructs; 
thereby facilitating improvement 
in learning. 
Ch 4: Providing 
Opportunity to 
Learn 
1) The value of training; 
2) General and specific costs of 
providing training; 
3) Ensuring safe performance; 
4) I.É.’s concern with the extant 
process; 
5) Gaining confidence to transition 
from the extant process. 
To furnish the main reason for 
changing the extant training 
process. 
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Chapter Main issues within chapter Objectives 




Lesson Plan and 
Training Delivery 
Strategy 
1) Types of training needs analyses; 
2) The approach adopted by I.É. to 
develop the scenarios; 
3) I.É.’s internal standards, and 
external regulation; 
4) Non-technical skills; 
5) Furtherance of learning using 
non-jeopardous means; 
6) Contextualisation of operating 
anomalies; 
7) The composite lesson plan. 
To present: 
1) The reason why the particular 
study type was adopted; 
2) The contextualised lesson 
plan which is aimed at 
developing technical and 
nontechnical skills; 
3) The reasons for the overall 
delivery strategy. 
Ch 6: Types of 
Simulators and 
Fidelity 
1) An overview of the range of 
simulator equipment available to 
purchasers; 
2) Maintenance and upgrade costs; 
3) Insights into egospeed and the 
concept of presence; 
4) Essential realism. 
To present: 
1) Issues surrounding cost/value 
trade-offs for the range of 
simulators and an overview 
of the type purchased by I.É.; 
2) Concerns in respect of speed 
misperception and 
psychological fidelity in the 
context of assessment. 
Ch 7: Contribution 
of Literature 
Review: description 
of I.É.’s project 
1) Matching system elaborateness 
with training needs; 
2) Identification of features that add 
or detract from the overall 
system; 
3) Garnering operator acceptance; 
4) Strategies used to ensure that the 
project would succeed at the 
contract, design and use phases; 
5) Systems engineering approaches; 
6) Detailed description of the 
project’s scope, deployment and 
necessary accommodation. 
1) To highlight where costs may 
be incurred and value may be 
extracted at the specification, 
procurement and use phases. 
2) To show the elegance and 
scope of the procured system 
which determine the cost of 
the project and affect IRR 
values. 
Ch 8: Study 
Methodology 
1) Context of study; 
2) Managing operational safety 
risk; 
3) I.É.’s Network Wide Risk 
Model; 
4) What the service user, and the 
service provider is willing to pay 
for safety improvement (VPF, 
and PF times VPF respectively). 
To show: 
1) The overall methodology 
used in the study; 
2) That the VPF and PF used in 
this study, and generally used 
by I.É., is not out of kilter 
with that used for other 
project evaluations. 
Ch 9: Measurement 
of Outcomes 
The stakeholder constituency approach is used to show the effectiveness 
of the revised training process as perceived by the public, the operators, 
the organisation, the regulator and the Government-appointment auditor. 




What worked well, didn’t work or 
was suboptimal in terms of the 
commercial aspects, strategic intent, 
equipment attributes, usability and 
use cases 
To provide guidance on a range 
of practical issues to railway 
operations training officers who 
may be tasked with managing 
the introduction of simulation 
Ch 11: Conclusions 1) Research methods used by the writer; 
2) Suggestion of additional areas of inquiry, and alternative approaches 
for the conduct of further research; 
3) Concluding remarks. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
Railway activities are prescribed and embedded in rules, processes and logical 
systems. These are given effect by highly trained operators who are dispersed 
throughout the system. The operators have to rely on their own internal resources 
and capabilities when the engineered subsystems become faulted. Railway 
companies hold a duty of care to those parties who are affected by its activities 
and management needs to be able to demonstrate the discharge of this duty. 
Proactively enhancing training delivery is an obvious manifestation of the 
discharge of management’s duty of care. However, management’s obligations are 
somewhat counterbalanced by corporate governance responsibilities. Expenditure 
incurred in the discharge of its obligations must deliver value that is 
commensurate. The use of risk modelling techniques to assess the extent of the 
delivered value resulting from investment decisions, most relevantly those relating 
to driver training, is appropriate. 
In spite of the degraded state of its extant asset base, I.É. had a reasonably good 
safety record but the underlying trend in accident precursors was worrying. After 
a long period of underinvestment, I.É. received external funding to improve all 
elements of its system. Without an acceptance that its driver training process 
required modernisation, I.É. may not have been in a position to procure its 
simulator system. The investor’s munificence was not unconditional and all 
expenditure was subject to prospective and retrospective audit and critique. 
Although, I.É. is absolutely fervent in the discharge of its duty of care through the 




2 The Changing Nature and the Complexity of Train Driving 
In the previous chapter, the writer provides organisational context. In this chapter, 
the writer describes the task and context of the traction driving role; these 
determine the skills that need to be developed and the necessary content of the 
training programme. 
Trains move with one degree of freedom. Directional control is provided by the 
fixed properties of the trackwork and by the actions of the controlling signalman 
on the variable route elements (Moray, in TRB, eds., 2006b). However, train 
driving is not just about moving and stopping a train on the tracks; the task is 
much more complex than this (CRC for Rail Innovation, 2013b) and it has 
evolved constantly over time. In the early phase of the evolution of the task, it 
comprised a large physical component. In the latter stage, it has become more 
complex and “... progressively dominated by cognitive and perceptual skills” 
(Tichon, 2007, p.177). This perspective on the evolution of the driver’s role is 
endorsed by RSSB (2009a) who perceives it as loosely approximating to that of 
an aircraft pilot “... knowledgeably monitoring indicators and intervening when 
systems fail or have to be overridden” (p.62). (See also Naweed and Aitken, 2014; 
and Balfe, 2017.) The skill development objectives and, hence, the content of the 
driver training process must reflect the context and content of the task. 
This chapter is divided into six sections, dealing with: 
2.1 The Evolution of the Train Driving Activity; 
2.2 Task Complexity; 
2.3 Task Context and its Ramifications; 
2.4 The Nature and Elements of the Train Driving Task; and 
2.5 Evolution of the Design of the Job. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 2.6. 
2.1 The Evolution of the Train Driving Activity 
The task of train driving is steeped in history and tradition. Custom and practice 
set the context for train working. There are three discernible phases in the 
evolution of train driving. 
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2.1.1 The Steam Era 
In the era of steam traction, from 1834 to 1956 in the case of I.É., boys as young 
as 14 years of age were recruited into the railway. These recruits tended to have a 
very basic education and performed the function of engine cleaners initially. They 
also assisted maintenance craftsmen to carry out repairs10. After a period of about 
a year, they were passed out for firing duties, and fired locomotives for short runs 
and shunting activities. This arrangement created a pool of contingency firemen 
who could be called upon at short notice. After about 10 years, a cleaner would 
obtain a full time fireman’s appointment. Subsequently, they were passed for 
limited driving duties. This was a milestone in the individuals’ careers. After a 
long period of satisfactory service at this task and at about 40 years of age, they 
would become mainline drivers. At this stage, they would have to take their place 
on the drivers’ roster as the most junior men and would work their way through 
the link structure until becoming top link drivers on express passenger working. 
The training process was not as inefficient or backward as it might appear at first 
glance. Although the training period was long, trainees were fulfilling productive 
roles as part of the two man crew. The foresight, understanding and contribution 
of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) at this 
early stage of the development of the driver training process deserve special 
mention. ASLEF recognised the contribution that traction models could make in 
the training process and, in 1887, set aside £100 for their purchase (RSSB, 2009a, 
pp.23-24). 
The system facilitated staged progression from initial learning through to 
unrestricted operation by keeping newly qualified drivers out of harm’s way by 
restricting their driving to those times and situations that are known to be lower 
risk, i.e., by avoiding night time driving, possession working, and complex track 
layouts and signalling arrangements. It also allowed drivers to gain experience on 
lower speed operations, with attendant lower driver-error frequencies, before 
                                                 
10 The situation in Britain was different. There, opportunity for personal development was 
provided through mutual improvement classes. These classes developed basic reading skills which 
facilitated book learning. They also provided knowledge on traction operation (RSSB, 2009a). 
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driving higher speed trains. The increased risk, associated with express operation 
is evident in the human reliability study by RSSB (2004a). The error probabilities 
for a range of incident precursors, for various types of train operation and 
associated stages of career progression are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Driver-error Probabilities by Type of Train 
Error Freight Commuter Express 
Misread signal 12X10-6 6X10-6 44X10-6 
Misjudge braking 14X10-6 32X10-6 65X10-6 
Mis-recall signal aspect 40X10-6 200X10-6 1,170X10-6 
Omit station stop N/A 20X10-6 75X10-6 
Place on I.É.’s drivers’ link structure11 Freight link  Special link Top link 
Adopted from: RSSB (2004a) 
As a driver negotiated his way through the long developmental process, he learned 
a great deal incrementally, albeit in an informal way, about the task and its context 
before he was ever placed in the highly responsible position of operating a high 
speed train. This training process was the epitome of the classic learning by 
association mechanism, where the ‘apprentice’ (equivalent to a fireman) learned 
from the ‘master craftsman’ (equivalent to the driver). However, the limitation of 
this type of process comes to the fore when there is an urgent need to train large 
numbers of drivers, and when limitations are imposed by route availability and 
rules on footplate occupancy. The process of learning to drive steam traction was 
facilitated by the prevailing technology which necessitated two people to be 
present on the footplate, one to drive and the other to ‘fire’12 the locomotive. 
Although a physically demanding process, it had complementary benefits. Reason 
(in Wallace et al., 2000) points out that “… many of the antidotes to vigilance 
decrement were unwittingly present on the footplate of a steam locomotive… the 
system kept the driver alert through the additional auditory stimulation and the 
presence of [the secondman] in the cab” (p.11). (See also Lyons, 2005.) 
From a business management perspective, this training process had a very long 
lead-time and required long term planning to ensure that there were sufficient 
                                                 
11 Until 2000, the normal sequence of progression for I.É.’s drivers was (1) shed duties, (2) pilot 
duties, (3) night-time freight trains (the freight link), (4) daytime freight operation and commuter 
trains (the special link), and (5) high speed trains (the top link). 
12 Ensuring that there was a sufficient amount of traction medium available with respect to the 
trailing load, schedule and gradients etc. 
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drivers available to satisfy future business needs. In addition, the amount of 
productive time on top link duties, as a proportion of a driver’s overall career, was 
relatively small. At the end of the steam era, the physical work element of the 
drivers’ role decreased and, in essence, drivers became information processors. 
The resultant potential to redeploy resources, from motor to cognitive demands, 
was seen as a positive development. If less attention is given to some elements of 
the driving task, more attention can be given to attending to stimuli which are 
crucial to the driving task (Buck, 1963). A 1948 report by the Railway Executive 
(in RSSB, 2009a) was less positive about the changes that the transition would 
bring; noting that “Diesel and electric train driving would be 'more monotonous' 
but healthier and more comfortable than steam locomotives” (p.34). 
2.1.2 The Transition Period 
In the mid 1950s when diesel or electric traction became the preferred methods of 
operation, the type of training process outlined above became obsolete. The need 
to have a secondman on the footplate no longer existed. However, there was a 
cohort of extant firemen who no longer had productive work but whose 
knowledge base was not totally redundant. These were reassigned to the grade of 
‘secondman’ or ‘driver’s assistant’ (in Britain). As part of the transition process, 
credit was given for the knowledge and experience that they already possessed. 
Accordingly, they undertook a special conversion training programme which 
lasted about 27 weeks and covered drivers’ rules, basic traction and the principles 
of route learning (RSSB, 2009a). Accounts are frustratingly deficient on the 
rationale underpinning the design process for the conversion programme. For 
completely new entrants, the training process lasted over 2 ½ years in Britain (3 
years in Ireland); a duration that was seen as exorbitant to management. 
2.1.3 The Recent Past 
It was not until the late 1960s that an attempt was made by I.É. to formalise and 
standardise its training process. In Britain, the MP12 programme of 1973 was the 
first formally structured national driver training programme. Even the logic 
underpinning the MP12 programme was flawed conceptually. It was developed 
through negotiation between British Rail and the trades unions; the latter’s 
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contribution centred on hygiene factors13 rather than programme content. It was 
not based on any standard that had defined objectives and measurable outcomes 
(RSSB, 2009a, p.40). 
It was not only the nature of the driving task, and the structure and duration of the 
training process that had changed since those early days; the demonstrable 
standard of care demanded from public transport providers had altered beyond 
recognition. In the earlier days, the internal workings of the railway were subject 
to internal scrutiny by and large; external regulation was less invasive and was 
typically confined to the investigation of fatal accidents. 
The range and sophistication of traction units, train control systems, on-board 
traction management systems, contracts of employment and expansion of duties14, 
and interactions of the driver within the overall system railway have all changed 
radically. It should be noted also that variance exists in the scope of the drivers’ 
roles in railways that are structured differently. In disaggregated non-vertically 
integrated systems, such as prevails presently in Britain, drivers specialise in 
driving specific types of trains over limited geographic regions. This 
specialisation by route, traction and rolling stock type does not exist in a vertically 
integrated railway, such as in Ireland. The only segregation that exists in I.É. is 
between the inner suburban (DART business unit), and the mainline and outer 
suburban activities. Other than this exception, I.É. drivers drive a multiplicity of 
train and traction types over a number of routes. There are ramifications for 
training providers resulting from differences in operating methodologies, e.g., the 
scope of training required, the comprehensiveness of the training tools, and the 
range and maintenance of the operational competencies of the instructors. 
2.2 Task Complexity 
After an extensive review of the writings of contingency theorists, McKechnie 
(1990) attempts to distil the characteristics of task systems. He identifies four 
characteristics that determine their complexity. He uses the terms heterogeneity, 
                                                 
13 This term is used in the context of Frederick Herzberg’s motivator-hygiene theory. 
14 Duties expanded with the blurring of lines of demarcation and the espousal of driver only 
operation. 
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interdependence, variability and unanalysability to describe them. Although 
McKechnie’s suggested use of this framework is to determine overall task 
complexity for the purpose of organisational design, the writer believes that it is 
insightful to use the framework to analyse tasks generically. 
McKechnie (1990) uses the term heterogeneity to define the number of distinct 
subactivities being performed within an integrated system of tasks. Rasmussen 
and Lind (1981) suggest that it is not solely about the number of activities; the 
amount of possible courses of action available when performing them should also 
be considered. A scenario where there are only one or two responses is less 
complex and demanding than one where many responses need to be considered 
prior to making a decision. The number of subtasks and, hence, the number of 
decision points involved in train driving is substantial but the number of permitted 
courses of action for any particular decision is limited through the imposition of 
prescribed rules and procedures. 
The term interdependence is used to denote the degree of interrelationship 
between the sub-activities, or the closeness of coupling as Perrow (1999) calls it. 
There are three forms of interdependence, i.e. pooled, sequential and reciprocal 
interdependence. Task complexity increases according to this typology. In the 
case of pooled interdependency, the tasks contribute to a common pool without 
any other direct point of contact between task contributors; they are loosely 
coupled. In the case of sequential interdependence, there is a one-way reliance on 
prior activities, such that activity ‘A’ must occur before activity ‘B’ and both of 
these must occur before activity ‘C’. Sequential interdependence is characteristic 
of production settings. Railway operations are typified by reciprocal 
interdependence; they are tightly coupled. Reciprocal interdependence occurs at 
the technological and human levels. At the technological level for example, a train 
must be verified as being in a particular location before a signal is replaced to 
danger and before the route can be altered. Likewise at the human level, the 
amount of interdependence between the train crew, signalmen, station staff and 
the traffic regulator is high and is a function of the level of service. More trains 
equate to more interdependence (Krueger et al., 2000). Various grades of railway 
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operators perform tasks that have a direct bearing on each other. These grades 
have their own culture and mental models. In recognition of the importance and 
extent of interdependence, joint training interventions are provided in some 
railways, e.g., for pilotmen and safety critical communications. Perrow (1999) 
highlights the effects of job demarcation, lack of cross functionality and job 
specialisation, on interdependence particularly during periods of system 
degradation. He suggests that unanticipated interdependencies are more likely to 
emerge when the system has developed a fault as “... those operating the system 
are less likely, because of their specialised roles and knowledge, to predict, note, 
or be able to diagnose the interdependency before the incident escalates to an 
accident” (p.87). 
Synonyms for variability include novelty, instability and unpredictability. These 
terms are used to describe the extent to which the tasks must depart from a 
constantly recurring pattern. High variability forces the application of new or 
different forms of task activity. The writer disagrees with McKechnie (1990) that 
“... this does not necessarily present any serious difficulty” (p.5). On the contrary, 
the writer concurs with Hughes’ (2004) views that “It is clear... from the analysis 
carried out, that abnormal working [the epitome of variability] is a significant 
contributor to safety risk on the railway” (p.43). Railway operations suffer from 
high variability that is brought about by unforeseeable events, degraded asset 
condition, as well as the actions of internal and external stakeholders. Traditional 
thinking attributes human unreliability to unwanted variability and attempts are 
made to eliminate it as much as possible (Reason, 2000a). In more modern 
thinking, it is accepted that the ability to compensate and adapt to changing events 
is one of the system’s most important safeguards. See Moray (in TRB, eds., 
2006b); and Prince and Salas (in Endsley and Garland, eds., 2000). High 
reliability organisations are prepared to respond to changed environmental and 
operating conditions. 
Unanalysability refers to incomprehensibility, uncertainty, and difficulty in 
establishing cause and effect relationships. The entity is absent where the tasks are 
so well understood that they can be performed by anyone with little or no training. 
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At one end of the scale, anyone who applies common sense, based on average 
intelligence and everyday experiences, is well capable of performing the task. At 
the other end of the scale, special training or experience is necessary. Perrow 
(1999) highlights the relevance of this construct to the safe operation of complex 
systems, such as railways, by suggesting that: 
“... as systems grow in size and in the number of diverse functions they 
serve... increasing their ties with other systems, they experience more and 
more incomprehensible and unexpected interactions. They become more 
vulnerable to unavoidable system accidents” (p.72). 
However, from the driver training perspective, the tasks are well understood and 
the consequences of underperformance are well known. An amalgam of the four 
constructs of complexity, as applicable to the system railway, is provided in 
Figure 3 below. 
 
Source: Schmid et al. (2002) 
Figure 3: Complexity of the Traction Driving Task 
2.3 Task Context and its Ramifications 
Being a train driver involves erratic working patterns and the conditions of service 
vary from one railway company to another. All drivers work to some form of shift 















determined by the times when customers want to travel. In order to maximise the 
productivity of the assets, freight trains are operated generally at night. Similarly, 
maintenance of the permanent way is carried out in such a manner as to minimise 
service disruption. Those depots which provide drivers for freight working and for 
the maintenance function have a high incidence of night working and weekend 
working. This work pattern is asynchronous to the body’s circadian rhythms and, 
for social reasons; some people are reluctant to make a career out of such a job. 
The combination of the job characteristics, shift work, and reducing experience 
profiles creates risk. 
The minimum age for a train driver to operate on Network Rail lines (UK) is 21; 
London Underground and RailCorp (Australia) employ drivers from 18 years of 
age. I.É. complies with the stipulations contained in the European Union 
Directives OJEU (2007) and OJEU (2006)15. As the provision of training to 
drivers is an expensive necessity, understandably, companies want to maximise 
the return on their investment. In order to recoup the high costs associated with 
training, it is desirable to recruit a driver at the youngest age possible and retire 
him at the oldest age possible. 
Not everyone holds a romantic view of a train driver’s job. It is generally accepted 
as being boring but very responsible (HEL, 2006; Whitlock, 2002; Kecklund et 
al., 2001a; DERA, 2000; Wallace et al., 2000; Edkins and Pollock, 1996; Wilde 
and Stinson, 1983; and Buck, 1963). Bainbridge (in Rasmussen, Duncan and 
Leplat, eds.1983) is more emphatic in her view; believing that an automated job 
which requires a lot of monitoring, such as, in a control centre or train driving, is 
one of the worst types. The potential repercussions of such job characteristics are 
evident in Smiley’s (1990) report into the underlying causes of the railway 
accident at Hinton16. She hypothesised about the effect that the nature of the task 
had on the accident, noting that “… monotony and frequently low task demands 
                                                 
15 OJEU C227 E mandates that “Applicants shall be at least 20 years of age. However, Member 
States may issue licences to applicants from the age of 18 years, the validity of such a licence then 
being limited to the territory of the issuing Member State” (p.486). 
16 On 08th February 1986, 23 people died in an accident following a SPAD on a single line track in 
Alberta. The brakes were not applied on either train even though both trains were visible, each to 
the other, for 20 seconds beforehand. Two crewpersons were on the footplate of each locomotive. 
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together with adverse organismic and workplace conditions, suggest that lack of 
vigilance may be an underlying factor” (pp.87-88). The effects of monotony are 
exacerbated if drivers have to contend with short periods of intense activity in the 
midst of long periods of low engagement (Dunn, 2011). Moray (in TRB, eds., 
2006b) describes the situation as “… long hours of boredom interrupted by 
moments of panic” (p.88). HEL (2006), Otterstad (2006), and Edkins and Pollock 
(1996 and 1997) provide evidence that this work pattern creates attendant risks. 
Their studies demonstrate the relationship between drivers’ loss of attention, and 
SPAD17 and accident18 occurrence. 
2.4 The Nature and Elements of the Train Driving Task 
Train driving is a dynamic control and decision making task. According to 
Colford (2004), the activity is characterised as a “... continuous cycle of acquiring 
information, making decisions based on that information and acting on the 
decisions” (p.4). A distinction must be made between the information that the 
driver collects from either the external or internal cab environments, and the 
explicit, implicit or haptic information which he retains either in his head or in his 
hands (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The decision making element is a “... a blend 
of situation awareness, automated cognitive processes, recognition, working 
memory limitations and dynamic decision making” (Jansson et al. (in Wilson et 
al., eds., 2005), p.44). 
Typically, the tasks and duties associated with traction driving are set out in the 
companies’ instruction manuals. The contents of Porter’s (in Whitlock, 2002) task 
analysis are presented in the first portion of Appendix 3. In the writer’s view, such 
task analyses are at a basic level of abstraction and provide only limited value as 
they: 
1. Do not address the cognitive or affective elements of task performance in any 
detail; 
                                                 
17 Over 47% of those SPADs that were attributable to human factor issues were due to drivers’ loss 
of attention (Otterstad, 2006). 
18 Attentional factors were implicated in almost 70% of train accidents (Edkins and Pollock, 1996 
and 1997) 
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2. Porter’s analysis is based on the normal operating mode only and does not 
include degraded, emergency or out-of-course working modes. The potential 
pervasiveness of system degradation is evident from Appendix 4. Each form of 
degradation requires specific non-routine operator input. 
In addition to the basic requirement of being sufficiently manually dexterous to 
operate a range of hand and foot controls, drivers also need another set of skills, 
viz.: 
1. The ability to think ahead and anticipate the effects of their intended actions 
(RAIB, 2007b); 
2. Appropriate, not necessarily fast, response time. However, Anon. (2002b) 
suggests that “... applicants for driving work are able... to react quickly and in 
compliance with safety requirements to changing situations” (p.11). The view 
of CAS (2006) is more, but not completely, aligned with the writer’s view, 
suggesting that “... reacting safely is seen as a crucial ability for drivers but 
speed of reaction is not thought to be so important” (p.17). The writer 
disapproves of the use of the term ‘react’ by the two researchers. Instead, he 
believes that drivers need to respond to cues by directing conscious cognitive 
effort and not merely reacting in an unconscious manner; 
3. The ability to maintain vigilance and concentration (Mills and Grimes, 2008); 
4. As driving is primarily a visual task, drivers need good observational and 
perceptual skills (de Winter et al., 2007; Glendon et al., 2006; Brock (in TRB, 
eds., 2006a); Kwon et al., 2006; Luke et al., 2005; Pardillo and Troglauer, 
2005, Allen et al., 2004; Naef, 2002; Harrison, 1999; Drummond, 1989; FRA, 
1998); and 
5. The ability to integrate information from their environment with information 
recalled from the short and long term memories, in order to support the 
decision making process (Kecklund et al., 2001a; and Kecklund et al., 2001b). 
Tichon (2007) suggests that the generation of options is an integral part of 
recognition primed decision making which “... requires retrieval of information 
from long term memory, such as prior experience of similar conditions” 
(p.180). Obviously, if the decision maker does not have access to a 
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comprehensive range of recallable experiences, the most appropriate response 
may not even be considered and the resultant actions may not be optimised. 
In general, the driving task requires the application of a blend of psychomotor, 
cognitive and affective skills. The psychomotor domain includes physical 
movement, coordination and motor skills. The cognitive domain concerns 
knowledge and intellectual capability. It includes the abilities to recall, 
comprehend, deconstruct, synthesise and evaluate (Bloom, 1956). The affective 
domain consists of behaviours corresponding to attitudes, awareness, interest, 
attention, concern, responsibility, and the ability to listen and respond when 
interacting with others (Morrison, 2003). In Table 7, the writer presents his view 
on the relative mix of these skills that are necessary for the task of train driving. 
Table 7: Different Skill Domain Development Requirements 




I.É.’s composite lesson plan, described in Chapter 5, is based on the holistic 
development of these skills. 
2.5 Evolution of the Design of the Job 
Job design is the specification of the tasks that role holders must perform to 
execute their duties. Job redesign can either reduce or increase complexity. Over 
the years, some job redesign initiatives for traction driving have taken place which 
have added complexity. Hellreigal et al. (1992) identifies five different 
approaches to job design. These include job rotation, job engineering, job 
enlargement, job enrichment and a sociotechnical systems approach. 
I.É.’s drivers have participated in the job rotation process since the acceptance of 
a ‘one rotating link structure’. In-so-far as their certification permits, they drive 
different classes of traction and trains, over different routes. The job of the driver 
is constantly subjected to job engineering principles as management seeks to 
achieve productivity gains through tighter linking and rostering arrangements. 
Traditionally, the job of the driver was highly demarcated and narrowly defined; 
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the driver was responsible for the traction unit, the shunter was responsible for 
putting the train together, and the guard was responsible for the operation of the 
train and maintaining the conduct of the passengers. The development of 
technology blurred some of this delineation of responsibilities. The advent of 
driver-only operation was facilitated by the features that were incorporated into 
the design of diesel and electrical multiple units and push/pull trains. This 
obviated the need for shunters and guards, and the drivers’ job was enlarged to 
subsume some of their responsibilities, i.e., marshalling, door operation, train 
starting procedures, normal and emergency passenger communications, and train 
protection arrangements. 
Job enrichment allows employees to assume more responsibility and 
accountability for planning, organising and controlling their own work. If 
implemented with sincerity, it can increase operational effectiveness. The 
underlying principle is that the people who know most about the subtleties of the 
task are those who perform it routinely. Within I.É., drivers’ groups draft 
operating links, review timetable alterations, participate in focus groups, assist in 
the anthropometric aspects of new traction unit design (fitting trials), participate 
on signal sighting committees and, most germane to this thesis, provided valuable 
advice during the specification and acceptance phases of I.É.’s simulator 
acquisition. 
Social and technical systems need to be designed with respect to each other. The 
fundamental precept is to get the best possible match between the people, the 
technology and the organisation. Railways meet the classic criteria for being 
defined as a sociotechnical system (Wilson et al., 2007). Cullen (2001a) 
recognised the importance of adopting a sociotechnical approach in respect of 
train driver management and training. On foot of his recommendation, the rail 




The job of traction driving has evolved over time. The required skill set has 
changed from being one with a large physical component to one that has become 
increasingly cognitive in nature. Coupled with solo footplate occupancy and the 
fundamentally boring nature of the work, this change has created problems in 
terms of the maintenance of vigilance and concentration. These problems are 
additional to those caused by the inherent complexity of the task, most 
particularly, due to system variability and interdependence with other system 
actors. 
From a training provider’s perspective, it is essential to ascertain the full range of 
subtasks that drivers need to perform the role both routinely, and exceptionally. 
However, knowing what a driver does and the associated rules is insufficient. It is 
also necessary to identify the cognitive processes underlying task performance 
and understand their potential to affect human reliability. An understanding of 
current risk types, and an acceptance that some risks are imposed by the intrinsic 
qualities of the job as much as by personal attributes, has resulted in the adoption 
of the sociotechnical system approach. Railway organisations now take a more 
human centred and proactive approach to safety management. Training functions 
have changed their approach accordingly and the training content is now based on 
the ‘soft’ issues as well as the ‘hard’ ones. 
Much to their credit, the early proponents of driver training recognised the value 
of using models for training purposes. However, these were used to provide 
training in the cognitive domain only. In latter times, modern simulators with their 
enhanced capabilities replaced these mechanical dioramas which allowed their 
usage to be extended to develop skills in all domains of learning. As there is such 
an obvious visual component associated with the driving task, modern simulated 
environments must cater for this. 
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3 General Cognitive and Developmental Aspects of Training 
Because training is a supporting rather than a primary activity in the 
organisation’s value chain, it is generally beyond the strategic gaze of senior 
managers. They are interested in the inputs and outputs of the activity and, 
perhaps because of their backgrounds, they are less concerned about the 
associated conversion process. More gracious writers might suggest that they 
entrust this element of the activity to knowledgeable specialists. However, few of 
the training managers with which the writer is familiar hold a formal qualification 
in education or have a background in academia; they tend to be subject matter 
experts or are management generalists. Consequently, it is unsurprising that in 
their study, McGuffog et al. (2006) find that there is a general absence of strategic 
thinking for the future development of training within the rail industry. 
Specifically, they highlight the lack of understanding of the difference between 
training and instructing activities; asking the question as to whether the industry 
“... needs trainers or just people to instruct” (p.35). Understanding the 
fundamental differences between these activities is crucial for an organisation that 
is considering a transition away from traditional training delivery to embrace the 
alternative facilitative approach that forms the central plank of this thesis. 
In the previous chapter, the writer provides insight into the nature of the driving 
task, and the development requirements. In this chapter he reviews some cognitive 
psychology theories and constructs that underpinned the transformation of I.É.’s 
training process. This review serves three complimentary purposes. Using some of 
the constructs, the extant training delivery process can be assessed and compared 
with simulator enabled training for appropriateness and adequacy. Other 
constructs reveal some of the influencers of operator behaviour and, hence, 
provides insights to aid the effective completion of a training needs analysis. 
Finally, more of the constructs assist in the identification of top level features for 
inclusion in the specification of a simulator system which will lead to more 
effective subsequent utilisation. Ten cognitive psychology constructs and topics, 
relevant to traction driver training, are discussed in this chapter: 
3.1 The Difference between Education and Training; 
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3.2 Experiential, Experimental and Contextual Learning; 
3.3 The Nature and the Extent of Necessary Experience; 
3.4 Inadequacies in the Extant Process; 
3.5 Learning Styles and Training Delivery Strategies; 
3.6 Mental Models: the training challenge; 
3.7 The Social Dimension of Learning; 
3.8 Mastery; 
3.9 Distributed Cognition; and 
3.10 The Necessary Qualities and Skills of Training Professionals. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.11. 
3.1 The Difference between Education and Training 
Handy (1989) recalls his early education and concludes, in a tongue-in-cheek 
fashion, that the objective of the experience was the transfer of ‘answers’ from the 
teacher to himself. He perceives himself as being a passive participant in the 
knowledge acquisition process. Disingenuously, Handy adds that he had learned 
nothing from the process, choosing for the purpose of his argument, to disregard 
the fact that he had learned the most fundamental attribute of education; he had 
learned how to think critically! By contrast, training interventions are not intended 
to develop logical thinking nor critical thinking skills. Depending on the future 
role of the training recipient, this level of development may be superfluous or 
even undesirable. Train drivers need to be able to apply pre-formulated rules 
rather than construct new ones. Critical thinking is not required in those situations 
where extant explicit rules can be applied; training is the appropriate intervention. 
However, the training requirement extends beyond preparedness for rules 
application. 
Training and education are not dichotomous entities. On the knowledge 
acquisition continuum, the relationship is complimentary and synergistic. 
Education levers off the ‘know how’ in order to facilitate the development of 
deeper ‘know why’ skills and, hence, facilitates the transition from skill and rule 
based behaviour to knowledge based behaviour. CRC for Rail Innovation (2008) 
recognises the need for this transition; concluding that “... reliance on rules has the 
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effect of deadening risk awareness… an important competence.” (p.10). Wallace 
et al. (2005) highlight the progressive nature of skill acquisition and performance 
improvement “... as the learner moves from being knowledgeable to prepared, to 
trained, to skilled, to expert” (p.vii). An evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of simulators for the various stages of skills acquisition and 
performance enhancement is contained in Appendix 5. 
3.2 Experiential, Experimental and Contextual Learning 
Kolb (1984) emphasises the value of learning-by-doing in real life situations. His 
cyclical theory is based on the learner’s application of newly developed concepts 
which have been derived from reviews of previous actions undertaken by him. It 
is premised on an explorative trial and error principle in order to create a 
knowledge spiral. The combination of Kolb’s model with the taxonomy of Bloom 
et al. (1956) highlights the necessity to provide practice based learning 
opportunities across the three skill domains. Making mistakes is an inevitable by-
product of the learning-by-doing process but this drawback is not entirely 
wasteful; learning opportunities derive from mistakes (Eichinger, 2004 and 
Handy, 1993). Although the concept of learning-by-failing may be acceptable 
when performing non-critical activities, it is unacceptable in the context of live 
railway operations. Through the use of virtual reality, this limitation of Kolb’s 
learning cycle disappears as employees can be provided with the opportunity to 
make mistakes in a risk free environment. 
This view of the benefit, derivable from the use of simulation to learn by failing, 
is not accepted without qualification. For example, Haworth et al. (2000a) opine 
that the lowered psychological fidelity, present in a simulated environment, 
together with the absence of attendant consequences, detract from the value of the 
learning experience. The mode of simulated scenario presentation also influences 
the extent of learning achieved. Using one presentation mode, scenarios are 
managed to accept all operator inputs; even incorrect ones. The scenarios are 
allowed to unfold to their logical conclusion whatever that may be. Using the 
other presentation mode, a simulator is used to provide directed learning, i.e., to 
train only the desired attributes and behaviours for a task. In this mode, the 
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instructor suspends the scenario prior to the occurrence of a catastrophic event 
resulting from a trainee’s incorrect inputs. (See Croft et al., 2000.) In discussing 
the training process of aircraft pilots, Croft et al. (in Catchpole et al., 2001) 
criticise the traditional practice used by instructors of “... lightening the load in 
line oriented flight training scenarios to assure a positive outcome (and thus 
creating a crew confidence boost)” (p.56). This well-intentioned approach was 
adopted so as not to put trainees into situations where they were operating outside 
of their capabilities which would induce under-confidence. It also served to ensure 
that the training sessions operated to the delivery schedule, and to obviate the 
need for a simulator reboot19 following the inevitable ‘accident’. The folly of this 
approach was recognised subsequently and the instructors now present the 
training scenarios from which trainees are unlikely to recover. Hence, the 
emphasis of this training has changed from one that discouraged the development 
of under confidence to one that encourages learning-by-failing. It is the writer’s 
opinion that the second mode of scenario presentation, i.e., providing directed 
learning only, represents a lost opportunity to learn-by-failing. Pardillo and 
Troglauer (2005) agree with this position, stating that “... it is better to use more 
demonstrations and exercises in which novice drivers fail in order to develop a 
realistic self-evaluation of their capabilities” (p.11). (See also Pardillo, 2008.) 
Kolb does not consider the time element or efficacy of the experiential learning 
process; criteria that are important to those who manage training delivery. The 
writer agrees with Handy (1993) who notes that learning by experience can be a 
painful, tedious and inefficient [but effective] process. However, just as it 
provides a solution to the ‘learning-by-failing’ challenge, the use of simulation 
can resolve this issue also by exposing learners to a large number of new 
experiences within a concentrated timeframe. But this facility to accelerate 
experience does not come without a financial cost (Wallace et al., 2005). 
                                                 
19 I.É.’s simulator freezes when particular incidents occur, e.g., when trains collide, reach the end 
of the modelled line or when they derail. The occurrence of such incidents does not require a 
reboot of the system. Using the instructor station, the instructor merely moves the train away from 
the location of the incident to restart the system. The process takes a few seconds to complete. 
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Lave and Wenger (1991) argue that learning is a function of the activity, context 
and culture within which it occurs. This argument does not describe accurately 
conventional classroom training delivery which is abstract and which cannot 
normally be delivered within a realistic context. Situated learning involves 
learners becoming involved in communities of practice; knowledge being 
presented in an authentic context that involves social interaction and 
collaboration. The situated learning approach is centred on the application of the 
learned content rather than the memorisation of facts. The approach mirrors the 
subsequent (post classroom) application of the taught material in collaborative 
workplace settings. 
3.3 The Nature and the Extent of Necessary Experience 
Guthrie (1938) suggests that all learning occurs as a consequence of the 
association between a particular stimulus and the response to that stimulus, e.g., a 
child will retain in his distinctive memory the recollection of a burn that he 
received by touching a hot surface and will learn, in a single trial, not to do it 
again. 
The amount of trials necessary to achieve learning is influenced by a number of 
factors. Although learning can take place in a single trial as exemplified above, 
many trials might be necessary to produce a general response if each stimulus 
pattern is slightly different (Anon., 2002a and Schmid, 1995). Prior exposure to 
the general task domain also influences the number of trials necessary to learn a 
particular additional subtask. In the case of psychomotor skills development, 
Grantcharov et al. (2003) found that the learning curve pattern is influenced by 
prior exposure to similar, but not the same, operative experience. Experienced 
practitioners needed only one repeat attempt to optimise their performance of the 
new skill, whereas, novices required between five and seven attempts to achieve 
the same degree of proficiency. 
Skinner (1985), a behaviourist, believed that the learning outcome is best when 
students are drilled and practiced, i.e., ‘practice makes perfect’. As Glendon et al. 
(2006) put it, “An amateur practices until he or she gets it right; a professional 
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practices until he or she can’t get it wrong” (p.100). This is the favoured approach 
for developing appropriate responses to emergency cues (Fletcher and Winfield, 
2007; Grantcharov et al., 2003; Anon., 2002a; Ford, 2001; RTA, 2001 and Pfeffer 
and Sutton, 2000). However, this approach may be unsuitable where the skill has 
to be applied in novel situations or where knowledge-based performance is 
required. 
Skill based training is appropriate for routine operations in stable situations where 
programmed responses will suffice. It is inappropriate for dealing with novel 
situations for which a clear response has not been thought out and explicated in 
advance. For this reason, i.e., being able to deal with both routine and non routine 
situations, a blended approach is required; behaviourism for basic training, and 
cognitivism and constructivism for the further development of the student (Ertmer 
and Newby 2013). In considering the transition between skill and rule-based 
behaviour, Tichon (2007), Rushby and Seabrook (2007) and Croft et al. (2000) 
suggest that the number of trials or repetitions required depends on the speed and 
accuracy necessary for satisfactory performance, task complexity and operator 
ability. 
3.4 Inadequacies in the Extant Process 
There was a lack of congruence between I.É.’s then-extant training process and 
the experiential learning constructs discussed above. With that training process, 
very limited practice based learning was achieved formally. Affording 
opportunities to trainees to gain comprehensive experience created difficulties in 
respect of opportuneness, practicality, cost effectiveness and defensibility. 
Because of these limitations, it was not possible to provide practical and 
contextualised training for a great number of events. Inter alia, it was: 
1. Inopportune to: 
1.1 Provide non-express paths for training trains which would allow trainees to 
practice precision stopping at platform markings; 
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1.2 Introduce abnormal, reversible, or single line working20, temporary block 
working or initiate wrong direction movements. This is an essential 
requirement as these types of working create risk (Hughes21, 2004). 
2. Impractical to: 
2.1 To ensure that training delivery co-occurred with poor climatic or low rail 
adhesion conditions; 
2.2 Apply fault finding routines22 that necessitate the driver blocking traffic on 
both lines. 
3. Cost ineffective to: 
3.1 Provide sufficient resources, e.g., paths, traction units and instructors, to 
allow trainees to practice with sufficient repetition. (See CRC for Rail 
Innovation (2013a) for an example of the costs associated with providing 
real equipment for training.); 
3.2 Apply the emergency brakes (recommendation 298 in Cooksey, 1992), as 
repeated application at speed results in wheel flats; 
3.3 Provide stimulated traction units, for each class, that are capable of 
responding to a range of instructor initiated faults. 
4. Unacceptable to the regulatory authority to: 
4.1 Degrade the train or infrastructure purposely; 
4.2 Make false emergency calls to the controlling signalman, thereby 
conditioning him in respect of future legitimate emergency calls. 
These constraints led to a greater reliance on conventional classroom delivery than 
was desired. This delivery methodology was based largely on discussion and 
clarification sessions, the use of powerpoint presentations, basic dioramas and the 
use of a limited amount of real equipment (typically for part task training). I.É.’s 
position was not unique; training delivery in other railways was likewise 
constrained. The inappropriateness of this delivery methodology is widely attested 
by Balakrishnan et al. (2017), CRC for Rail Innovation (2014), Risk Solutions 
(2013), RSSB (2013a), RSSB (2009c) and CRC for Rail Innovation (2008). 
                                                 
20 In the UK, the incidence of single line working has been reduced for reasons of time loss and 
safety; blockade working is introduced instead (RSSB, 2004c). 
21 In Britain 22% of SPADs occur during abnormal working. See also Pěchouček (2007). 
22 See Edkins and Pollock (1996) for an appreciation of the frequency of such events. 
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3.5 Learning Styles and Training Delivery Strategies 
The different ways that learners process information must be considered during 
the training design process. Specifically, train drivers organise information in a 
more analytic manner than those in the general population; tending to arrange it in 
parts rather than in a wholistic manner. However, this tendency is less pronounced 
in respect of older drivers (Russell, 2006). This may provide a partial explanation 
of how, when using Riding’s Information Processing Index, Russell found that 
older drivers attained higher scores than their younger counterparts. Although 
working memory diminishes with age, wholists use it in a frugal and more-
compensating manner. They attempt to understand and retain the high level 
principles that will be used to guide exploration of the detail. 
Citing the results of empirical studies by Mayer, and Hegarty and Just; Newton 
(2000) attests to the value of using dioramas and combinations of text and images 
to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of training delivery. Using drawings 
and block diagrams, Mayer demonstrated to his students how automobile brakes 
work and, using physical models, he demonstrated the atomic structure of 
chemical compounds. He found that conceptual recall improved by 144%, and 
creative problem solving improved by as much as 460%. Hegarty and Just found 
that students took longer to read material that contained text only than when it 
contained a combination of text and pictures. (See also Curran and Doyle, 2011; 
Defeyter et al., 2009; Cuevas, Fiore and Oser, 2002; and Houston, Childers, and 
Heckler, 1987.) 
Learning is not influenced by presentation techniques alone; learner motivation 
and application opportunity are essential. Handy (1989) believes that taught 
material must have relevance for the learner and its delivery must be 
contextualised. If the material is considered by the learner as being irrelevant, “... 
it is unlikely that learning will occur ‘in spite of himself’” (p.238). He adds that 
learning takes place in psychological and physical contexts and that the learning is 
“…put into a frame of reference in our mind… ideas or facts out of context are 
still there… but studied and learnt in isolation will not readily be used” (p.239). 
(See also Evans, 2002; Kruse and Keil, 1999; and Rogers, 1969.) 
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In an idealised world, the foregoing ideas make sense. Application of these ideas 
in settings where training is delivered to a cohort of learners rather than to 
individual learners, albeit well motivated learners, as is typical in the railway 
industry, creates challenges. Newton (2000) believes that the lower efficiency 
associated with heterogeneous group delivery, because “... providing for a mixed 
group of learners will usually mean preparing materials which offer the same 
information in a variety of ways” (p.134), may be compensated by greater 
effectiveness. Similarly, the delivery of training at a remove from the operational 
environment or in the absence of operational equipment may prove ineffective. 
3.6 Mental Models: the training challenge 
Mental models are the basic structure of cognition (Johnson-Laird, 1983). People 
use them as representations of reality to understand specific phenomena or 
experiences. They operate below the level of consciousness and frame how we see 
the world. Most importantly, they influence our actions. Senge et al. (1995) liken 
them “… to a pane of glass that frames and subtly distorts our vision” (p.235). 
Humans cannot navigate through a complex environment without the use of 
cognitive mental maps that, by their nature, may be flawed and distorted 
(Shebilske et al. (in Endsley and Garland, eds., 2000). 
One of the fundamental objectives of training is to alter deeply held inappropriate 
mental models. To achieve this objective, the inappropriate mental models must 
first be surfaced and challenged. Air Affairs (2006) suggests that some of the 
problems associated with mental models can be mitigated by providing training in 
attention distribution (simultaneous capacity) and self-checking skills (‘how do I 
know I’m right?’) (p.3-9). A fundamental objective of training is to ensure that 
training interventions are structured and presented in such a way to ensure that 
incorrect models are not created or reinforced. 
Besnard and Greathead (2004), Eysenck and Keane (2000), Senge (1999) and 
Senge et al. (1995) provide insights into the features of mental models: 
1. Mental models are incomplete and evolve constantly; 
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2. They are not necessarily accurate representations of a phenomenon and may 
contain errors. However, such errors “... have to be considered as a side effect 
of the cost-benefit driven reasoning process that is aimed at getting the 
maximum level of performance for the minimum mental cost” (Besnard and 
Greathead, 2004, p.8); 
3. They may result in the acceptance of the partial confirmation of a situation that 
could lead individuals to disregard evidence that does not match the mental 
model, and that encourages them to search out confirming information only. 
For example, a driver who is nearing an approach-released signal may 
mistakenly believe that it is being held at danger to prevent overspeeding 
through a diverging junction (a function that is part of the design philosophy), 
rather than the possibility that the route has been claimed already by a 
conflicting movement. (See also Endsley and Robertson (in Endsley and 
Garland, eds., 2000); and Braiker, 1989.); 
4. They help to prevent cognitive overload by supplying readymade responses to 
emerging events. Similar to the recognition primed decision making process, 
they can be represented by sets of condition-action rules. Woodward et al. 
(1999) believe that high speed train driving forces reliance on them; 
5. They contain measures of uncertainty about their validity that allow their usage 
even when they are incorrect; 
6. The probability, that the negative attributes of mental models will surface, 
increases in situations where two sets of them interact in instances of reciprocal 
interdependence, e.g., in verbal communication exchanges between drivers and 
signalmen. (See also Hockey and Carrigan, 2003; Shebilske et al. (in Endsley 
and Garland, eds.), 2000; and Schmid and Collis, 1999.) In such cases, the 
intended meaning of the transmitter of the communication may be 
misunderstood by the receiver. Specifically in relation to the unintentional 
promulgation of incorrect mental models, Coplen (1999) warns that “Even 
rulebooks with identical phraseology could be interpreted and applied 
differently on different [US] railroads” (p.2). The effect of the difference in 
stakeholders’ mental models is shown humorously in Figure 4. 
Page 41 
Source: TRIZ (in Professional Engineering, Vol.21, No.1) 
Figure 4: An Example of Stakeholders' Different Mental Models 
3.7 The Social Dimension of Learning 
Bandura (1977) highlights the social dimension of the learning process as 
epitomised by the observation and modelling of the behaviours, attitudes and 
emotional reactions of others. He considers learning as being a situated process, 
with skill and knowledge acquisition being critically dependent on the social 
environment and on the learning context. He recognises that learning would be 
exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if people had to rely solely on 
the effects of their own actions to inform them as to what to do. However, the 
benefits23 associated with social learning must be offset against the likelihood and 
extent to which undesired learning may occur. The quality of the social learning is 
dependent on the attributes of the mentor (Waylen and McKenna, 2002). 
The ubiquity of role models during the on-the-job portion of traction driver 
training programmes, in the form of mentor drivers, is reported in DNV 
Consulting (2004). The importance of the role is recognised, as the selection 
process for mentor drivers is based on the quality of the applicants’ employment 
records, the calibre of their knowledge and driving skills, the depth of their 
driving experience and their ability to communicate cogently with trainees. 
                                                 
23 The benefits of social learning are reported by SWOV (2007). After mandatory accompanied 
driving was introduced into the Swedish car driver training process, there was a 35% reduction in 
crash involvement in the first two years post licensure. See also Christie (2001) and Mason (1992). 
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Attitudinal and personal qualities, such as the exhibition of an aggressive driving 
style, complacency, overconfidence and anti authoritarianism, are also considered. 
In addition to the risks associated with undesired learning occurring due to the 
poor calibre of mentor drivers, the placement of trainees under their tutelage can 
lead to situations of deficient role definition, divided responsibility, indifference 
and dependency. These caveats are exemplified in the accidents investigated by 
ATSB (2013), NTSB (1999) and RAIB (2007a). ATSB (2013) concluded that “... 
a competing administrative task diverted the co-driver’s [mentor driver’s] 
attention away from his primary task of supervising the actions of the train driver, 
who was a driver-in-training for the route, in the period that the train was 
approaching signal 135” (p.29). Worse still, the NTSB (1999) investigation into 
the fatal accident at Butler revealed an appalling lack of interest in the trainee’s 
workplace progress. The NTSB finds that “... during the accident trip, the 
crewmembers’ actions neither promoted compliance with the operating rules nor 
provided a positive model for the student to emulate” (p.32). In RAIB (2007a), a 
tram being driven by a trainee driver under the supervision of a driver instructor 
moved off from the platform when a passenger was trapped in a door. The 
investigator concludes that “... the perception of a split of responsibility between 
the driver and the instructor may have contributed to the lack of a final check on 
the platform before the tram moved off” (p.15). Ergo, when the quality of the role 
modelling and supervision processes is poor, the value of providing mentor 
drivers becomes questionable. 
Compared to the real world process, the possibility of undesired learning 
occurring in a simulated scenario is reduced significantly but, depending on the 
system’s configuration and instructor to trainee ratio, it may not be eliminated 
entirely. By using a channel selector to access any one of the seven scenario 
management screens (see Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 for a list of the displays 
and a pictorial overview), it is possible to present the operant scenario and the 
behaviours of any of the four operators for instructor and peer review. I.É.’s 
system enables three instructors (one to operate each of the instructor stations and 
Page 43 
one to take the lead role in the peer review process) to train up to eight trainees24 
at a given time; four operating the simulators and four in an observer role. The 
overall arrangement of I.É.’s system is shown in Figure 5. Using this span of 
surveillance, each instructor (#1 and #2) must switch attention between two 
operators. However, the scenarios are phased to ensure that critical events do not 
co-occur. The observers switch attention between the activities and scenarios in 
the four simulators, as controlled by the instructors. This span of surveillance 
might appear inefficient when juxtaposed with French and American practice. 
SNCF use an instructor-trainee ratio of 2:6 at its Paris facility, while BNSF use a 
2:1825 ratio at its Salt Lake City facility. However, the writer believes that 
affording I.É.’s trainees this amount of attention strikes a very good balance 
between efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Figure 5: Overview of Simulators, and the Instructor and Observation Stations 
                                                 
24 This is the maximum class size for ab-initio drivers. The average class size for refresher 
programmes is 3·15 drivers per session. Refresher programmes are delivered by 2 instructors. 
25 Two instructors use nine networked simulators to train 9 drivers and 9 conductors concurrently. 
Trainee #3 in simulator 
(Locomotive 1) 
Channel selector
Trainee #1 in 
simulator (DMU 1) 
Instructor station  #2 
(managing 
Locomotives 1 and 2)
Instructor station  #1 





capable of repeating 
scenarios #1 to #4 
individually
Trainee #2 in 







Trainee #4 in simulator 
(Locomotive 2) 
Instructor #3 
(leading the peer 
review process)
Page 44 
The discussion above relates to the use of simulators for training purposes. When 
simulators are used in assessment mode, a use case that is prevalent among British 
users, an instructor to operator ratio of 1:1 is necessary (Anon., 2007). 
3.8 Mastery 
Carroll’s (1963) idea of mastery is particularly relevant to training delivery in 
commercial settings wherein there is an imperative to reduce the duration of 
training processes to a minimum, typically, without regard to individual learner 
abilities. Carroll’s theory supports self-paced learning where students are 
allocated whatever time it takes them to learn the full content of the lesson and to 
master the subject. With this approach, all of the students should have acquired 
the same mastery of the subject matter, albeit over differing time horizons. This 
approach is in contrast with the classical approach to learning which is ability-
focussed, whereby all of the students are given the same amount of time to learn 
the material. Using the classical approach, the amount of learned material differs 
according to individual ability. 
There is a conflict between these two approaches to learning. The first approach is 
effectiveness driven and is favoured by the trainees. The second approach is 
efficiency driven and, hence, is favoured by some training managers. The 
challenge in applying the classical approach is that after the delivery of training, 
students will demonstrate varying levels of achievement. In the context of the 
education of engineers, Schmid (1995) suggests that “... for some skills a pass 
mark of, say, 95% might well be appropriate” (p.213). The writer is inclined to the 
view that Schmid’s approach may be appropriate in cases where students are 
afforded the opportunity to make up the shortfall of declarative knowledge during 
their period of further structured professionalisation within a risk free 
environment. However, it would be very difficult for the manager of a railway 
training function to defend such a position if an accident occurred and the 
subsequent investigation into its causation centred on the lack of understanding of 
those rules or procedures that were contained in the 5% where the trainee was 
unable to demonstrate competence! To avoid such an eventuality, prudent and 
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cautious rail training managers provide supplemental training26 where assessment 
deficits have been identified. 
3.9 Distributed Cognition 
There are two extreme positions in relation to the cognitive process. The 
traditional view of cognition is that it is a localised phenomenon which is best 
explained in terms of information processing at the level of the individual. 
Cognitivists claim that all cognition occurs in a person’s mind and nowhere else. 
At the other extreme, situationists claim that cognition happens in a person’s 
environment; knowledge is not assumed to exist but is socially constructed and 
embedded in different kinds of environmental artefacts. The situationist’s per-
spective supports the concept of contextual learning as discussed in Section 3.2. 
Unsurprisingly, most cognitive psychologists hold the view that learning occurs 
somewhere between of these two extreme positions, and as a result of distributed 
cognition, i.e., at the interaction between the individual, environment and cultural 
artefacts (Baber et al. 2006; McLeod et al. (in Wilson et al., eds., 2005); Hockey 
and Carrigan, 2003, Anon., 1999 and Lave and Wenger, 1991). Charles (2014) 
and Wilson et al. (2007) add railway relevant insights. In her study into the 
importance of artefacts to signallers’ task performance, Charles (2014) concludes 
that artefacts “... may be used to aid decision-making and planning and enhance 
the performance as well as the situation awareness of these cognitive tasks” 
(p.44). Whereas, Wilson et al. (2007) emphasise the cross functional nature of 
distributed cognition; spanning the roles of signalmen, controllers and drivers. 
Because of the contribution of the environment and cultural artefacts to the 
distributed nature of cognition, it is essential that simulator systems are 
sufficiently elegant to be able to present the full range of information sources and 
cues that the operator exploits when driving in real life. To be effective, such 
                                                 
26 In the form of repeated exposure to lessons or opportunities for clarification 
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systems should be able, at a minimum27, to stimulate the operators’ visual, 
auditory and tactile senses. 
3.10 The Necessary Qualities and Skills of Training Professionals 
Rogers (1969) and Bruner (1960) are in agreement in respect of the centrality of 
the teacher in the learning process. The teaching role is to present readily 
understandable material in a facilitative manner. This approach is predicated on 
the existence of an adult to adult relationship between the parties. The teacher 
encourages self-discovery, and the teacher and students engage in Socratic 
learning. The teacher adopts a non-prescriptive approach and endeavours to 
educate the student in the fullest meaning of the word ‘educate’. 
Similar to Gagnè’s (1972) focus of enquiry, Bruner addresses the manner in which 
a body of knowledge can be structured so that it can be understood by the learner 
most readily. Good methods of structuring knowledge result in simplification of 
concepts and ideas, the generation of new propositions and an increase in the 
capability to manipulate the information. Bruner suggests that training material 
should facilitate extrapolation; a concept synonymous with the projection entity of 
Endsley’s (in Endsley and Garland, eds., 2000) situation awareness model. 
McGuffog et al. (2006) highlight some of the skills which trainers in the rail 
industry must possess. They need “… to demonstrate effective interpersonal skills 
and understand how skills are transferred from the classroom or simulated 
environment to the workplace… [and they must also have] a facilitative coaching 
style” (pp.14-15). The requirement for these skills is additional to strong 
occupational competence. They are particularly important in those training 
regimes that are attempting to make the transition from providing lecture-based 
instruction merely, to providing training. Facilitation skills are also important 
when the training goal is moving from the development of skill and rule based 
behaviours merely, to the development of knowledge based behaviours (Hörmann 
                                                 
27 If, unlike the case of I.É., the development of a response to an onboard fire is a training goal, 
then it may also be necessary to provide olfactory cues. Training appropriate responses to such 
events is a goal at the JR East facility at Omiya; smoke is introduced into the ‘cab’ to simulate a 
train fire (Abbott et al., 2000, p.24). 
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et al., 2003a). This change imposes particular demands on instructors. For 
example, the use of simulators for crisis training, as distinct from procedural 
training, is exacting as crisis scenarios are more difficult to generate. Generation 
of crisis scenarios requires creative thinking to identify those events that could 
occur but for which there are no predefined procedures already in place. As 
evidenced by Macdonald (2006), there is a clear need to develop instructional 
skills in order to exploit the full capability of training simulators. 
To attract suitable people to the role of instructor, McGuffog et al. (2006) suggest 
that emphasising the intrinsic elements of the role rather than the hygiene factors 
“… would be more beneficial in attracting people to the profession for the right 
reason” (p.33). Their review of the recruitment and selection procedures for 
trainers indicates that the normal selection process is primarily based on some 
minimum level of vocational experience while a few recruiters insist on National 
Vocational Qualification (NVQ) accreditation. It is the writer’s belief that this 
accreditation should be considered merely as a ‘stepping stone’ in the overall 
development process which should, ideally, culminate in the attainment of a 
formal Level 7 qualification in cognitive or developmental psychology. A similar 
logic applies to the developmental requirements of training managers who carry 
the ultimate responsibility for the training activity. Training centre managers 
should possess operational competence in addition to managerial competence. It 
should be noted that none of the training managers interviewed by McGuffog et 
al. came from training backgrounds; they came from operations and engineering 
functions within the rail industry instead. 
3.11 Conclusion 
Safe operation in a dispersed operating environment necessitates rules and process 
standardisation. However, there is now an accepted need to transition operator 
training from being exclusively rules and skills focussed, to encompass a 
knowledge based component. The provision of experiential learning is premised 
on the priority afforded to the achievement of improvements in training 
effectiveness rather than efficiency; trainees need to be allowed to learn by failing. 
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It was difficult for I.É. to provide comprehensive and defensible experiential 
training formally because of opportuneness, practicality and cost effectiveness. 
This forced reliance on traditional classroom delivery which was non-contextual, 
did not promote trainee engagement and was delivered in instructional mode. The 
focus was on the memorisation of rules, procedures and equipment attributes. 
Likewise, the delivery process did not accommodate trainees’ differing learning 
styles. Simulator enabled training was perceived as a means to circumvent these 
challenges. 
Mental models are generally cognitively efficient. As they influence actions, the 
construction of correct ones and the extinction of incorrect ones are central to the 
training process. Facilitated, open dialogue and frank questioning among trainees 
in group settings helps to ensure that correct mental models are held. Care must be 
taken when producing training content, to ensure singular correct interpretation. 
Social learning is beneficial insofar as it may help to prevent repeating the 
mistakes of others. However, realisation of the benefits depends on the personal 
attributes of the mentor, role definition and division of responsibilities. In railway 
workplace settings, trainees typically interact with a number of mentors; each with 
varying abilities, knowledge, experience and motivations. 
Because of scheduling constraints and cost considerations, railway training 
programmes are typically ability focussed. However, to safeguard the investment 
already incurred, individualised training interventions are provided to make up 
any identified knowledge or performance deficiencies. 
Environmental artefacts facilitate the construction of knowledge and guide 
actions. When operating traction units in the real environment, drivers depend on 
the accuracy, efficiency, reliability, informative ability and malleability of the cab 
artefacts. Consequently, the internal and external simulator environments must 
contain and present artefacts that possess these qualities. 
The attributes of the trainers, in terms of their ability to structure the training 
material, and their presentation and facilitation skills, are particularly important 
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when using a simulator develop all the domains of learning. The means that the 
various features of a simulator enabled training process can capitalise on the 
cognitive psychology constructs are summarised in Table 8. 




of the simulator 
system or of the 
training process 








a) The visualisation capability facilitates trainees’ 
development from knowing ‘what’ to knowing ‘why’. 






the range of 
realistic scenarios 
available in the 
simulator library 
a) The learning cycle can be applied off line for training 
in safety critical tasks. 
b) Risk free mistakes can be made; even encouraged. 
c) It supports positive transfer from the training 
environment to the workplace. 
d) The reflective element of the cycle is facilitated by the 
provision of internal and external feedback. 
e) It approximates to situated learning. 
The observation 













a) It facilitates development of the affective, cognitive 
and psychomotor domains. It also facilitates the 
combinative exploitation of the theories of Kolb and 
Bloom, i.e., practice based learning in the 3 domains. 
b) It is not abstract and is delivered within a realistic 
context. 
c) It partly circumvents the limitations of providing real 




and peer review 
processes 










a) It can provide learners with range of stimuli to elicit 
pertinent and acceptable responses. 
b) Depending on the learner’s experience, single trial 
learning may occur. Each qualified operator will 
experience the specific event on at least on one 
occasion and also to experience a variation of the 
event on another occasion. Ab-initio operators are 
afforded opportunity to experience events many times. 
Archived 






The variety of 
formats available 
to deliver the 
lessons 
The use of simulation in conjunction with other 
presentation methodologies, e.g., lectures, CSD videos, 
images and quizzes, facilitates the differing learning 







a) The visualisation capabilities of these tools assist in 
the development of appropriate mental models. 
b) The simulator provides a mechanism for trial and 
error learning to surface the validity of mental models. 
c) As part of awareness training, simulator operators can 
be subjected to inadequate or incomplete information 
as well as a range of distractors. 
d) Joint training interventions can be scripted to illustrate 










of the simulator 
system or of the 
training process 








capability of the 
simulator 
a) Lessons are contextualised and involve a range of 
actors, e.g., the controlling signalman, regulator, 
passengers etc. 
b) The classroom and peer review elements promote 
group learning. 
c) More reliable extrinsic feedback is provided from 




the lesson plan 
Trainees can be facilitated by providing repeated 
exposure to the lesson until the behaviours exhibited by 




range of artefacts 
in the internal and 
external driving 
environments 
Depending on the type and elegance of the system, an 
extensive range of visual, auditory, tactile and olfactory 
cues are available. 
Theses artefacts can be faithful replications of those 








the overall change 
initiative 
a) Provides opportunity for self actualisation of the 
training professionals. 





4 Providing Opportunity to Learn 
The management consultant and educationalist Peter Drucker is attributed with 
the maxim that ‘If you think training is expensive, try ignorance’ (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2012; and HMIC, 2003). 
Although alluding to the problems caused by knowledge deficiency, the 
underlying sentiment creates a bipolar inference that the provision of training 
should not be commercially constrained. The capabilities of a workforce can be 
directed towards the creation of organisational wealth by enabling the satisfaction 
of valued customer criteria. But the reality is that the development of 
organisational capability, through the provision of staff training initiatives, 
impacts financial performance in respect of costs as well as benefits. Training is 
not provided out of a sense of altruism; it must deliver value. 
In the previous chapter, the writer showed how simulator enabled training satisfies 
a range of theoretical cognitive psychology constructs that conventional training 
processes cannot. In this chapter, the writer discusses the business dimension of 
training and presents the reasons underpinning I.É.’s migration from its extant 
driver training delivery system. This chapter is divided into seven sections, 
dealing with: 
4.1 Organisational Capability and Value Creation; 
4.2 The Contribution of Training to Organisational Capability; 
4.3 Safety: a seeming compromise of stakeholder value; 
4.4 Investment in Training to Create Organisational Capability; 
4.5 Dissatisfaction with the Outcome of the Extant Process; and 
4.6 The Confidence-building Value of Other Studies. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.7. 
4.1 Organisational Capability and Value Creation 
Distinctive competence is the business feature that an organisation is 
exceptionally capable at achieving. It enables the organisation to achieve higher 
levels of customer responsiveness, quality, product innovation and efficiency over 
its competitors and, hence, secure success in the market place. Distinctive 
competence is achieved by combining resources and capabilities (Hill and Jones, 
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1998). Whereas, an organisation needs a resource base comprising tangible and 
intangible resources, it also needs the capability to put the resource base to 
productive use. The model, illustrating the pathway between capabilities and 
higher profits, is presented in Figure 6. 
 
Source: Hill and Jones (1998) 
Figure 6: The Roots of Competitive Advantage 
Bontis et al. (1999) believe that the wealth-creating ability of an enterprise is 
based on the knowledge and capabilities of its people. More recent contributions 
in business and management literature suggest that knowledge and information 
provide increasing returns whereas the yield from fixed assets is diminishing. As a 
corollary, a company may not need unique and costly physical resources to 
succeed. In the case of the rail network in Britain, train operating companies do 
not own substantial physical resources. Network Rail provides and maintains the 
infrastructure, station buildings and structures etc. By and large, rolling stock 
companies (RoSCos) provide and maintain the traction and rolling stock through 
leasing agreements. The value created by the TOCs derives from their capabilities 
both at managerial and operational levels. Organisational capability is achieved by 
focusing on the internal processes and systems that lead to customer satisfaction, 
and by ensuring that employee skills and efforts are directed towards this end. 














Value creation Higher profits
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4.2 The Contribution of Training to Organisational Capability 
Accounting for the costs of training is relatively easy; putting a value on the 
realised benefits is more difficult (Bonsall and Taylor, 2011). Leveraging 
knowledge is the key reason attributed to corporate success stories, such as the 
tremendous over-valuation of high-tech and internet companies (Bontis, 2000). In 
respect of train driver knowledge and capability, a fundamental business question 
must be asked, i.e., do customers value the observable outputs of driver training? 
In respect of the value proposition of rail travel, a wide range of factors influence 
passenger perceptions and, thus, their willingness to make rail travel their 
preferred mode of transport. The service attributes, identified and ranked by three 
research groups, are juxtaposed and presented in Table 9. The declared 
preferences that are enabled by driver training are marked thus (*). 
Table 9: Rail Customers' Declared Preferences 
Declared preferences Anon.'s (2008) 
ranking 




Level of crowding on train 1 1 N/A 
Punctuality of trains (*) N/A 2 N/A 
Train cancellations/delays (*) N/A 3 2 
Cost/value for money N/A 4 3 
Frequency of services N/A 5 N/A 
Provision of information (*) N/A 6 N/A 
Safety on the train (*) and at stations 2 7 1 
Cleanliness on train and at station 3 J 8 N/A 
Toilet facilities on train and at station 5 9 N/A 
Staff (*) N/A 10 N/A 
Ticketing services N/A 11 N/A 
Accessibility N/A 12 N/A 
Cycle facilities N/A 13 N/A 
Catering on train and at stations N/A 14 N/A 
Quality of trains 3 J N/A N/A 
How relaxing the journey is (*) 6 N/A N/A 
Heating, lighting and ventilation on board 7 N/A N/A 
Integration N/A N/A 4 J 
Disabled provision N/A N/A 4 J 
Environment N/A N/A 6 
Sources: Anon. (2008); Baker et al. (2007) and RSSB (2004b) 
It is clear from Table 9 that driver capability is an enabler of the higher valued 
customer satisfaction criteria. The writer conjectures that the rankings assigned to 
‘safety on the train’ (2, 7, and 1 respectively) may be influenced by the customers’ 
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view that ‘safety is a given’, and the recency and scale of the last recollective rail 
accident (Chilton et al., 2006; Fischhoff et al., Alhakami and Slovic, and Slovic et 
al. (all in Hiselius, 2003), and Reason, 1997). However, the perception of system 
safety is fickle and it is reappraised in the event of an accident; Reason (2000b) 
noting that "Safety is defined and measured more by its absence than by its 
presence" (p.4). 
4.3 Safety: a seeming compromise of stakeholder value 
The raison d’être of a commercial organisation is to maximise profits through the 
creation of stakeholder value. Preoccupation with safety could be seen by some, 
particularly those who are operating on tight margins, in loosely regulated 
industries and within particular geographic regions, as a dissipation of stakeholder 
value. The commercial imperative brings the tensile, and sometimes conflicting, 
relationship between safety and production into sharp focus (Tichon, 2007; HEL, 
2006; Wilson and Norris (in Wilson et al., eds., 2005); Chambers, 2005; Hobbs et 
al., 2004; Hughes, 2003; Hale et al., 2003; van Vollenhoven, 2002; McInerney, 
2001; Greenstreet Berman, 2001; Kecklund et al., 2001a; Bushell and Dalgleish, 
1999; Perrow, 1999; Reason et al., 1998; Free, 1994 and Mason, 1992). Reason 
(1997) recognises the reality of the situation and the necessity for safety and 
production to coexist, albeit inequitably as “... the partnership between production 
and protection is rarely equal and... since production creates the resources that 
make protection possible, its needs will generally have priority” (p.4). 
The pursuit of the ‘safety objective’ may involve the adoption of seemingly 
inefficient practices, e.g., regulated hours of drivers’ work, the appointment of 
lookouts, pilotmen, secondmen, flagmen, or track safety coordinators, during 
periods of system degradation or maintenance. However, the benefits of safe 
operation are significant to an organisation, e.g., the discharge of moral and 
ethical responsibilities, compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, and 
maintenance of reputation capital. On the other hand, unsafe operation will be 
personally costly to management and staff, and financially costly to the 
organisation. Reason (1997) provides worrying insights into the cost of safety 
failures in hazardous industries and cites a HSE study that reveals that “... for 
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every £1 of costs recoverable through insurance, another £5 to £50 [of non-
recoverable costs] are added to the final bill through a wide variety of other 
financial losses” (p.238). Similarly-damaging contingencies will be inflicted on 
railway organisations. It is extremely difficult to accurately and reliably ascertain 
the costs associated with railway accidents because of confidentiality agreements, 
the apportionment of liability among stakeholders and the timescale of claims’ 
settlement. However, in respect of the accident at Ladbroke Grove on 5th October 
1999, the writer extrapolates that the amount paid out in compensation alone was 
in excess of £73 m28. In addition, the cost of holding the ensuing inquiry was £8·7 
m (Cuypers et al., 2006), and fines of £2 m (Thames Trains) and £4·225 m 
including costs (Network Rail) were incurred. In addition, there were also the 
costs associated with damage to equipment and loss of process. Disregarding the 
moral and regulatory imperatives, improving safety is not a zero sum game and 
the benefits of adopting a proactive safety strategy outweigh the apparent costs 
(Chan, 2012; and OSHA, 2005). 
4.4 Investment in Training to Create Organisational Capability 
There is an almost insatiable appetite for training; it is seen as an elixir that is 
capable of addressing many types of staff competence improvement areas. 
Overall, $164.2 bn (2012 prices), constituting 3·6% of payroll costs, was spent on 
training and development by US Companies (Anon., 2013). The proportion of 
payroll costs spent by larger Irish companies on training was 3·2% (IBEC, 2013). 
Of this global amount, mandatory and compliance training accounted for 10·8%, 
and training in processes and procedures accounted for 9·9% (Anon., 2013). 
Specifically in the rail transport domain, I.É. spent 3·94% of payroll costs (€9·6 
m, 2006 prices) to train its staff. By comparison, Veolia spent 2·08% (Frérot, 
2011), RENFE spent 1·75% (RENFE, 2004) and JRE spent 2% (Watanabe, 1997) 
                                                 
28 This estimate is based on average compensation amounts of £200,000 per fatality and £128,570 
per injury in respect each of the 31 fatalities and the 520 injured parties. From (1) Laville, Sandra 
(2001) £4m paid to relatives of Paddington rail victims. The Telegraph, 11 Aug 2001. Available 
online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1337063/4m-paid-to-relatives-of-Paddington-
rail-victims.html; (2) the revelations of one legal representative who acted on behalf of the family 
of one fatality, and 49 injured parties. Available online: 
https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/Archive/2004/April-2004/In-the-aftermath-of-Paddington (both 
of the above accounts were accessed on 19.06.’16; and (3) IRSE Proceedings 2014/2015. 
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of the respective organisations’ payroll costs to provide employee training. 
Superficially, I.É.’s costs may appear excessive but cognisance must be taken of 
the differences in national cost structures. The analysis by Monaghan (2006) 
shows that I.É.’s expenditure is not out of kilter with Irish norms as “... the level 
of investment by Irish firms in training rose 25 per cent to 3·91 per cent of payroll 
between 2004 and 2006” (p.9). 
A disproportionate amount of I.É.’s overall training costs is incurred in providing 
training to its cohort of drivers. Reflecting the responsibility of the role, the scope 
of training and the regulatory requirements, 30% of its overall training costs are 
attributable to training the 9% of employees in that grade. As it costs €73,000 and 
€30,00029 to train mainline and DART drivers respectively (2009 prices), a total 
investment of ca. €33 m has been made to establish the competence of its 500 
extant drivers30 and another €300,000 is spent annually to maintain it. Invariably, 
expenditure of this magnitude prompts questions in relation to the achieved 
realisation of the training outcomes and also possible methods to improve 
delivery. 
4.5 Dissatisfaction with the Outcome of the Extant Process 
SPAD precursor events are significant contributors to overall railway safety risk. 
For example, Andersen (1999) calculated that, during the period between 1970 
and 1997, 30% of accidents on British railways were attributable to SPADs. 
Before the development of I.É.’s Network Wide Risk Model, it was common for 
I.É.’s management, just as it was in other jurisdictions (ORR, 2015b), to 
benchmark its SPAD performance against that of other railways. An overview of 
the SPAD performances of British and Irish drivers, based purely on the number 
of such occurrences between 1990 and 2005, has been presented in Figure 2 
above. I.É.’s SPAD performance, which had deteriorated in the period 1998 to 
2005, was all the more disconcerting when the relative contexts of the driving 
tasks were considered, i.e., system usage, traffic density, and the different features 
                                                 
29 It cost between £40,000 (converted to €56,641 at 2009 prices) (Walker and Bailey, 2002) and 
£60,000 (converted to €90,444 at 2009 prices) (Uff, 2000) to train a driver in Britain. Based on 
calculations from http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/ 
30 The number of drivers in I.É. fluctuates to reflect business needs. 
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of the AWS and CAWS (see Connor and Schmid31). Benchmarking performance 
against other railway jurisdictions, using SPADs per million train-kilometres or 
SPADS per driver as criteria (in Table 10), provided little solace either. Of the 7 
organisations compared, I.É. ranked either 5th or 6th depending on the criterion. 











Association of Train Operating 
Companies (ATOC) 
13,085 463·2 321 0·025 0·693 1/2 
Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) 3,000 157 13834 0·046 0·879 2/3 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) 3,500 220 214 0·061 0·973 3/4 
Norges Statsbaner AS (NSB) - 
Norwegian Railways  
2,500 27·95 53 0·021 1·896 4/1 
Iarnród Éireann (I.É.) 490 18·24 4035 0·082 2·193 5/6 
London Underground 4,334 70·636 609 0·141 8·626 6/7 
Queensland Rail 62537 36·70 109 0·1744 2·97 7/5 
Sources: Chief Safety and Security Officer, I.É., van der Flier (in Andersen, 1999), UIC (2006; 
Table 41), Fischer (2007), RSSB (2008a), Otterstad (2006), Queensland Rail (2008) and Flack 
(2009). 
Furthermore, as the available human reliability rates vary by an order of 
magnitude, attempts to make meaningfully comparison of them are 
unenlightening. For example, the respective reliability rates for drivers in 
Queensland Rail and Britain are 1 SPAD for every 12,100 and 1 SPAD for every 
50,000 successful stops (QR, 2008 and RSSB, 2015). In respect of the relationship 
between human reliability and the distance travelled beyond the limit of 
movement authority, Anderson (2007) presents error rates of 2·00E-4 for LMA 
exceedences, and 2·00E-5 for LMA exceedences in excess of 50 m. Data in 
respect of the reliability of Irish drivers are not available. Even if available, the 
validity of comparing driver reliability rates is questionable; Nikandros and 
                                                 
31 Train Protection. Available online: www.railway-technical.com/signalling/train-protection.html. 
Accessed: 03.08.’17. 
32 SPADS/driver 
33 SPADS/MTkm (Million train kilometres) 
34 Extrapolated from SPAD occurrences during the period January 2007 to October 2007 inclusive 
35 2005 
36 TFL (2009) London Underground named best metro in Europe as passenger numbers hit record 
high. Available online: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/media/newscentre/archive/11579.aspx. 
Accessed 24.08.’09. 
37 Annual Report 2014-15, Queensland Rail (5,778 employees of which 10·8% are drivers) 
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Tombs (2007) cautioning that “... data and tasks from one system may not apply 
to a different system” (p.1). 
To ensure relevance, reliability and to mitigate statistical noise, the writer presents 
a time series approach; comparing I.É.’s SPAD performance between 2005 and 
2009 and not against an external comparator. It shows, most saliently, that eighty 
three per cent of I.É.’s SPADs at running signals were contained within the signal 
overlap. Exceedences beyond this inbuilt safety margin are particularly 
worrisome. A five point box plot is included within the table to illustrate the 
extent of the dispersion and skewness of the exceedences, and also to show the 
outliers. The changing profile of I.É.’s SPAD data set is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Probability of Overlap Exceedence 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total SPADs involving I.É.’s drivers 40 36 30 22 21 
SPADs at shunting discs/signals 7 9 7 7 5 
Shunting SPADs as a proportion of total 17·5% 25% 23·3% 31·8% 23·8% 
Proportion of SPADs at shunting signals 23·5% 
Number of overruns ≥ 180 m at shunting 
signals 
1 0 0 1 0 
SPADs at running signals 33 27 23 15 16 
Number of SPADs at running signals for 
which data is available 
32 23 22 15 16 
Number of overruns ≥ 180 m at running 
signals 
5 4 5 3 2 
Proportion of SPADs at running signals 
where the overrun was ≥ 180 m 
17·6%38 
Mean exceedence of the LMAs for running 
signals (m) 
70 189 116 119 82 
Standard deviation of exceedences of 
LMAs for running signals (m) 
108·6 466·5 124·3 139·9 148·9 
Probability of a SPAD exceeding the 
overlap (180 m) of a running signal 
15·6% 17·4% 22·7% 20·0% 12·5% 
                                                 
38 This is ca. 3% higher than the rate reported in European Union Agency for Railways (2016). 
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 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Source: Chief Safety and Security Officer, I.É. 
By any measure, I.É.’s SPAD rate was a justifiable cause for concern. 
Dissatisfaction with it was a key reason to change its training process. 
4.6 The Confidence-building Value of Other Studies 
Training Centre management believed that the training process and its outcomes 
could be improved using simulators. However, the fact that other railways were 
using them was not, in itself, sufficient reason for I.É. to follow suit. The 
bioethical maxim ‘primum non nocere’39 was a fundamental principle when 
deciding to migrate to a different training process. The results of the writer’s 
research provided confidence that simulators could be used to effect improvement. 
These results are presented in Appendix 8 and Appendix 9. They provide evidence 
that simulators are effective training tools for a range of outcomes. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Railways are like any other business type; they must provide value to the end 
user, or else they will lose their legitimacy and support base. The creation of value 
is determined more by staff capability than the availability of physical resources. 
                                                 
39 First, do no harm. Accepting that there is a problem, it may be better to do nothing, rather than 
risk exacerbating the situation by changing it. 
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Staff competence enables the delivery of valued customer satisfaction criteria. The 
provision of training does more than satisfying regulatory requirements; it enables 
safe operation, reduces risk exposure and creates shareholder value. Staff 
competence is the most important, and sometimes the only, barrier against adverse 
consequences after the system has suffered a technical malfunction. 
It is costly to provide training but I.É.’s costs are in line with those of other 
businesses in Ireland. Differences, if any, between I.É.’s training costs and those 
of foreign railway undertakings are attributable to the high underlying cost base in 
Ireland rather than inefficiencies in training delivery. In spite of incurring high 
training costs, and management’s unrelenting focus on SPADs, I.É.’s relative and 
absolute SPAD performance was unsatisfactory. The position had deteriorated in 
line with the erosion of the experiential profile of its driver population which was 
brought about by business expansion, and legislative, organisational and social 
change. It was also clear that the capability of the extant training process was 
challenged when juxtaposed with other delivery approaches. The purchase of a 
simulator system was perceived as a means to improve training outcomes 
generally but, most particularly, SPAD performance. 
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5 Training Needs Analyses, Scenario Development, Lesson Plan 
and Delivery Strategy 
In the previous chapter, the writer highlighted the potential for staff training to 
create organisational value and also showed that I.É.’s extant process was not 
achieving a key safety objective. 
In respect of simulator enabled training, it is axiomatic that if the training 
objectives and the associated scenarios, and the delivery methodologies are not 
identified at the equipment specification stage, it will be serendipitous whether or 
not a simulator project will create value and realise its goal. The link between 
these entities should be established prior to system specification. Such a strategic 
approach is not evident in all cases where simulators have been acquired (Russell, 
2006; Macdonald, 2006; and Pennant Training Systems, 2004). 
In this chapter the writer discusses two types of processes that are generally used, 
at respective units of analysis, to determine training needs. The first process is 
used at the organisational level, inter alia, to determine the quantum of the 
resources that are required to satisfy the organisation’s training requirements. The 
second process is used at the role holder level to reveal all necessary training 
requirements. Poor identification of these will result in a suboptimal outcome, 
irrespective of delivery methodology. This process comprises three methods of 
varying degrees of elaboration that are used to elicit the training content, delivery 
methods and programme durations for each particular role under analysis. The 
specific process that was used to generate the scenarios for incorporation into the 
lesson plan for I.É.’s drivers is also described. In recognition of their importance 
to the achievement of I.É.’s training objectives, the five NTSs that comprise the 
awareness training element of its lesson plan are discussed. 
Part task training is appropriate when the individual elements, contained within 
the overall task structure, are complex and when the relationship between them is 
straightforward (Tendick, 2002). On the other hand, whole task training is most 
appropriate when the sub tasks are relatively straightforward but the 
interrelationship between them is complex. This is the case of traction operation. 
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An events-based approach to training (EBAT) was used by I.É. to guide the 
design of lessons; thereby introducing particular events and sub tasks into general 
training contexts. This approach provides opportunities to observe behaviours of 
particular and general interest concomitantly; most particularly, the exhibition of 
NTSs during the performance of technical skills (Fowlkes et al., 1998). EBATs 
comprise purposely engineered scenarios to facilitate the accumulation of 
schemata. The EBAT process does not depend on chance interactions and 
encounters; it creates the requirement to act by purposely embedding trigger 
events and cues within training scenarios. Fletcher and Winfield (2007) capture 
the essence of the goal of this approach, suggesting that “... instead of getting 
drivers to just recall newly learnt rules [and procedures], give them real life 
scenarios where they have to apply the rules and make the right decision, under 
pressure, because this is what they will have to do in practice” (p.19). In addition 
to describing the development of the content element of the revised training 
programme, key principles of the training delivery process are also presented. 
This chapter is divided into ten sections, dealing with: 
5.1 Training Needs Analysis at the Business Level; 
5.2 Training Needs Analysis at the Role-centric Level; 
5.3 Effects of Standards and Regulation on Training; 
5.4 How the Content of I.É.’s Lesson Plan was Developed; 
5.5 The Strategic Objective of Developing Non-technical Skills; 
5.6 Fostering Intrinsic Motivation to Enhance Learning Outcomes; 
5.7 Serious Gaming - a loose-tight delivery approach; 
5.8 Contextualised Development of Driving Skills; and 
5.9 The Composite Lesson Plan. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.10. 
5.1 Training Needs Analysis at the Business Level 
The objective of a training department is to timely deliver sufficient competent 
personnel into the workplace to allow the organisation to function effectively 
(Evans, 2002). The primary objective for conducting an annual TNA, at the 
business level, is to align the training function with the organisation’s business’s 
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plans and strategic imperatives. The consequential objective is to plan the 
provision of training resources to achieve this alignment. Determination of 
training content or delivery methods is not the output objective of this particular 
process. Figure 7 is a representation of a framework that is useful to identify an 
organisation’s training needs. 
 
Adapted from Furjanic and Trotman (2000) 
Figure 7: The Driving Forces of Training 
Use of this model facilitates the identification of the range and scope of training 
requirements in respect of new, extant and recurrent programmes. It is particularly 
useful in those situations when there is a non-recurrent pattern to the annual 
requirements. Most germane to this thesis, the process is also used to evaluate the 
additional requirements, and consequential training resources, resulting from 
identified operational performance deficits. The type of training and the numbers 
of employees requiring each type are revealed by the TNA. The overall training 
requirement is calculated and courses are scheduled having regard to the 
constraints of all of the stakeholder groups, e.g., staff availability and operational 
requirements. The output of the TNA constitutes the annual training plan. It is the 
responsibility of the training function’s management to identify and acquire the 
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output of this type of analysis was used to determine the scope of I.É.’s simulator 
system, i.e., the number of driving desks that were required and their deployment. 
The long term plan of I.É. was to grow the business into one requiring 900 drivers 
to operate. In conjunction with the natural attrition rate, this overall requirement 
translated into an annual requirement to train 48 ab-initio drivers. In addition, its 
competence management process mandated the provision of biennial refresher 
training to its ca. 500 extant drivers and remediation training on an as-required 
basis to incident-involved drivers. The business level TNA revealed that there was 
a necessity for I.É. to provide 8 simulator driving desks and 1 extra instructor to 
support the new training delivery system. 
5.2 Training Needs Analysis at the Role-centric Level 
A hierarchical task analysis is a structured method that is used to identify all of the 
task components, the conditions under which they are performed and the 
performance sequence (Shepherd, 1998). It is a multilayer process that starts with 
the identification of high level tasks. Each task is incrementally decomposed in 
terms of sub-tasks and sub-goals until it is fully described. A fundamental flaw 
with using the HTA process alone is that it decomposes what needs to be trained 
into isolated knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs). However, the KSAs in which 
complex cognitive competence exists are interdependent entities. KSAs are often 
utilised in clusters, and require parallel processing and multitasking (Lodge et al., 
2002; Hörmann et al., 2002; Croft et al., 2000; Shirts, 1992 and Drummond, 
1989). Fowlkes et al. (1998) suggest the adoption of an events-based approach to 
training as a way of developing integrations of KSAs. I.É.’s utilisation of the 
EBAT approach in its training programme is discussed in Section 5.8. 
Behaviour based task analyses do not provide adequate information on the 
training requirements to enable performance of more cognitively complex jobs, 
such as train driving (Emmanuel, 2013; and Clark and Estes, 1996). The 
identification of these training needs can only be comprehensively ascertained by 
using two complimentary approaches. HTAs provide the framework for 
conducting cognitive task analyses. Shepherd (1998) makes a succinct distinction 
Page 65 
between the two approaches. The goal of a HTA is to establish “... an accurate 
description of the steps that are required in order to complete a task; whereas the 
focus of CTA is to capture some representation of the knowledge that people have, 
or need to have, in order to complete the task” (p.1544). There are over 100 
techniques available to evaluate and describe the cognitive aspects of task 
performance but these can be categorised into three principle approaches: (1) 
analysing the domain in terms of the goals and functions, (2) computer modelling, 
and (3) observation and interview methods (Stanton et al., 2005). On the basis of 
its intuitive usability, the writer favours the critical decision method proposed by 
Klein and Armstrong (in Stanton et al., 2005). When I.É.’s training scenarios 
were being developed, the writer did not have access to cognitive ergonomic 
competence to perform a professional CTA in accordance with the process set out 
in Stanton et al. (2005, p.102). Accordingly, he used the resources that were 
available to him, i.e., the strong operational competence and personal experiences 
of the instructors in managing critical incidents and a limited understanding of the 
CTA principles, to elicit the cognitive elements of the tasks and situations that 
would comprise the training scenarios. 
The TNA, performed at the role holder level, is aptly described by Anon. (2002b) 
as being “… an auditable series of processes used to determine the performance 
needs of personnel acting in the role(s) being analysed, the training and 
assessment objectives required to be met to ensure competent performance in the 
role(s) and the training media best suited to support training” (p.8). Based on this 
common sense approach, the more difficult it is to perform a task, the more 
important a task is in terms of safety risk and the less frequently the task is 
performed; the more effort and time is expended to train it. Because subjective 
evaluations are used, the DIF process has been perceived by some as being 
suboptimal and liable to SME biases, e.g., recency, availability of information, 
detectability or representativeness. Such perceptions are exacerbated by Cullen’s 
(2001b) general comments on the quality of risk assessments, suggesting that they 
can be “… superficial, too restrictive or poorly scoped, too generic, overly 
mechanistic, and with an insufficient appreciation of human factors” (p.209). (See 
also Darling et al., 2004.) 
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In more recent times, attempts have been made to introduce formality, objectivity, 
mathematical rigour and auditability into the TNA process. RSSB (2013b) defines 
a risk based training needs analysis as “An approach to developing skills, 
experience and knowledge that results in the performance of activities to the 
standards required in order to reduce the likelihood of an accident and the harm 
that could arise” (p.3). The RBTNA process may have application in the UK where 
the Safety Risk Model is populated with data in respect of some 2,00040 accident 
precursors relating to 131 hazardous event types (RSSB, 2014b, Table C1). 
Objectification of the TNA process, to transform it to a RBTNA process, may be 
less productive in the case of I.É. where its NWRM is populated with objective 
data for 64 precursors. The writer believes that it is impossible to conduct a 
meaningful RBTNA on the basis that the number of safety critical tasks 
performed by drivers far surpasses this number. Perhaps reflecting the concerns 
raised in RSSB (2013b) about the courage needed to change established training 
processes, adoption of the RBTNA method has generally been slow. Bonsall and 
Taylor (2011) note that “… although several companies were involved with the 
development of the RBTNA methodology, only one company was able to pilot 
the RBTNA template” (p.10). A somewhat similarly cautious approach was taken 
by the participants in the study by CRC for Rail Innovation (2010), only one 
company out of eight performed a “... detailed risk-based training needs 
assessment, most appear to rely on the nationally approved training packages” 
(p.16). 
The overarching output objectives of both the DIF and RBTNA processes are the 
same, i.e., the minimisation of risk and the allocation of time, effort and resources 
to where they will achieve the most desirous results. The perceived quality of the 
decision making inputs, and the inherent defensibility achieved through using the 
respective processes are the only differences. 
5.3 Effects of Standards and Regulation on Training 
I.É. functions in accordance with its 200 standards. Ten Company Standards 
contain the fundamental principles upon which its SMS is founded. Forty three 
                                                 
40 About four hundred and sixty of these relate to SPADs. 
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Railway Safety Standards underpinning the Company Standards. In turn, each 
department has formulated its own domain-specific standards; demonstrating how 
it complies with the Company and Railway Safety Standards (RSC, 2010). The 
detail and granularity of the standards varies with hierarchical position. Relevant 
to this thesis, very detailed standards exist in respect of ab-initio and recurrent 
driver training, assessment, and retraining. Accordingly, changes to these 
processes, such as those required because of the introduction of simulator enabled 
training, require formal validation by I.É.’s Safety Validation Panel. 
OJEU (2007) provides direction on the training and certification of European train 
drivers. As the legislation is in the form of a directive, it sets out the overall goals 
only and is non prescriptive in respect of the strategy necessary to achieve them. 
Specifically in relation to training methods, OJEU (2007) suggest that “... 
although not obligatory, [simulators] may be useful for the effective training of 
drivers” (p.70). However, Member States are free to adopt a customised strategy 
that reflects local conditions better. The RSC is the ‘Competent Authority’ in 
Ireland and it has provided guidance (RSC, 2012) in respect of the transposition 
and implementation requirements for the directive. As the competent authority, 
the RSC has the overall responsibility, and matching powers of compellability, for 
the driver certification and licensing process. The RSC audit regime ensures “… 
that duty holders’ compliance with their respective SMS is supervised in 
accordance with the common safety method specified in Commission Regulation 
(EU) No.1077/2012” (p.3). 
5.4 How the Content of I.É.’s Lesson Plan was Developed 
Simulator equipment must be specified with respect to the scenarios that are 
intended to be used in the lesson plan, and the system must also be configured to 
suit the intended training delivery processes. As I.É.’s project advanced from the 
feasibility stage to the operational stage, a number of approaches were used to 
ensure that the equipment would be fit for the immediate purpose and would have 
the capability to satisfy future requirements. Initially, an expansive range of 
training scenarios was identified and these were funnelled down to what 
ultimately became the lesson content. This approach was strategic. Over-
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specification was not a case of directionless extravagance; the possibility of a 
future need to revert to the supplier, requesting ‘out of scope’ items or 
functionality, was mitigated. 
I.É.’s overall output objective was well defined. It was not the intention to use the 
equipment to provide training on ergonomic issues, such as managing the effects 
of circadian rhythms, the effects of driver comfort or fatigue on performance, or 
the recognition of olfactory cues41 etc. Rather, the system would be used to 
provide procedural and NTSs training in the three operating modes, i.e., normal, 
degraded and emergency modes. A comprehensive list of emergency and 
degraded operating situations is presented in Appendix 4. This list was modified 
to make it context specific and relevant, and to incorporate normal operating 
scenarios. The modified list (Appendix 10) formed part of I.É.’s system’s outline 
specification. An inclusive approach was used in these developmental activities 
which were performed by staff at I.É.’s Training Centre, District Traction 
Executives and drivers from its operating core. The development and prioritisation 
of content was based on: 
1. The outcome of a combination of TNAs: 
1.1. A HTA which formed part of an earlier competence assurance process; 
1.2. An amateurish, limited but valuable, CTA which was conducted by a 
subset of Staff Trainers. This process disclosed cognitive requirements 
associated with particular operations that occur within specific 
locations42. Consequently, specially chosen artefacts43 and hazardous 
locations were included in the scope of supply of the computer generated 
imagery. 
The experience of I.É.’s team led to a comprehensive, but subjective, 
revelation of operational risks. A formal RBTNA was not completed 
because the assessment of training priority (Step 2 of the RBTNA 
process, in RSSB, 2013b) requires the incorporation of objective NWRM 
data. I.É.’s NWRM was in its early stages of development and was not 
                                                 
41 Resulting from an onboard fire 
42 Hazardous operations being performed in specific locations, e.g., driving into a maintenance 
shed or starting a train on a curved platform 
43 Permanent way road vehicles and the locomotive shed at Connolly Station for example 
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available for general use (see Section 8.4). A RBTNA would have added 
value as it would have brought the risk at the platform-train interface into 
sharper focus. This would have resulted in steps being taken at the 
specification phase to ensure that the training, suggested in Section 11.2 
(Table 36), could be delivered without simulator modification. 
2. A review of accident and incident inquiry reports from railways around the 
world. Particular attention was paid to the querists’ recommendations in 
respect of simulator enabled training and the attribution of human error; 
3. The integration of I.É.’s extant safety improvement initiatives: 
3.1. SPAD awareness; 
3.2. Defensive driving policy; 
3.3. Structured safety critical communications programme; 
4. Research-disclosed possibilities and limitations of simulator capability; 
5. The completion of a ‘gap analysis’. The purpose of this was to identify any 
unjustified omission of content from the extant programme; 
6. Discussions with users44 about the capability of simulators to meet training 
requirements. 
It was not practical to simulate, nor considered fruitful to provide training in each 
of the identified scenarios. It was also necessary to structure the lesson plan by 
prioritising those scenarios which were capable of addressing the identified 
inadequacies in the extant process and which were considered most meritorious 
and urgent, and those that were congruous with I.É.’s other safety initiatives. The 
store of scenarios which was assigned a lower priority remains available to 
broaden the lesson plan and to introduce novelty into its delivery in the future. 
5.5 The Strategic Objective of Developing Non-technical Skills 
While fully accepting that staff needs to be technically competent, technical 
competence on its own is insufficient to ensure effective task performance (RSSB, 
2009b). In recognition of the contribution that NTSs play in safe operation, I.É. 
                                                 
44 Connex South Eastern, EWS, GNER, JRE, Login, London Underground Limited, Óglaigh na 
hÉireann (Irish Army), Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, Scotrail, Translink, Virgin Trains 
and the Simulator User Group 
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placed appropriate emphasis on their development. As the simulator system is 
extremely flexible, productive use of its open architecture for this task is 
constrained only by the creativity and experience of the scenario designers. The 
challenge for training designers lays in the identification of scenarios that promote 
skill development. Contextualisation of the use of NTSs within appropriate and 
realistic training scenarios requires a combination of blue skies thinking, critical 
incident recall and, ideally, professional ergonomist input. 
5.5.1 Developing Role Appreciation through Joint Training 
From the perspective of developing a system’s understanding, and unifying 
drivers’ and signallers’ mental models, Cullen’s (2001a) recommendation (#42) 
that “… that signallers and drivers obtain a full appreciation of the nature and 
demands of each other’s work” makes sense. Two different approaches can be 
taken to satisfy this recommendation. The first approach is based on the physical 
integration of separate signalling and driving simulator systems. Gutiérrez et al. 
(2005) describe the integrated system that is used to train signalling, driving and 
engineering personnel at the metro in Madrid. The procurement of an integrated 
system had been considered by I.É. but this option was not pursued because of the 
same concerns as expressed by Gutiérrez et al. (2005). They recognise the 
engineering difficulty of integrating such systems, question the cost-benefit 
advantage, and conclude by asking “… it’s obvious that the new simulators are 
full of new possibilities for training, but are all these options necessary?” (p.13). 
I.É. uses an alternative approach; one that is based on joint simulations. These are 
designed to engage other operational roles with the simulator users; using the 
driver simulator only. Very mindful of the difficulty in justifying the ignoring of 
Cullen’s (2001a) Recommendation #19 in any post-accident public sworn inquiry, 
the writer decided to provide joint training using this approach despite the 
negative findings of the qualitative study by Atkins et al. (2005). Their study 
indicates that mixed group training is not highly valued by 49% of recipients 
Forty six percent of these believed that “… mixed group training took time away 
from gaining skills specific to their role and 3% reported mixed group training 
was not useful at all” (p.4). This finding is disconfirmed in this study by the 
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unprompted ex post facto comments, made by I.É.’s drivers in respect of joint 
training. None of I.É.’s drivers expressed dissatisfaction with joint training. To the 
contrary, when providing unprompted end-of-course feedback, 8% of the 
respondents welcomed the concept (see Table 30). 
5.5.2 Developing Hazard Perception Skills 
If a hazard is not perceived; evasive action will not be taken. There are two 
elements associated with the skill of hazard perception. The first is a process and 
content based element relating to the methods that are used to detect and perceive 
the hazard, and the mechanism used to rate its hazardousness. The second element 
is performance-based and relates to the time taken to mount a response. There is a 
symbiotic relationship between situation awareness and HP; the necessity to 
perceive an important cue is a common thread in the two constructs. Although the 
evidence emanates from a different domain, Table 12 illustrates the predominant 
relationship between perception and overall SA. 
Table 12: Proportion of Air Accidents Caused by the Constituents of SA 
Type of error: 
(level 1) 
Proportion Type of error: level 2 (constituents of level 1 errors) 
Perception 80·2% Failure to monitor or observe data (37·2%); 
Information unavailable because it was not actively sought 
out (11·6%); 
Information hard to discriminate or detect in the 
environment (11·6%); 
Memory loss, e.g., due to distraction, (11·1%); 
Confusing available information with that sought (8·7%). 
Comprehension 16·9% Use of incorrect mental model (6·4%); 
Incorrect expectation of system behaviours (4·7%); 
Lack of, or poor, mental model (3·5%); 
Other, e.g., momentary loss of [aircraft] position (2·3%). 
Projection 2·9% Projections of future actions of the aircraft systems were 
missing. Examples include misjudging or mistiming the 
amount of time necessary to complete actions by self or 
other crew members (2·9%). 
The competencies linked to HP include effective scanning and anticipation. 
Personal attributes, such as field dependence, boredom thresholds and willingness 
to accept risk, play an important role in the manner in which individuals identify 
and respond to risk (Dumbuya et al., in Dorn, ed., 2005). HP skill is also affected 
by experience. By taking in more information from peripheral and distant views, 
experienced drivers detect more hazards, and quicker, than their inexperienced 
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counterparts (RTA, 2003 and Crundall et al., 2002). They also make more holistic 
assessments of hazardousness whereas the less experienced ones operate at a more 
detailed level and appear less able to integrate diverse stimuli into an overall 
assessment of the situation (Killion, 2000 and Zsambock, 1993). Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the hazardousness of a situation by an inexperienced driver is overly 
influenced by past experiences of similar events (Nicholls and Cobb, 1996). The 
reliance on past experience has shown to be a significant contributory factor in 
SPAD occurrences at approach released junction signals. 
The link between the extent of HP skill development and accident avoidance has 
been firmly established (Whelan et al., 2004; McKenna (in Kuiken and Twisk, 
2001); Leadbeatter and Catchpole, 2001 and Gregersen, 1998). Studies by Watts 
and Quimby, and Hughes and Cole (both in Mills et al., 1998) indicate that 
simulators are valid training tools for HPT; there is a strong correlation between 
subjects’ ratings of hazards when in a simulator and when driving on a real road. 
5.5.3 Developing Crew Resource Management Skills 
A 1997 experiment, into the performance of air crews during a simulated flight, 
exposed various operational problems and crew errors which were “... a result of 
breakdown in crew co-operation or poor co-ordination, and not a result of lack of 
technical skills or knowledge” (Beaty, 1995, p.39). The crew resource 
management training initiative was developed to address the matter. Although 
normally associated with the airline industry, the skills are generic and CRM45 
training can be applied in any setting that involves collaborative or teamwork 
activity. In the railway operating context, such collaborative activity takes place 
within and between the driver, signaller, guard, pilotman, shunter, platform 
dispatch, regulator and secondman roles. The importance of interdisciplinary team 
training is evident in the recommendations ensuing from high profile railway 
accident inquiry reports and studies, e.g.: 
1. Recommendation 3 d in McInerney (2004); 
2. Recommendation 2 vi in McInerney (2001); 
                                                 
45 Variously referred to as railroad crew resource management (US) or rail resource management 
(Australia) 
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3. Recommendation 42 in Cullen (2001a); 
4. Recommendation R-99-1246 in NTSB (1999). 
CRM training is designed to develop knowledge, skills and attitudes and includes 
modules on communications, situational awareness, problem solving, decision 
making, teamwork and workload management. From the mid 1980s, CRM 
training in the aviation sector has “… proved to be very successful in improving 
flight deck performance, particularly with regard to better sharing of situational 
awareness, improved communications and enhanced leadership skills” (Reason, 
1997, p.130). Mitsopoulos et al. (2005) cite the findings of two studies which 
indicate that CRM training improves teamwork skills by 8% to 20% (Salas et al.) 
and by 8% to 13% (Stout et al.). The provision of CRM training in the airline 
industry has been mandatory since March 1998. 
Embracement of the concept has proven slower in the rail domain even though 
studies show that the skills are amenable to training. RSSB (2012) conducted a 
before-after study (N = 16 train drivers). A comparison of evaluations, using the 
behavioural marker system, revealed positive transfer of the skills as perceived by 
both managers and the drivers themselves. From an economic perspective alone, it 
is unsurprising that interest in the concept of CRM is starting to grow within the 
rail sector. A utility analysis47 by Roop et al. (2007) reveals that, when assessed 
on the basis of its potential to reduce accidents alone48, CRM training yields a 
utility between -$2 m and +$11 m per annum49. Although these potential gains are 
not as large as those obtained for the airline industry50, the analysis indicates that 
“… the benefits of CRM training to the railroad industry generally outweigh its 
costs” (p.20). (See also O’Connor et al., 2008.) 
                                                 
46 Amtrak employees who have been involved in critical incidents now attend CRM training that 
addresses the incident-specific issues (Savidge, in Madden and Boursier, eds., 2005). This training 
is usually attended by the entire train crew that was involved in the incident. 
47 Based on a typical Class 1 railroad in the US, employing about 11,000 traincrew members 
48 The analysis is ultraconservative. It does not include (a) the financial benefits of those cases 
where poor CRM was a secondary cause of an accident, (b) the ensuing increase in the efficiency 
of operations, (c) the cost of accident clean up, or (d) the remediation costs. 
49 These values are based on a sensitivity analysis using the (a) number of accidents attributable to 
human error, (b) cost per accident avoided, (c) duration of training effect, and (d) cost of providing 
the training. 
50 Training 1,200 maintenance staff at Continental Airline in CRM principles reduced ground 
damage costs by 66% and occupational injuries by 27% (Roop et al., 2007). 
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5.5.4 Developing Situation Awareness Skills 
Definitions of the situation awareness (SA) construct abound. The authoritative 
definition is proffered by Endsley (1995). She defines SA as “... the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (p.36). It is a meta skill that works over and above the existing skills, and 
enables the effective management of cognitive abilities. Hence, it is difficult to 
disambiguate it from other human factor constructs (Anon., undated). The writer 
considers the definition provided by Dominguez (in Croft et al., 2000, p.38) to be 
more suited to the train driver role in-so-far as it includes the integration of 
information emanating from different sources. She suggests that SA involves the 
extraction of information from the external environment and the integration of this 
with relevant internal knowledge to create a mental picture of the current 
situation. This picture is used to continue exploration in a cyclical manner to 
anticipate future events. 
The construct of SA is especially compelling in settings that involve the operation 
of complicated systems within dynamic environments. In these, the operator has 
to integrate widely disparate and, sometimes inconsistent inter-sensory inputs, 
with elaborate cognitive models of the vehicle and operating environment in order 
to achieve a successful outcome. The construct is particularly relevant in 
situations where (i) the environment is dynamic and information-rich, (ii) the 
operator may experience high workload, (iii) extensive training is required, (iv) 
the problem is ill-structured or novel, and (v) there are time constraints (Uhlarik 
and Comerford, 2002). This description typifies the task of a train driver when 
operating in the emergency mode. 
Catchpole et al. (2001) identifies five factors that are thought to affect the 
acquisition and maintenance of situational awareness: 
1. Attention management, i.e., an individual’s ability to multitask; 
2. Information management, i.e., an individual’s ability to acquire appropriate 
information and make rational decisions; 
3. Cognitive efficiency, i.e., an individual’s ability to ignore distractions; 
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4. Automaticity, i.e., an individual’s experience of performing routine tasks in an 
overly practiced and automatic way; 
5. Interpersonal dynamics, i.e., an individual’s understanding of the dynamics of 
non-verbal communications and team membership. 
Air Affairs (2006) suggest the inclusion of the following topics during train driver 
training in order to improve their SA (pp.5.5-5.6): 
1. Attention management to include attention control, time sharing and attention 
monitoring; 
2. Environmental scanning to promote a systematic way of monitoring the 
environment. Trainees are taught where to look, what to look for, and when 
and in what sequence to look; 
3. Self-checking skills to encourage individuals to check their own assumptions 
about the state of the environment against the information presented. Drivers 
should be trained to treat the projection phase of the SA process as a hypothesis 
which must be tested for correctness against the environmental evidence. For 
example, when nearing an approach released signal, drivers should question 
themselves as to why the signal is at danger; 
4. Workload management to provide knowledge about the effects of high and low 
workloads on SA and to provide guidance on effective coping strategies; 
5. Fatigue management to include information on the relationship between fatigue 
and performance, and on fatigue management strategies; 
6. Task management advice to provide trainees with the skills and knowledge to 
be able to prioritise tasks efficiently and effectively, rather than using event or 
interruption strategies where each interruption is dealt with as it occurs. 
Generally, losses in SA occur during periods of high workload, when multi-
tasking, when preoccupied with other tasks or issues, when there is inadequate 
feedback from crewmembers, during periods of stress and when interacting with 
automated systems (Hörmann et al., 2003b). The effect of the breakdown of train 
drivers’ SA is evident from the accident investigations conducted by NTSB 
(2006), NTSB (2003) and Walsh (1995). The value of SA maintenance is 
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evidenced in the reports by Reilly (2008) and RAIB (2007b) of successful 
incident handling. 
5.5.5 Developing Decision Making Skills 
In dynamic operational settings, good decision making is crucial to the avoidance 
of accidents and precursors. A study of human error in aircraft accidents found 
that 26·6% of accidents involved situations where there was poor decision making 
even though there was adequate understanding of the situation (Endsley, in 
Endsley and Garland, 2000). Effective decision making is also a fundamental 
requirement of train drivers; ca. 10·6% of SPADS are attributable to poor decision 
making (Appendix 11). 
Decision making effectiveness is influenced by many factors, e.g., the dynamism 
of the environment, psychological stress to make the right decision, availability of 
information, time constraints and conflicting goals. In some contexts, drivers may 
not be afforded the time or information to engage in either the rational or bounded 
rational decision making processes, and may revert to intuitive decision making or 
to the RPD making process. However, there are inherent dangers in their use in-
so-far as their application may be influenced by biases (commission, omission or 
confirmation biases, or the non-rational escalation of commitment) or the lack of 
experience. The situation can be ameliorated through awareness training and 
through enhancement of the decision maker’s experience profile. Simulator 
enabled training allows operators to be immersed into scenarios that compel them 
to make decisions at critical junctures. 
5.6 Fostering Intrinsic Motivation to Enhance Learning 
Outcomes 
Rogers (1969) believes that human beings have a natural propensity to learn; the 
role of the training professionals is to facilitate the process. (See also McGuffog et 
al., 2006; Juhary, 2006; Evans, 2002; Schmid, 1995; and Leave and Wenger, 
1991.) Olson (in Williams and Williams, 2011) opines that learner motivation “... 
is probably the most important factor that educators can target in order to improve 
learning” (p.2). 
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In the case of the transition of I.É.’s training process, it was essential to create an 
environment that would maximise learners’ motivation; any possible hindrance of 
this goal was not countenanced. No element of the training delivery process was 
allowed to detract from the intrinsically motivating features of the system. The 
ethos of the delivery process was defined by the professionalism of the operators, 
the culturing of an adult-to-adult relationship between the participants, an 
acceptance that it was okay - even encouraged to make errors, and the free 
availability of the knowledge and experience of the trainers. Above all, there was 
a desire to accentuate the learning experience and make it enjoyable. 
5.6.1 Non-use of Simulators for Formal Competence Assessment 
The initial establishment of competence and its subsequent maintenance are key 
components in satisfying the railway undertaking’s obligations contained within 
its Safety Case. It must be demonstrable that safety critical employees, such as 
traction drivers, understand and apply standard operating procedures. However, 
train drivers, who are assessed as being competent under the competence 
management arrangements, make avoidable errors which compromise safety. This 
implies that either an element of driver error is acceptable and/or irreducible51, 
that the assessees know the correct procedures but opt to exercise alternative 
courses of action52 (the knowing-doing gap), or that current assessment processes 
are inadequate. (See also de Winter et al., 2009; RAIB, 2006; Peck (in TRB, eds., 
2006a); McCarquodale, 2002; and Mason, 1992.) 
The traditional process used for assessing driver competence has been the subject 
of criticism by rail accident investigators (McInerney, 2001; Neal, 2001 and Uff, 
2000). For Uff (2000), the main issue that emerged from the Southall crash was 
that the training system failed in its most fundamental task of “... weeding out 
drivers who are unsuitable for the heavy task which they have to bear, by attitude 
or temperament” (p.199). Howells (2000) believes that the reasons why the extant 
                                                 
51 Nikandros and Tombs (2007) believe that train driver error rates are low and may be 
approaching the limits of human reliability. 
52 An analysis of train dispatch incident reports by Hughes (2003) reveals that “... mistakes which 
have occurred have not done so because individuals failed to understand the applicable rules or 
procedures, but because, on the days in question, the individuals failed to comply with the 
procedures” (p.8). 
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assessment process was so unreliable was “... due primarily to testing being 
performed in the classroom or on a scheduled train service, neither of which 
permits adequate, controlled complex skills development or assessment” (p.4-4). 
It is intuitively appealing to suggest the use of simulators for qualification 
assessment purposes; 12 of the 18 railway organisations in the study by Schmitz 
and Maag (2008) use them for this purpose. 
The perceived benefits of simulator enabled assessments are: 
1) If based on a combination of data from the simulator’s log files and subjective 
assessor judgement, simulators can provide an “... impartial, transparent, and 
detailed assessment” (Maag and Schmitz, 2012, p.1); 
2) They promote standardisation and reliability (Schmitz and Maag, 2009, p.51); 
3) The assessor’s attention is not divided by concomitantly monitoring the safe 
passage of the train on which the assessment is taking place (Endres, 2005). If 
an automated process is used, the assessor can further confine his attention to 
those elements that require human input, i.e., the human factor components. 
See Schmitz and Maag (2009) for a comprehensive discussion on the merits 
and challenges of automating the assessment process; 
4) High fidelity simulators can provide “A more predictive assessment of the 
candidate’s behaviour because the same operating pressures can be placed 
upon them that they would undertake within the work place” (Anon., 2007, 
p.15); 
5) There are obvious limitations to the validity of any real world test or 
assessment. It is unethical to include task demands that expose test subjects to 
personal risk (McGuffog et al., 2006); 
6) A more comprehensive range of tasks can be assessed practically, including 
driving performance during periods of system degradation (Uff, 2000); 
7) The reporting and recording of trainees’ actions and reactions is almost 
indisputable, and is unbiased by sympathy or prejudice (Scott, 1998). 
The detractive argument for such assessments is based on: 
1) The absence of high physical and psychological simulator fidelities. SQA 
(2014) asserts that “To be effective [for assessment purposes], simulations 
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must succeed in recreating the atmosphere, conditions and pressures of the real 
situation” (p.28). (See also RSSB, 2009b.); 
2) The concerns of assesses. Schmitz and Maag (2009) found that “As far as the 
storage of the results [e.g. maximum speed and reaction time] in the AssDB is 
concerned, the trainees are sceptical due to the comprehensive character of 
such a database” (p.58); 
3) The requirement for an instructor, to candidate, to simulator ratio of 1:1:1 when 
used as a assessment tool for certification; a use case that is prevalent among 
British users (Anon., 2007 and the Simulator User Group53); 
4) The process blurs the demarcation line between the training and certification 
processes and roles. “Formal competence assessment should be performed by a 
competent assessor who has not been directly involved in training the person 
being assessed” (Evans, 2002, p.26); 
5) A deconstruction of Uff’s (2000) comments. He did not specify that simulators 
should be used for jeopardous assessment; merely that “Simulators should be 
introduced for driver training and for the observance of driver behaviour” 
(p.212). Likewise, he did not specify a change in responsibility for conducting 
assessments, i.e., from DSMs to instructors54. The integration of training and 
jeopardy assessments discourages drivers from ‘declaring their hand’ in respect 
of any lack of knowledge, or seeking clarification on a rule or procedure; 
6) The preclusion of accepted peer review by respected others. 
5.6.2 Non-jeopardy Training 
In many railway jurisdictions, operators’ performance is formally assessed as an 
integral part of simulator enabled training processes (Appendix 12). Non-jeopardy 
training is an alternative approach that is used in the airline sector and is, after 
consideration of the arguments in Section 5.6.1, the approach that was adopted by 
the writer. (See also Bonsall and Taylor, 2011 for supporting commentary.) The 
provision of non-jeopardy training is not incongruous with Uff’s (2000) 
recommendation #17.5 (3). The term ‘non-jeopardy’ implies that the operators’ 
licenses will not be subject to revocation in the event of underperformance during 
                                                 
53 Meeting of 9th October 2007 at Crewe 
54 From DTEs to Staff Trainers in the case of I.É. 
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training. The rationale underpinning non-jeopardy training is that operators “... 
can manifest attitudes that are as close as possible to those that would be 
demonstrated in unmonitored conditions... reserve or defensiveness because of 
concern for failure must not inhibit participation” (ICAO, 1998, 2.2.16 and 
2.5.22). The assignment of this status acknowledges the primacy of the purpose of 
the event, i.e., the promotion of learning. 
A fundamental premise of this philosophy is that the instructor does not issue pass 
or fail accreditations to course attendees. Except to prevent negative transfer of 
training, each training scenario is allowed to progress without interference or 
interruption by the instructor; the operators learn by experiencing the results of 
their own decisions and actions. The instructor is ‘not present’ within the training 
event except when role playing. Decisions and actions which produce unwanted 
results do not indicate a training failure; they serve as a developmental 
opportunity instead. 
The apparent benignity of this approach should not be misunderstood; it is not a 
‘soft option’. Non-jeopardy does not mean that the training event is treated 
frivolously. Before the trainee is allowed to return to the operating core, 
performance deficiencies are corrected through the provision of additional training 
and coaching. At the end of the training session and after debriefing has taken 
place, the instructor certifies merely that the training has been completed. It is 
implicit that, upon exiting the process, all performance deficiencies have been 
corrected. (This approach does not lend itself to the conduct of Level 2 
evaluations, and as there is no auditable paper trail, this deprived the writer of an 
opportunity to present the results of a full suite of evaluations. The results of 
Level 1, 3 and 4 evaluations are provided in Sections 9.2, 9.1 and 9.3 
respectively.) 
There are practical as well as philosophical arguments why a non-jeopardous 
approach is favoured. The appropriateness of conducting jeopardy assessments 
that are based on responses, made in an environment lacking full psychological 
fidelity, to events occurring within an environment that comprise some inaccurate 
cues, i.e., the misperception of speed, is questionable. At best, it could lead to 
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false positive results which would result in the dissipation of the training 
investment made in assesses up to that point. Furthermore, the potential to revoke 
a licence unjustifiably would be unacceptable to the operators and could create 
disharmony that would detract from the overall initiative. In its study, RSSB 
(2009b) highlights a range of reasons why a driver might make an error while 
operating a simulator; only one of which is a skill deficiency. Furthermore, RSSB 
(2009b) finds that “… there have been some occasions where errors in the 
simulator have been noted [unjustifiably] as a formal incident on the driver’s 
record, and in some circumstances this has led to the removal of the driver from 
driving duties” (Point 1.1.3). Most importantly, the introduction of jeopardy 
assessment would fundamentally change the instructor-driver relationship which 
is based on frankness, collegiality, altruism, and confidentiality. McKenney 
(2011) opines that worsened relationships could be generated without any gain, as 
“Jeopardy assessment… may result in crews producing acceptable behaviour in 
the simulator but have little real impact on the safety culture” (p.15). 
5.7 Serious Gaming - a loose-tight delivery approach 
Disparagingly, some critics view simulation merely as a game and suggest that the 
lack of imminent danger gives rise to ambiguous cues that reduce learning 
transfer. Blana (1996b) notes that “... the penalty and reward structure that 
motivates driver behaviour is substantially altered in the simulator” (p.10). The 
writer contends that the assignment of gaming status to a training simulation is, if 
implemented properly, a positive attribution. 
Serious gaming is currently used in a range of training contexts, e.g., for military 
personnel and first responders. The essence of the process is captured by Abt 
(1987) who states that “The oxymoron of serious games unites the seriousness of 
thought and problems that require it with the experimental and emotional freedom 
of active play” (p.11). Serious gaming offers “… a playful environment that 
provides serious content, topics, narratives, rules and goals to foster a specific 
purposeful learning outcome” (Mitgutsch and Alvarad, 2015, p.2). The results of 
Sitzmann’s (2011) meta analysis attest the synergistic effects of the gaming aspect 
on the seriousness of the process as: 
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“… the intrinsically motivating features… increase self-determination 
because trainees… find it interesting and enjoyable… When trainees 
participate in traditional learning activities, they rarely display the level of 
effort and motivation that is typical of simulation games, thereby limiting 
the learning potential” (pp.15-17). 
Using this loose-tight delivery approach, trainees’ brains are stimulated to such a 
degree that almost all cognitive function is focused on the game, leading to 
increased interest and, consequently, learning (Cordova and Lepper; and Parker 
and Lepper (both in Sitzmann, 2011). In respect of its potential to enhance 
learning of NTSs, Gamberini et al. (2008) believe that serious gaming “... could 
represent an ideal tool for attitude and behavioral changes” (p.133). 
5.8 Contextualised Development of Driving Skills 
Although the main foci of the constituents in the lesson plan are well defined, e.g., 
passing a signal at danger or single line working, such events do not happen in 
isolation in the real world. Degraded and emergency conditions are encountered in 
the midst of normal operations. To reflect this, the lessons in I.É.’s lesson plan are 
contextualised within overall training scenarios and are experienced by simulator 
operators as anomalies. General driving skills that comprise of a blend of 
technical and NTSs, such as, defensive driving skills, train control skills, 
adherence to permanent speed restrictions and temporary speed restrictions, 
SPAD awareness, communication skills, and the detection of anomalies and 
discrepancies within the driving environment, constitute this contextualisation. 
The writer refers (in Column 2 of Table 27) to these general aspects of the lessons 
as overarching lessons. (More expansive lists of these skill sets are provided in 
Appendix 3.) Even though these general lessons are not mentioned specifically in 
the lesson plan, by their very nature they represent a crucial and intrinsic part of 
the overall process. 
5.9 The Composite Lesson Plan 
I.É.’s lesson plan is presented in Table 14. Many of the lessons contain a preview 
element which is sometimes presented in lecture format. This format is often 
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criticised, particularly by those who have been absent from formal learning 
settings for long periods. However, the value and overall suitability of this 
delivery approach is dependent on the delivery context, the lecturer and 
participant qualities, and the availability of suitable alternatives. Some decry 
lectures on the basis that, when poorly executed, they devolve into disengaging 
and unidirectional methods of delivery. The use of quizzes, games, videos and 
computer based training tools, such as the classroom scenario demonstrator55 
feature of I.É.’s simulator system, ameliorates the situation. 
By its nature, the traditional lecture process cannot provide an experiential, 
situated or active learning opportunity. However, it can make a valuable 
contribution when it is well executed in a communal setting. Engaging and 
penetrating lecturers can capitalise on the delivery setting to surface incorrect 
mental models. To lever off of the best attributes of each approach, a combination 
of lectures and simulator enabled training is delivered. The information is 
presented in lecture format for subsequent application in the simulator setting. 
In respect of the designation of the subject matter of the scenarios, the 
presentation of fault finding scenarios, and their purpose and scope, it should be 
noted that: 
1. The designations of the subject matter of the scenarios, shown in Table 13, is 
not linked intentionally to similarly numbered sections of I.É.’s Rule Book; 
2. Fault finding scenarios, relative to the traction types that attendees are passed 
competent to drive, are presented to them. For example, if a course attendee 
operates 201 class locomotives, faults are presented on this class; 
3. The use of the description of ‘fault finding’ to the process belies its 
comprehensiveness; it is more embracing than merely rectifying the fault. The 
training reflects the totality of the activity and is designed to improve technical 
and NTSs. In many cases the origination of a fault is presented to the driver by 
means of the presentation of an alarm on the train’s TDMS56; creating a task 
                                                 
55 Described in Section 6.3 (Point 3.1) 
56 On earlier, less elegant stock, awareness of the anomaly is less straightforward. For example, the 
driver may have to piece together tactile information on train performance with information on the 
gauges to become aware of a fault on the brake system. 
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interruption. Depending on whether it is an immediate or negotiated alarm, the 
driver will: 
3.1. Manage the distraction and his workload; 
3.2. Identify the location of the fault; 
3.3. Effect a remedy; 
3.4. Apply the associated rules and processes to the scenario; 
3.5. Resume the original task. 
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Table 13: Coding of Lessons in Lesson Plan 
Subject Designation Lesson type: focussed and/or general lesson Subject Designation Lesson type: focussed and/or general lesson 
Low adhesion driving A Focussed and general lesson Opposite line fouled G Focussed lesson 
Defensive driving and SPAD awareness B General lesson Train operation H General lesson 
Communications C Focussed and general lesson Possessions T3 I Focussed lesson 
Passing signals at danger (with permission) D Focussed lesson Shunting J Dependent on attendees’ work location 
SLW E Focussed lesson Degraded on board systems K Focussed lesson 
Working of a single line by pilotman F Dependent on attendees’ work locations57 Providing and seeking assistance during train failure L Adjunct to fault finding lessons 
Table 14: Simulator Enabled Refresher Lesson Plan for Qualified Drivers 





Advise the attendees of the safety protocols. Provide attendees with an overview of the 
facility and features, and inform them of the logistical arrangements. 
 
09:40-10:00  Hazard free exploration of equipment and discussion on the: 
Equipment and how to fault find in 2D; 
Scenarios to be presented; 
Purpose of repeating operating performance in observation room and role of observers; 
Types of instructor interactions and interventions. 
The output objectives are to provide: 
An appreciation of equipment functionality and configuration; 
Experience of touch screen operation; 
An understanding of the roles of the instructors and peers; 
A bespoke simulated Weekly Circular, showing the locations of TSRs, T3 possessions, 
train headcodes and warnings of low rail adhesion etc.; and 
To state the rules of conduct 58 associated with providing peer reviews 
 
10:00–10:30 Half of the drivers operate the simulator for a duration of 15 minutes to become familiar 
with it; the balance remains in the observation area. Operant drivers and observers switch 
roles. The trial is not complicated by the presentation of train faults or operating 
anomalies. 
Collectively, the two trial periods include starting, stopping, running on restricted 
signals, obeying TSRs (communicated through the bespoke simulated Weekly Circular) 
and PSRs, using the verbal communication protocols, stopping to serve stations, pre-
advised low rail adhesion conditions, driving into a dead end platform and through gate 
crossings. 
Activities are performed in a range of environmental conditions. 
 
10:30- 10:45 Operators are provided an opportunity to comment on the simulator equipment and to 
ask questions about the process they are about to engage in. 
To ensure participants are confident in the use of the equipment. N/A 
10:45- 11:00 Break 
11:00–12:00 
(Lesson 1) 
A preview of the session, using a training video59 is provided. Trainees take part in a 
quiz using a SMART Board ™ interactive whiteboard. They answer the questions 
anonymously using an electronic voting facility. Half of the drivers operate the simulator 
and the remainder observe for a period of ca. 15 minutes. Then, they switch roles. The 
review session comprises discussion, self appraisal of performance, and reviews from 
instructors and peers. 
Scenario type D: Passing signals at danger with (a) authority of the signalman and (b) 






Half of the drivers engage in fault finding simulations; the balance observes. The drivers 
and observers switch roles. Two faults are presented. 
The review session comprises discussion, and performance reviews from instructors and 
peers. 
Saloon door system failure and inability to either open the doors, or to restore traction 
after subsequent closing. Drivers initiate bespoke ‘open’ and ‘lock-off’ procedures. See 
note 2 above regarding the presentation of scenarios on relevant classes of traction. 
Emotional intelligence (remaining calm 




A preview of the session, using a PowerPoint presentation, is provided. Half of the 
drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 minutes while the balance observes. 
Then, they switch roles. The review session comprises discussion, self appraisal of 
performance, and reviews from instructors and peers. 
Scenario type G: Opposite line fouled. Each group is presented with the scenario while 




Half of the drivers engage in fault finding simulations; the balance observes. The drivers 
and observers switch roles. Two faults are presented. 
The review session comprises discussion, and performance reviews from instructors and 
peers. 
A range of brake problems are displayed on the train’s TDMS, e.g., emergency brake 
application, brake electronic control unit circuit breaker tripped, parking brakes not 
releasing or service brakes sticking. 
Problem solving. 
15:20-15:30 Break 
                                                 
57 Many drivers do not operate over single line routes. 
58 Peer reviews are provided with the intention of assisting fellow simulator operators. Honest constructive comment, rather than phoney praise, is provided within a framework of order and decorum. 
59 The use of the term ‘video’ includes the audio video interleaved (.avi) files that have been generated using the scenario classroom demonstrator (CSD) facility of the simulator. 
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Time slot Activity Procedural training and technical skills under development Non-technical skills under development 
15:30-16:30 
(Lesson 5) 
A preview of the session, using a training video, I.É.’s communications handbook and a 
case study is provided. Half of the drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 
minutes while the balance observes. Then, they switch roles. The review session 
comprises discussion, self appraisal of performance, and reviews from instructors and 
peers. 
Scenario type C: The communications process is initiated verbally, e.g., a request to 
examine the line or visually by telegram message, e.g., ‘Stop and Examine’ (after 
activation of hot axle box detector) on the train radio. Operators communicate as either 
transmitters or receivers over the train radio or signal post telephone. Communication 
exchanges are rated by peers. Each group experiences a variation in the simulation. 
Communications; 
Managing performance of others in the 
exchange; 
Workload management; 
Reflective and active listening. 
Day 2: 
09:30-09:45 
Sign In Review of activities from Day 1 




A preview of the session, using a PowerPoint presentation, is provided. Half of the 
drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 minutes while the balance observes. 
Then, they switch roles. The review session comprises discussion, self appraisal of 
performance, and reviews from instructors and peers. 
Scenario type A: Low adhesion driving 
Two variations are selected, e.g., falling gradient, buffer stop approach, sand application, 
requesting a route through a station. Each group experiences a variation on the theme. 
Situational awareness. 
10:45- 11:00 Break 
11:00–12:00 
(Lesson 7) 
A preview of the session, using a PowerPoint presentation, is provided. Half of the 
drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 minutes while the balance observes. 
Then, they switch roles. The review session comprises discussion, self appraisal of 
performance, and reviews from instructors and peers. 
Scenario type K: Degraded on board systems 
One group encounters failure of the safety control equipment (SCE); the other 
experiences CAWS failure. The groups need to identify the cause of the failures, isolate 
the equipment and implement the necessary protocols, e.g., advising the controlling 
signalman, or the deployment of a secondman. 
Awareness of the dangers associated 




Half of the drivers engage in fault finding simulations; the balance observes. The drivers 
and observers switch roles. Two faults are presented. 
The review session comprises discussion, and performance reviews from instructors and 
peers. 
Failure of the warning device (horn), headlights or track circuit assistor (location-
specific procedures involved). This lesson is replicated for a range of traction classes. 





A preview of the session, using a training video is provided. Trainees take part in a ‘card 
game’ in which the procedural steps, associated with the task about to be undertaken, 
must be ordered. Half of the drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 minutes 
while the balance observes. Then, they switch roles. The review session comprises 
discussion, self appraisal of performance, and reviews from instructors and peers 
Scenario type I: T3 possessions  
14:40-15:20 
(Lesson 10) 
Half of the drivers engage in fault finding simulations; the balance observes. The drivers 
and observers switch roles. Two faults are presented. 
The review session comprises discussion, and performance reviews from instructors and 
peers. 
Drivers are presented with a range ‘General Warnings’ on the TDMS., e.g., MCB 
tripped, motor/trailer bogie fault, couple/uncouple cock in wrong position, fire 
extinguisher removed, WSP failure, fire on train, passenger/driver interphone, 





A preview of the session, using a training video and a PowerPoint presentation, is 
provided. Half of the drivers operate the simulator for a period of ca. 15 minutes while 
the balance observes. Then, they switch roles. The review session comprises discussion, 
self appraisal of performance, and reviews from instructors and peers. 
Scenario type E: SLW 






Specific events, aimed at developing awareness of NTSs, are contained within the 
lessons. Some NTSs are practiced in a number of the lessons. Opportunity to 
practice and exhibit these may occur in advance of the formal bespoke lesson. For 
example, communications skills are practiced extensively in Lesson 1 but the 
focussed ‘Communications’ lesson is Lesson 6. Feedback on communication 
performance is delivered at the end of Lesson 1 as well as in Lesson 6. The 
contexts, used to develop awareness on NTSs within the lessons are: 
1) Hazard perception skills are developed by placing objects and avatars in the 
visual environment. A commercial road vehicle, modelled on those used by the 
infrastructure department, is placed in the environment to provide a cue to the 
driver; prompting him to be on the lookout for permanent way workers who 
may be ‘on or about the line’; 
2) Communication skills are developed by the application of I.É.’s structured 
communication protocols during all of the interactions between the driver and 
the signaller60. The driver also manages the authority gradient in cases where 
the signaller deviates from the standard protocols that are set down for such 
interactions; 
3) Workload management skills are developed during training for normal 
operations, e.g., non critical communication is initiated by the train regulator61 
over the train radio at a critical juncture. The driver answers the call only after 
the critical tasks have been attended to; 
4) Emotional intelligence (remaining calm in stressful situations) is developed 
during train failure situations. The train regulator and a passenger62 enquire 
impatiently, over the train radio and passenger communication systems, into 
the reason for the stoppage and the estimated time of journey resumption; 
5) Simultaneous capacity is developed by creating situations that are designed to 
divide the driver’s attention. An avatar or a trackside fire is positioned in close 
proximity to a section signal. The signal is at danger; 
                                                 
60 Role played by the instructor, or by a signalman when used for joint training interventions. It 
should be noted that to prevent negative learning it is the instructor, role playing the signalman, 
who is involved in cases where the driver is required to deal with a deviation in communication 
procedures. 
61 Role played by the instructor. 
62 Role played by the instructor 
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6) Problem solving skills are developed by placing a shopping trolley, which has 
been discarded by vandals, on the line. As the train passes the trolley, an 
emergency brake application is initiated. The process involves the 
establishment of a causal link between the detection of the trolley and the 
application of the train brakes; 
7) Decision making skills are developed by presenting a mediated63 alarm to the 
driver. The driver will decide when to deal with the situation having regard to 
the tasks at hand, the risks that are known to exist at the particular location and 
the criticality of the alarm, and the relevant operating procedures; 
8) Situational awareness skills are developed using a combination of the CSD64 
and the simulator. Using the CSD, video footage of a train about to start from a 
curved island platform is shown to attendees. In the video, both lines are 
occupied by trains. A ‘ready to start’ handsignal is displayed by platform staff 
to one of the drivers but is visible to both drivers because of the curve. This 
creates a starting against signal SPAD (SASPAD) trap for the unintended 
observing driver. Using the simulator in a separate use case, the adhesion at the 
wheel/rail is reduced. Advice of low rail adhesion (LRA) locations is provided 
in the bespoke simulated Weekly Circular; 
9) The danger associated with automaticity, the potential over reliance on safety 
systems, and the necessity to respond rather than to react to displays on the 
aspect display unit of the continuous automatic warning system are discussed 
in Lesson 7. 
The readers’ attention is drawn to the relevance of the numbering of the lessons in 
Table 14. The reference numbers of the scenarios (from Appendix 10), together 
with the locations of these scenarios within the numbered lessons (from 1st 
column of Table 14), are show in Column 2 of Table 27. Relevant changes to 
I.É.’s operational risk, achieved through the use of the simulator system, are 
presented in Column 5 of Table 27. 
                                                 
63 Passenger communication alarm 
64 Simulated occurrence presented in video format 
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5.10 Conclusion 
The completion of a TNA at the business level unit of analysis is necessary in 
order to determine the scope of the system to be acquired. The completion of a 
TNA at the role centric unit of analysis is necessary to determine the training 
content for the role and, by extension, the training scenarios and the capability of 
the system. The intended use cases determine the requirements specification for 
the system. 
Under the influence of emerging technologies, train driving is becoming an 
increasingly complex process and drivers must receive appropriate training in all 
the domains of learning. Training requirements must be determined with respect 
to the task components and, as importantly, to the cognitive processes which 
determine performance. A combination of hierarchical and cognitive task analyses 
is necessary to elicit both sets of determinants. To maximise the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the training process, it makes intuitive sense to adopt a risk and value 
based approach during the content elicitation, scenario development and training 
delivery phases. However, this approach has not garnered wide acceptance even in 
those jurisdictions where there is an abundance of data available on risk exposure. 
I.É.’s training programme was developed having regard to its internal standards 
and validation process whilst, at the same time, respecting the regulatory 
requirements. Although I.É. did not have access to internal professional 
ergonomic competence, it utilised the extensive knowledge and capability of its 
Staff Trainers to reveal the cognitive requirements associated with the operating 
scenarios. 
Non-technical skills compliment technical skills and contribute to safe traction 
driving. Accordingly, I.É. integrated NTSs awareness training within some of the 
lessons. This training was delivered in respect of SA, HPT and CRM. I.É. adopted 
an EBAT approach when designing the lessons. Using this approach, trainees 
encounter anomalous situations in the midst of routine operations. This approach 
enables the concomitant training of technical and non-technical skills. Prior to 
undertaking the simulator component of each lesson, enabling content is delivered 
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in lecture format using a range of engaging techniques. At the end of the simulator 
component of each lesson, instructor and peer feedback on performance is 
provided. 
Choosing the wrong training delivery approach would have hindered value 
creation. The writer wished to create an acceptable, non-threatening and engaging 
learning environment wherein attendees could devote their all of their efforts to 
the task of learning. It was decided not to make jeopardous assessments part of 
I.É.’s training process. Instead, the mastery approach was used and operators 
receive whatever repeat training is necessary until they have mastered the lesson 
content. Confidence in the competence of the operators is maintained through the 
precept that operators have been deemed to be competent at the end of the training 
session. An individual may have made one or more unsuccessful attempts before 
succeeding but this is unimportant; what is important is that, at the end of the 
training process, he is competent in task performance. 
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6 Types of Simulators and Fidelity 
In the context of the overall railway system, simulation is used in a full range of 
engineering, planning and operations applications, e.g., modelling vehicle 
suspension characteristics (Vampire ™), modelling wheel behaviour with 
hardware in-the-loop simulations (roller rig), modelling the effects of dynamic 
loads on trackwork (Adams/Rail-MEDYNA ™), modelling the effects of dynamic 
loads on structures (LUSAS ™), and modelling train running paths (Voyager ™). 
There is a fundamental difference between these types of simulations and the type 
that forms the central plank of this thesis. With the former types of simulation, the 
operators exist outside of the simulation; with the latter type, the operators exist 
within the simulation. This is referred to as human-in-the-loop simulation. 
Effective training for all of the identified training needs cannot be provided in the 
real world, so a surrogate mechanism is required to satisfy any identified 
insufficiency. Training simulators constitute the mechanism to abridge this 
shortfall. There is a wide variety of simulator equipment, with similarly wide 
ranging costs, available in the market. Each type is capable of bestowing 
particular benefits but each type also has specific drawbacks. In the previous 
chapter, the writer presents I.É.’s simulator enabled lesson plan, discusses the 
process that was used to develop it and provides insights into training delivery 
considerations. In this chapter, he discusses the means by which the lesson plan 
would be delivered. He addresses general issues around simulators, reveals the 
high level options that were selected by I.É., and introduces the concepts of 
egospeed and presence; both of which are particularly relevant in the context of 
performance assessment. 
At the feasibility stage of the project, the writer was in the fortunate position of 
not being overly constrained by cost implications; costs represented ca. 0·31% of 
the overall cost of the RSP (see Table 1). Because of the perceived 
transformational effects that simulation would have on training outcomes, there 
was an ephemeral inclination to procure an extremely elaborate system. Using the 
research contained herein, such inclinations were quickly aligned with the key 
commercial principle, i.e., unproductive costs must not be incurred. 
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This chapter is divided into eight sections, dealing with: 
6.1 What is a Simulator?; 
6.2 The Proliferation and Development of Simulators; 
6.3 Simulator Components; 
6.4 The Market for Simulators; 
6.5 Overview of the Product Range; 
6.6 Egospeed in the Simulated Environment; and 
6.7 Simulator Presence. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.8. 
6.1 What is a Simulator? 
A distinction must be made between the terms ‘simulation’ and ‘simulator’. A 
characteristic difference is that the former relates to a process and the latter refers 
to the tool or technology involved in creating the simulation. 
Juhary’s (2006) explanation of the simulation process is most agreeable to the 
writer insofar as it encompasses its main output objective, i.e., “... the context 
should place the student in a situation similar to the one in which he is going to 
apply the knowledge where understanding is much more important than 
memorising the facts” (p.3). Simulation is about practice-based contextualised 
learning which facilitates the development of a comprehensive suite of mental 
models, most relevantly, the probabilistic ones. Simulation permits the inclusion 
of probabilistic events into the more predictable aspects of the task environment. 
The occurrence of possible but improbable operational events epitomises the task 
context of train drivers. Although there is a lot of predictability associated with 
the job, it is the ability to cope successfully with the combination of predictable 
and unpredictable events that defines true competence and expertise. 
A simulator is always an imitation of reality and, as such, it is never perfect 
insofar as it reproduces the behaviours, states and perceptions of the real world to 
a limited degree. Because of this lack of congruence between the virtual and real 
worlds, Juhary (2006) advises that a simulation should resemble the real world 
closely as the use of a low level simulation could, conceivably, lead to the 
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formation of two separate mental models; one of the simulation and one of the 
real world. The approach taken by I.É. at the specification and use phases of its 
project, to prevent negative learning, is discussed in Sections 7.6 and 5.6.2 
respectively. 
The description of a simulator by Eichinger and Geraghty (2004) builds upon 
Juhary’s by including the notion of user experimentation. It promotes the concept 
of non-jeopardy training which is predicated on the concept of learning by failing 
which, in turn, supports the concept of mental model development. They describe 
training simulators as “... tools that allow users to experiment with alternative 
options... [and] predict the results of... operational decisions or actions” (p.1). 
6.2 The Proliferation and Development of Simulators 
Whilst the preponderance of simulation technology was developed to satisfy the 
needs of the aviation industry, this technology is now being used for skills training 
and assessment in many other industries and contexts. 
Simulators have been used since 190365 to train pilots in aircraft rudder 
movements (Perrow, 1999), between 1914 and 1918 to train cavalry men, since 
the 1950s to teach basic car control skills to drivers in Sweden and, since 1996, to 
train Japanese motorcyclists66 (Haworth et al., 2000a). Although dioramas had 
been used in Britain since 1887 to train traction drivers, the earliest recorded use 
of the human-in-the-loop simulators was associated with the electrification of the 
West Coast Mainline in the early 1960’s (Scott, 1998); they have been gaining 
widespread acceptance ever since. The Canadian National Railway has been using 
them since the early 1970s and Queensland Rail has been using them since the 
mid 1980s. More locally, Translink, the railway operating company in Northern 
Ireland, acquired a simulator in 2004. 
                                                 
65 However, the purchase of six simulators (Edwin Link Trainers) in 1934 by the US Army Air 
Force is widely accepted as being the precursor of modern flight simulation. 
66 The task of motorcycle riding is particularly challenging to simulate as it includes 
proprioceptive and tactile components, and balance ability, in addition to the psychomotor, 
cognitive and affective skills that are required for car driving. 
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Early traction simulators were constructed using real cab components and 
controls. The out-the-windscreen view comprised video footage of a real route. 
Recordings of actual in-cab sounds were used to provide aural cues. A computer 
simulation of the train behaviours integrated the audiovisual environment and the 
train control. Although the first generation of simulators created a very realistic 
training environment, they had limitations. It was not possible to change the state 
of the environmental artefacts, or to manipulate the weather or time of day etc. 
The quality of the OTW view deteriorated when the route video was played at 
different speeds than that at which it was recorded. Computational power was 
limited and the models of train behaviour were simple. Sometimes, the limited 
capability to alter signal aspects was circumvented by placing a hardware 
replication of a signal head adjacent to the projection screen. These simulators 
were used to develop basic driving skills, limited fault finding capability and route 
knowledge. No consideration was given to training the NTSs. The business case 
for making the financial investment in them was that they could substitute for a 
real train and that they were cheaper to purchase and operate. 
Technological improvements facilitated higher quality graphics and provided 
much larger computer memory storage. More accurate and detailed train models, 
more complex train configurations and more complicated train faults can be 
modelled which increase the functional fidelity. The second generation of 
simulators can replicate the virtual environment and train performance 
characteristics accurately, store and manage data to facilitate multiple comparative 
runs for each trainee and can calculate train performance data, i.e., in-train forces, 
energy efficiency, brake performance and trip times etc. Developments in 
computer graphics have also meant that CGI has replaced video footage67. States 
of infrastructure elements, climatic conditions and time of day can be altered at 
will. The audiovisual environment can be whatever the user wants to include in 
the simulation; not what was available on the day that the recordings were made. 
Modern simulators can create “... not a rendering of a place in time but of that 
                                                 
67 CGI was first applied, in primitive form, to aerospace and scientific engineering in the mid 
1960s. However, the 1982 movie ‘Tron’ was the first example of its widespread use to replicate 
realistic imagery digitally (Hahn, 2010). 
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place here and now” (Coelho et al., 2006, p.26). A three-dimensional model of the 
navigable space is generated using CGI. As the train is routed through this virtual 
space, the computer almost instantaneously generates the OTW view based on the 
exact location of the train, its speed and the objects that are placed in the scenery 
by the instructor as part of a scenario. 
However, the creation of this realism by artificial means comes at a cost. It is 
difficult to capture the data with sufficient accuracy to construct a high fidelity 
simulator and also to create the virtual environment for the OTW view. Gutiérrez 
et al. (2005) believe that accurate data capture is even more difficult to achieve 
than the process of engineering the simulator. The behaviours of the trains and the 
geographical parameters have to be accurately defined in the algorithms. The 
construction of a geo-specific visual database requires a detailed survey68 so that 
all of the topographical details are presented as they appear on the real route. 
6.3 Simulator Components 
There are seven principal components of a human-in-the loop simulator: 
1. A mock up control station or driver’s desk. There is much discussion around 
the required accuracy and realism of this component and whether it needs to 
be faithfully replicated in hardware or software. This choice is not a 
dichotomous one; some elements can be modelled in hardware while others 
can be modelled in software; 
2. A vehicle model. This is an accurate representation of the train’s systems 
and behaviours. It ensures that the driving experience is realistic and 
convincing: 
2.1. The physical properties of motion are calculated in real time; 
2.2. The physical movement of the cab as it responds to changes in the 
alignment of the trackwork and the elasticities in the formation also 
forms part of the vehicle model. Depending on the importance 
                                                 
68 The creation of a geo-specific database has been made much easier. Manufacturers have recently 
commercialised laser technology and use a software programme (MATRIX ™) to develop routes 
accurately and effortlessly. The landscape is traversed by a rail mounted scanner and digitised 
scans are manipulated so that the states of the artefacts on the route can be reconfigured at will. 
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assigned to recreating cab movement, some simulator systems 
incorporate expensive motion platforms; 
3. A display. The complexity of the display arrangement varies along a 
continuum from single to multiple monitors; to single channel projectors. 
The most sophisticated display arrangements utilise multiple channel 
projectors with edge blending to present a wide field of view seamlessly. 
Choosing the appropriate FOV and the method of its presentation is most 
important as it influences the presentation of redundant operator cues69, 
speed misperception70 and proneness to sickness71; 
3.1. In contrast to video, CGI can be used to provide environmentally rich 
training scenarios that can be designed and modified readily to meet 
fluid training objectives. CGI allows the user to define the training 
environment, e.g., the same scenario can be played in conditions of 
daylight, night, fog, rain, snow, increased environmental traffic and 
altered character behaviour. It also allows almost unlimited generation 
of interactive scenarios. Additionally, when using the CSD feature, the 
‘camera’ or eye point can be positioned anywhere in the CGI to 
provide bird’s-eye views of emerging scenarios. In I.É., this feature is 
used to illustrate the visual and cognitive traps that confront drivers in 
situations when artefacts and actors are occluded in one viewpoint but 
are visible in another, e.g., other operational staff are occluded from 
the driver’s view by environmental features or when drivers are 
presented with ‘ready to start’ handsignals that are intended for drivers 
of trains on adjacent platforms. The need for flexibility to alter the 
visual environment becomes evident when the broad range of 
scenarios, contained in Appendix 10, is considered; 
3.2. The use of the track builder tool allows users to extend the product’s 
capability. From their desks, users can update the databases of extant 
                                                 
69 Excluding the shunting activity, drivers have limited need for wide FOVs of the route ahead. 
70 Research by Wallis, Tichon and Mildred (2007) reveals that the field of view, presented to 
simulator users, is a determinant of the misperception of speed. 
71 FAA (2003) found that when there is a visual reference to the horizon or ground, the sensory 
system in the inner ear of the vestibular system becomes more reliable and the operator becomes 
less disoriented. 
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modelled routes to cater for infrastructure changes, or alternatively 
when fully proficient, users can develop new routes; 
4. A traffic model. This model includes the other traffic in the environment, 
e.g., controlled and automatically generated approaching trains, road traffic 
at grade crossings and trackside workers. Some of the model’s components 
are dynamic and others are placeables, i.e. ‘cut and paste’ static objects, and 
avatars; 
5. The scenarios. Training scenarios can be pre-scripted using the scenario 
preparation station. Alternatively, they can be constructed in real time using 
the instructor station. However, the latter informal approach does not 
provide opportunity to debug them or to validate them against defined 
objectives prior to deployment; 
6. An instructor station. The instructor manages the simulation and observes 
trainee performance through this interface. The instructor station also 
incorporates a communications computer which interfaces with the train 
radios on the drivers’ desks. Using this feature, instructors assume the roles 
of other actors, e.g., signalmen, other crew members, traffic regulators and 
passengers in the myriad of inter-party verbal exchanges that can occur, in a 
variety of contexts, over the train radio, crew phone and passenger 
communication systems; 
7. A SPS. The instructor pre-scripts scenarios on this computer. He defines the 
type of traction, the route, the environmental conditions, the event and any 
anomalies, prior to launching the scenarios onto the simulators. 
The above decomposition of a simulator system is generic and only presents a 
high level view of the basic components. Simulators are engineered to customer 
requirements and the specification of many of the components necessitates 
choices that are influenced by appropriateness to goal achievement, cost-benefit 
tradeoffs and acceptability to the user groups. As the typical life of a simulator is 
fifteen years, the choices exercised in respect of each component and attribute 
should be based on informed inquiry. The options selected by I.É. are presented in 
Table 15. 
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Table 15: Option Selection 
Simulator Component Option Selected by I.É. 
Mock up driver’s desk i) Desks would be based on nine classes of traction. In respect of 
engineering and modelling compromises, priority was afforded to 
the most recent traction fleets with the greater populations. 
ii) Productivity of desks would be maximised by the use of 
interchangeable handle boxes. 
iii) Operator interfaces would comprise a combination of hardware 
and software elements. 
iv) Artefacts on the desk that facilitate the achievement of training 
objectives would be modelled functionally. Ancillary artefacts, 
e.g., cab heater and saloon light switches, would be modelled non-
functionally. 
Vehicle model i) Accurate train models were specified. 
ii) Motion devices were actively avoided. 
Display i) To assist the creation of presence, 330 kilometres of strategically 
selected, geo-specific track database would be provided. Presence 
would be augmented by the inclusion of a number of lifelike 
prominent buildings on each route. 
ii) A small FOV would be presented to operators by means of 
projectors. The result of adopting this approach is presented in 
Section 10.3. 
Traffic model The supplier’s standard offering of controlled and automatic trains, 
and passenger activity on the platforms was accepted. Although this 
was adequate to address the extant needs, it may require modification 
in the event of the use cases being extended as proposed in Section 
11.2. 
Scenarios An ‘open’ platform was specified to enable scripting of a 
comprehensive range of realistic and relevant scenarios. See 
Appendix 10. 
Instructor station This would be configured to reflect: 
i) The extant AEG 90 train radio; 
ii) A span of surveillance of two operators per instructor; 
iii) The use of an observation station. 
Scenario preparation 
station 
The supplier’s standard offering was accepted. 
6.4 The Market for Simulators 
The market for driver training simulators is highly fragmented. It has passed the 
growth phase and is now mature. Manufacturers are now trying to gain market 
share from each other. As it becomes saturated and commences the decline phase, 
many suppliers will be forced to exit and some users will be left with costly 
equipment without manufacturers’ after sales support. However, support is 
usually available from remaining players in the market and these can provide 
maintenance and refurbishment support for equipment that was provided by 
extinct competitors. It should be noted that there is a vibrant market for the 
provision of half life equipment rebuilds. Even though the life expectancy of 
simulators is generally regarded as being fifteen years, there is a need to update 
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them at half life due to lowered reliability of the computer hardware, unsupported 
operating systems, the requirement to model modifications to stock or new fault 
remedies etc. Annual maintenance and half life rebuild costs amount to about 
1·4% and 25% respectively of the initial purchase price and have a significant 
effect on the internal rate of return of a simulator project. Over the lifetime of the 
project this product extension amounts to nearly 50% of the initial capital cost and 
it is unsurprising that simulator manufacturers are desirous to build and harvest 
long term customer relationships. 
6.5 Overview of the Product Range 
There is a full simulator product line-up. The degrees of fidelity and elegance of 
the various simulator types are evident from the photographic montage, presented 
in Appendix 13. Within each product segment, there is a great deal of variance in 
terms of sophistication and, hence, the proffered costs are indicative only. The 
part task trainer segment occupies the least expensive end of the continuum. It 
costs about £29,000 to develop the initial prototype and £21,000 per trainer 
thereafter (2015 prices). Full cab simulators occupy the other end of the 
continuum. These replicate all of the vehicle’s functionality and physical features 
and, depending on the specification, cost between €650,000 and €1,440,000 for 
each desk (Actuate Consortium, 2015). It should be noted especially that the 
scope of supply of full cab simulators in this price range is typically limited to 
about 30 kilometres72 of visual database and motion is provided by a shaker seat 
instead of a costly73 motion platform. 
However, ‘expensive’ is not synonymous with ‘better’. The value that is derived 
from the various types is dependent on their ability to satisfy the defined output 
objectives that constitute the customer requirements specification. For example, 
on the one hand DERA (2000) were able to productively use a part task rail 
simulator to study the effects of shift pattern and route type on safe performance 
whereas, on the other hand, the simulator in use by Amtrak has to be a full cab 
                                                 
72 Double line track data base costs about €900/km in excess of this minimum economic order 
quantity. 
73 The cost of a 6DOF motion platform, including modelling, is about €275,000 (2015 prices). 
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replica that is mounted on a motion platform. Because of Amtrak’s output 
objective, i.e., to use it for performance skills testing, there is a requirement to 
faithfully mimic the cab layout and functionality, handling characteristics, and 
draft and compression forces etc. of the HHP8 Bombardier–Alstom locomotive 
(Luczak, 2000 and GPO, 1999). 
Rail regulatory authorities, in Ireland (RSC, 2012) or elsewhere in Europe, do not 
prescribe the type of simulators that should be used for training; it is left entirely 
up to individual railway undertakings to decide the type and degree of elegance of 
the equipment to be used. The US regulatory authorities are more prescriptive. 
Although FRA (2012) states that it “… takes no exception to the use of simulators 
as a training tool… [it] does not consider the use of simulators to be an acceptable 
substitute for practical experience in the initial training of persons” (p.16-16). 
Sheridan et al. (1999) presents the reasoning underlying the FRA’s philosophy on 
the suitability of particular types of simulators to satisfy particular use cases. In 
respect of the use of Type II and III simulators, Sheridan et al. state that their use 
“... for initial training of persons... may improperly prepare them for the task of 
actual operation... [as] in the real world, drivers gain experiences which are 
tactile... and kinaesthetic” (p.19). See Appendix 14 for an elaboration of simulator 
taxonomy. 
The FRA is even more prescriptive when the simulators are to be used for 
certification. GPO (1999) mandates74 that, as a criterion of the assessment of 
performance skills, the testing procedure “...shall be of sufficient length and… 
conducted when the person is at the controls of the type of train, or Type I or Type 
II simulator to be normally operated” (§ 240.127). It should be noted that a 
performance skills test is more comprehensive than a monitoring check ride and is 
performed once every three years whereas the check ride is performed annually. 
6.5.1 Part Task Simulators 
Part task simulators comprise of software and, depending on their application, a 
visual display system. When used for ab-initio driver training, they include a basic 
                                                 
74 Regulations valid at 04.04.2016. 
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OTW display system (see Appendix 13). They also incorporate a meagre 
hardware interface comprising dummy panels, and a selection of real switches and 
buttons to represent the principal hardware cab elements. As the term suggests, 
functionality is designed around a subset of specific tasks and they are usually 
employed to supplement or fill critical training gaps within an overall training or 
assessment programme. 
They are used to provide non-contextual, general training rather than holistic 
traction-specific training. Part task training is more appropriate when the 
individual elements contained within the task are complex, and when the 
relationship and organisation between them is straightforward and there is no 
problem integrating the elements (Tendick, 2002). However, as discussed in 
Section 5.2, skills are often clustered together, so there comes a point in time 
when learning in those subtasks has to be integrated into a whole piece. Stand 
alone part task trainers are available to provide training for route learning, basic 
control skills, eco-driving, passenger information system operation, global system 
for mobile communications for railways, automatic train protection, ATO and 
ATC systems. 
Their frugality belies their utility and cost effectiveness. They are particularly 
useful as complimentary training devices as: 
1) They are relatively cheap; 
2) For particular outcomes, they can be substituted for other training devices. If 
procured as part of an overall strategy, trainees’ in-seat time on more elaborate 
and expensive simulators can be curtailed; reducing the number required; 
3) They can be used to cope with equipment changes, e.g., when UK operators 
were transitioning from the cab secure radio to the GSM-R system; 
4) There may be cost advantages ensuing from their generic nature. For example, 
the large quantity of them that were purchased to support the implementation 
of the GSM-R project in the UK, led to a reduction in the unit price. 
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6.5.2 Desk Simulators 
The system purchased by I.É. comprises desk simulators. Desk simulators 
incorporate comprehensive sets of necessary controls, such as door controls, 
safety control equipment, train radio, train data management system, master 
switch and the power/brake controller, in hardware format. They are not contained 
within replica driving cabs but are accommodated either in enclosed spaces or 
within bespoke booths. As could be expected, they do not create the ambience of 
real traction units. They are situated mid way on the product continuum. 
Depending on their design and functionality, desk simulators cost anything from 
€150,000 to €350,000. Features, such as, the control instruments (speedometer, air 
and vacuum gauges), circuit breaker panels and isolation switches, and 
faultfinding artefacts are presented through the medium of touch screens. Images 
of the route, much smaller than those used in a full mission simulator, are 
presented either on a projection system or on a monitor. 
One advantage of this type of simulator is that a number of simulator workstations 
can be networked and operated using the same set of communications computers, 
and modelling and development tools through a local area network. This type of 
system provides a number of efficiencies: 
1. There is an economy of scale. A number of workstations can be incorporated 
into a small space and can share the physical infrastructure as well as the 
software; 
2. A number of trainees can receive training at once, thus speeding up the training 
process; 
3. Very favourable instructor/trainee ratios can be achieved. However, the danger 
with a large class size is that slower learners may not be able to keep pace and 
an overburdened instructor may not notice this. 
6.5.3 Full Cab Simulators 
A full cab simulator looks and behaves like the traction unit upon which it is 
based. It is designed to provide operators with the greatest immersive experience 
possible; one that replicates the experience in the working environment. To 
achieve this goal, all of the equipment contained within the cab itself is fully 
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functional whilst the layout, features and functionality of the cab’s exterior, e.g., 
the engine room or car body side, is simulated using either an integrated touch 
screen arrangement or a part task trainer. 
Depending on the activity under training, e.g., driving a locomotive(s) hauling a 
long and heavy train or driving a tilting train, it may be considered necessary to 
develop the drivers’ kinaesthetic skills, or ‘knowledge in the hands’ as Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995) call it. To train such skills, full cab simulators are mounted 
on motion platforms. This approach increases the sense of presence experienced 
by the operator and improves egospeed. 
Accepting that full cab motion simulators abet the maximisation of presence, they 
were precluded by the writer for practical considerations: 
1) I.É. could have purchased only two full cab simulators for the same cost as 
eight desk simulators. This would have been inadequate to satisfy the 
anticipated training workload and to cater for its driver deployment; 
2) The value proposition is poor. I.É. would be paying for a facility to train a non-
essential skill; 
3) A simulator system, based on full replication of a particular traction unit, has 
low functional and physical fidelity in respect of another type of traction, and 
nearness of training transfer is diminished. 
Irrespective of simulator type, there is a requirement to keep train models and 
visual databases up to date. This challenge becomes more expansive and 
expensive in line with simulator complexity. EWS utilised a novel approach to 
keep its simulator current with the modelled locomotive. EWS assigned a ‘total 
operations processing system’ number to it, thus ensuring that any modifications 
that were carried out on the Class 66 locomotives would be carried out on the 
simulator as a matter of course Maintaining the visual database to reflect 
infrastructural changes poses a similar challenge but this was not a concern for 
EWS who had only included a geo typical database in the scope of supply. As 
well as affecting training effectiveness negatively, failure to update the system is 
likely to draw criticism from accident inquiry chairmen and simulator operators 
(Mackie, 2005; Neal, 2001; McInerney, 2001 and NTSB, 1999). 
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6.5.4 Simulator Fidelity 
There are three dimensions of simulator fidelity and each plays a part in the 
contribution that simulators make to the didactic outcomes: 
1) Physical fidelity is the degree to which the simulated environment looks like 
the real environment (Eichinger, 2004). To ensure high physical fidelity, a high 
proportion of original equipment manufacturer parts are used in construction. 
For example, when General Motors constructed 250 Class 66 locomotives for 
EWS, they produced an extra cab which was used by IITRI75 to construct 
EWS’ full cab simulator; 
2) Functional fidelity is the degree to which the simulated environment behaves 
like the real environment (Eichinger, 2004). A simulator with high functional 
fidelity provides a comprehensive set of stimuli in order to elicit the correct 
response from the range of possibilities. Such a simulator accepts either correct 
or incorrect inputs with veridical resultant outcomes; 
3) Psychological fidelity is the degree to which the simulation replicates the 
associated psychological factors, such as stress or fear. (Alexander et al., 
2005). High psychological fidelity is achieved by means of the equipment 
features, ambience and training scenario. For example, an operator who is 
participating in a scenario of high psychological fidelity and can project 
forward the outcome of his ineffective inputs, e.g., when encountering wheel 
slide on the approach to a buffer stop, will become stressed. If dealing with 
stressful situations effectively is one of the goals of the training intervention, 
this attribute is essential. The effect of stress on an individual’s performance is 
well recognised (Tichon et al., 2006). Drivers need enhanced skills, 
particularly cognitive skills, such as, decision making, problem solving and 
critical thinking, to deal with emergencies but these skills degrade in stressful 
situations. (See also Haworth et al., 2000b.) Virtual reality “... has been 
demonstrated to enhance the development of quality decision making skills, 
particularly under the stress imposed by time limitations” (Tichon et al., 2006, 
p.2). 
                                                 
75 Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) now trades under the style of Alion after a management 
buy out in 2002 
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It is clear that not all of the systems discussed in Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.3 are 
capable of providing high fidelity, and also that a simulator specifier may not wish 
to incorporate the highest fidelity within each of the classifications. The 
simulators purchased by I.É. provide a high degree of functional fidelity, a 
medium degree of physical fidelity and a low degree of psychological fidelity. 
6.6 Egospeed in the Simulated Environment 
Egospeed is the internal estimation of self-motion (Kim, 2015). The correct esti-
mation of speed is of paramount importance to successfully completing the 
driving task (see Section 2.4). Humans are adept at estimating their speed even 
when travelling at speeds that are well beyond those for which evolution has 
equipped them. Wallis and Tichon (2013) believe that this ability has possibly de-
veloped “… through the training gained by observation of a speedometer in fast 
moving land-based vehicles, [and that]… in order to make speed estimates, the 
brain relies on integrating a range of sensory cues” (p.71). Kim (2015) points out 
that “… there is a tendency for individuals to rely far more on external cues to 
indicate their speed rather than the speedometer, especially on stretches of [the 
route] that the driver is familiar with” (p.15). (See also Recarte and Nunes, 2002.) 
An underestimation of vehicular speed and an observed overproduction of speed 
can be considered equivalent behaviours and vice versa (Kim, 2015; Pretto et al. 
2012; Diels and Parkes, 2010; Rakauskas, 2009; and Pardillo, 2008). It should be 
noted that an underestimation of 16% in vehicular speed, as found in the study by 
Wallis, Tichon and Mildred (2007) equates to an underestimation of 35% in 
braking distance requirement76. Perceptual judgments are often different between 
simulated and real world environments. Thus, driving speed tends to be signifi-
cantly underestimated in simulated environments (Fischer, Eriksson and Oeltze, 
2012; and Diels and Parkes, 2010). There is a great deal of empirical evidence 
concerning the perception of speed in a simulator. Some of this evidence relates to 
very specific qualities of the visual imagery presented, e.g., modifications to con-
trast or luminescence. Unsurprisingly, there is variation and conflict in respect of 
the direction of misperception (whether speed was under- or over-estimated), the 
                                                 
76 Because of the squared speed-energy relationship 
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extent of misperception, and the correlation between the extent of (mis)perception 
and the FOVs used to present the scenery. However, the preponderant finding is 
that egospeed is underestimated consistently when driving in a simulated environ-
ment and when compared with the real world driving. The findings of 5 research 
groups are presented in Table 16. 
Table 16: Perception of Speed in a Simulator 
Researchers Findings 
Kemeny and Panerai 
(2016) 
Contrary to the findings of Wallis, Tichon and Mildred (2007), 
Kemeny and Panerai found that “… in driving simulators with a large 
field of view, longitudinal speed can be estimated correctly from visual 
information… [but] a horizontal field of view of at least 120o is 
needed” (pp.31-32). 
Diels and Parkes 
(2010) 
When using a normal display configuration (a Geometric FOV77 to 
observer’s FOV ratio of 1:1), visual speed was consistently 
underestimated resulting in speed overproduction of 10% on average 
(in the range 13·0% to 7·3% for speeds of 20, 30, 50, and 70mph with 
higher overspeeding associated with the lower speeds) (p.59). 
Wallis, Tichon and 
Mildred (2007) 
Drivers, using the wide-screen simulator, consistently underestimated 
their true speed by up to - 16%78 when travelling at 80 km/h. A 
variance of ca. 11% (from + 5% to – 6%) was noted in respect of the 
cab simulator.  
Variance in wide screen 
simulator (FOV = 160oX40o)  
Target 
speeds  
Variance in cab simulator 
(FOV = 50oX40o) 
- 15% 20 (km/h) + 1% 
- 7.5% 40 (km/h) + 5% 
- 10% 60 (km/h) + 2% 
- 16% 80 (km/h) - 6% 
Brünger-Koch, Briest 
and Vollrath (2006) 
Average speed was significantly lower in real driving and faster in the 
simulation. On straight sections of road, the difference was ca. 9%, i.e., 
from 63·6 km/h in the real world to 69·2 km/h in the virtual world. 
Hurwitz, Knodler and 
Dulaski (2005) 
Based on 320 unique data points, the underestimation of speed was in 
the range 14·44 mph to 0·50 mph (average 6 mph) when the actual 
speeds were in the range 17mph to 45 mph. 
The findings of Diels and Parkes (2010) does not concur entirely with the experi-
ence of the writer nor of I.É.’s Staff Trainers (N = 10) who found that speed 
underestimation was associated with higher operating speeds. 
As Wallis and Tichon (2013), and Recarte and Nunes (2002) point out, there is a 
range of devices and cues (visual, vestibular, proprioceptive and acoustic) 
                                                 
77 GFOV:FOV ratios in excess of 1:1 result in the content of the scenery appearing to be further 
away from the observer. The effect of changing the GFOV, while holding the size of the FOV 
(viewport) constant, is to change the displayed image between a wide angle view and a telephoto 
view. With a GFOV greater than the FOV, the visible scene is larger than in the real world. It 
alters the amount of visual information (object density) in the visual periphery, as well as the 
proximity of objects to the observer (Diels and Parkes, 2010, p.54). 
78 The negative sign denotes underestimation; positive sign denotes an overestimation 
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available to drivers to assist accurate speed deduction. The most obvious defence 
against speed misperception is speedometer observation which, because its output 
is determined by a simulator’s ‘physics engine’ tends to be very accurate. How-
ever, this defence mechanism is predicated on its observation, but as Recarte and 
Nunes (2002) point out “… speedometer inspection is a very vulnerable process, 
perhaps because it is very demanding in visual terms” and, additionally, that en-
gaging “… attention with mental tasks causes drivers to neglect speedometer in-
spection, which practically reaches null levels” (pp.120-121). 
Most of the other cues that aid accurate speed perception, identified  by Wallis 
and Tichon (2013), as well Recarte and Nunes (2002), are not available to the 
operators of I.É.’s simulator system: 
1. As motion platforms are not incorporated, the operator does not receive 
accurate vestibular cues; 
2. As the simulated trains operate over continuously welded rail, the aural cue 
associated with jointed track is not available to the operator. Similarly, the cue 
associated with ‘road noise’ is largely absent. 
6.7 Simulator Presence 
The task of a simulator is to mislead the operator’s senses to elicit naturalistic 
behaviours. Operators must suspend belief in the real world and must be complicit 
in the process by allowing themselves to be misled. The deceit is facilitated by the 
creation of an artificial presence. Witmer and Singer (1998) define presence as 
“… the subjective experience of being in one place or environment, even when 
one is physically situated in another” (p.1). The more immersive that an 
experience is in the virtual world, the greater is the sense of being part of that 
experience. The extent of immersion achieved is a function of the quality of the 
stimuli that are derived from the simulator fidelity. As Coelho et al. (2006) 
suggest, the feeling of presence or immersion that is experienced depends “... on 
the meaning that the operator gives to the stimuli that are presented to him” 
(p.32).  
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The creation of a sense of presence influences the training effectiveness of 
simulators (Tichon et al., 2006, and Witmer and Singer, 1998). Tichon et al. 
(2006) propose a set of presence causal factors, i.e., involvement79, sensory 
fidelity80, interface quality81, and adaptation or immersion82. The results of their 
self report study (N = 12 RailCorp drivers) reveals that the adaptation or 
immersion dimension was perceived to be the most influential factor in 
determining the level of presence experienced by the participants. Specifically in 
relation to the presentation of visual information, Alexander et al. (2005) believe 
that immersion is “… based on the extent to which the visual displays support an 
illusion of reality that is inclusive83,… extensive84,… surrounding85,… and 
vivid86” (p.6). Simulator sickness detracts from presence, and any effort expended 
to create presence will be fruitless unless successful mitigation measures are taken 
at the design and use phases to prevent its occurrence (Tichon et al., 2006; Coelho 
et al., 2006; and Witmer and Singer, 1998). 
Train drivers need to access a large amount of visual information at any given 
time. Information on the state of the internal environment is provided to the driver 
by means of TDMS displays, gauges, lamps, annunciator displays, general 
warning and incident panels etc. Information on the external environment is 
available from views through the windscreen and droplights. Internal information 
requirements are provided through the artefacts on the simulator desks, and the 
choice whether or not to include specific artefacts in the design is straightforward. 
Information on the external environment is provided through the presentation of 
CGI imagery. However, the choices concerning its provision are less 
straightforward. On the one hand, Tichon (2007), Allen et al. (2004), Emery et al. 
                                                 
79 Involvement is the extent to which the user is induced to focus attention on a coherent set of 
stimuli. It increases when the interface feels natural, and when the user can exercise control. 
80 The more that sensory information engages the operator and makes sense to him, the more likely 
he will be able to ignore external distractions to his feeling of presence. 
81 Interface quality affects the time taken to adapt to the setting and the resultant performance. 
82 Factors that affect immersion include isolation from the physical environment (by placing 
driving desks inside individual booths), perception of self inclusion in the virtual environment (the 
subject allows himself to be immersed), natural modes of interaction and control (provision of a 
realistic operator interface) and perception of self movement (a moving visual database). 
83 The extent to which physical reality is shut out 
84 The range of sensory modalities that are accommodated 
85 The size of the field of view 
86 The resolution, richness, and quality of the display 
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(1999) and Allen et al. (2004) suggest that the development of the visual database 
is of paramount importance. On the other hand, Parkes (2005) cautions that the 
provision of highly realistic, complex and overly elaborate visual environments 
may induce simulator operators to attend to elements in the visual environment 
that are peripheral to the training objective. Kaptein et al. (in Blana, 1996a) go so 
far as to say that complex scenery adds no value to a simulator and may, in fact, 
detract from it. A further drawback, associated with the presentation of complex 
CGI, is the distortion in the perceived velocity of the simulated vehicle. 
To enhance the sense of presence, Beasley and Burwell (2002) propose that a geo-
specific, rather than a geo-typical, visual database should be used as it resembles 
more closely the real world view with which trainees interact. (See also SWOV, 
2009; Waters (ed.), 2006; and Allen et al., 2004.) Geo-specific visual databases 
are difficult to construct. Here-to-fore, the development of a good geo-specific 
database was dependent on the availability of good source data87, the 
mathematical rigour used to develop the imagery and the capability of the 
rendering 88device. The recent commercialisation of the MATRIX ™ software has 
reduced the effort required to achieve this outcome. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Simulation permits the inclusion of probabilistic events into the more predictable 
aspects of the task environment; facilitating the key objective of training for 
degraded and emergency working. The development of I.É.’s specification was 
constrained only by the desire to procure a system that was appropriate to the 
identified training objectives. From a very extensive product range, I.É. chose to 
procure a suite of desk simulators. 
Having considered the various arguments in respect of the creation of presence, 
the writer found favour with the predominant view. The creation of a moderate 
degree of presence was sufficient to facilitate the integration of human factors 
                                                 
87 Typically, this data is obtained from asset management systems, track charts, architectural 
drawings, CCTV footage from the front of trains, and physical surveys. 
88 Rendering is a conversion process that transforms 3D objects into 2D images. The process 
calculates the characteristics of a 3D model, such as colour tone, shades and depths, and projects 
them into a 2D space. This is achieved by PC graphics cards (Kwon et al., 2006). 
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training with procedural training. Presence would be created by specifying the 
combination of realistic driving control stations and an extensive geospecific CGI 
visual database. However, absolute presence was subjugated to value-for-money 
and practical considerations when full cab motion simulators were being 
considered. Speed production and egospeed can be considered to be equivalent 
behaviours. Underestimation of speed, commonly experienced in simulated 
environments, generally results in overspeeding. 
Systems need to be maintained and kept current. Over the life of simulator system, 
maintenance costs can amount to 50% of the capital cost. This must be included in 




7 Contribution of Literature Review and Description of I.É.’s 
Project 
The writer conducted a literature review of some seven hundred89 peer reviewed 
articles, conference papers, books, trade journals and industry reports. Referenced 
peer reviewed articles relate to the nature of the train driving task, operational 
rules, human reliability, the business case for training provision, cognitive aspects 
of training design, the use of models and images for training, motion cueing, 
simulator sickness, egospeed, competence assessment and the use of proportion 
factors90. The review was carried out using comprehensive library and internet 
searches, and the information gained from it was supplemented with information 
gained from seminar attendance and interviews with knowledgeable others in the 
training and simulator sectors. The elicited information was used to satisfy the 
writer’s inseparable and mutually supporting, personal and vocational objectives. 
The personal objective was thesis-based and, hence, was undertaken to inform the 
writer about the effectiveness of driver training simulators. The vocational 
objective was centred on the developments of the use cases and a procurement 
specification for I.É.’s simulator system. The outputs of the inquiry processes 
informed the writer on each of the many occasions when he reached decision 
points, initially during the specification and procurement stages of the project and, 
more latterly, during the implementation and value extraction phases. 
In the previous chapter, the writer provides a general discourse on simulators; 
making mention of specific attributes that can limit their use for assessment 
purposes. This chapter is presented from two discernible foci. At the general level, 
the writer discusses the necessity for a robust project management process when 
procuring a bespoke IT based system, the need to establish the necessary fidelity 
requirements timely, and also specific noteworthy features that can detract or add 
value to the overall training process. He then focuses attention on I.É.’s system; 
going on to describe it in detail. The elegance and scope of the system determined 
the benefits and cost and, hence, the project’s IRR. 
                                                 
89 About three hundred and seventy five of these are referenced herein. 
90 Proportion factors (PFs) are used in combination with the value of preventing a fatality (VPF) to 
evaluate what an organisation, rather than a customer, is willing to pay to reduce risk. 
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To achieve a project’s goals, the strategic imperatives must be decided from the 
start. As Lewis Carroll91 (in Thompson and Strickland, p.3) put it "If you don't 
know where you're going, any road'll take you there". All elements of the training 
system must be designed with respect to each other. However well the system is 
engineered, if it is used without strategic intent, it will not result in optimised 
outcomes and goal realisation. Descriptions of the strategies and the systems 
engineering approaches that were used to achieve I.É.’s project’s goals, and 
details of the bespoke equipment, its scope and the accommodation that was 
necessary to provide for it, are presented in this section. These descriptions 
contextualise and give meaning to the achieved outcomes, and also to the findings 
resulting from project implementation. 
This chapter is divided into ten sections, dealing with: 
7.1 Importance of a Robust Project Management Process; 
7.2 Establishing the Fidelity Requirements of the Driving Desks; 
7.3 Identifying the Value Detracting Properties; 
7.4 The Use of Motion Platforms to Provide Cues; 
7.5 Simulator Sickness: a jeopardous occurrence; 
7.6 The Value of an Observer Station; 
7.7 Strategic Imperatives of the Project; 
7.8 Deployment and Description of Equipment; and 
7.9 Salient Features of Simulator Accommodation. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.10. 
7.1 Importance of a Robust Project Management Process 
The Standish Group (2013) reports92 that during 2010, 21% of all information 
technology projects failed93 and a further 42% were challenged94. The worldwide 
cost of IT project failures was €4·5 trillion, and half of the failures incurred 
budget overruns in excess of 80% (Fanning, 2011). Irish high profile failures 
include the abandonment of electronic voting machines which cost over €52 m, 
                                                 
91 Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
92 The report is based on an overall analysis of the outcomes of over 50,000 IT projects. 
93 They were cancelled prior to completion, or they were delivered but never used. 
94 They were late, over budget or did not have the required functionality. 
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and the curtailment of the Personnel, Payroll and Related Systems (PPARS) 
project for the Health Service. The original estimate of costs was €9·14 m but it 
was forecast that costs would rise to €230 m to achieve the specified functionality. 
Spending on PPARS was halted by the Irish Government when the costs escalated 
to €116 m. 
Because of these notorious IT project failures, it is understandable that resource 
allocators are cautious when granting approval for such projects. Particularly in 
those cases where the implementation of such projects is novel within the 
organisation, it is usual to seek experienced consultants’ assistance in order to 
mitigate risk. An alternative approach is to entrust it to those who are most 
directly involved in the relevant activity, i.e., Training Officers in the case of 
simulators. To minimise project risk and to prevent the ‘non-rational escalation of 
commitment’, I.É. adopted a two phase procurement process (see Section 7.7.1). 
7.2 Establishing the Fidelity Requirements of the Driving Desks 
The veridical limitation of simulation is captured succinctly by Shechtman et al. 
(2009) who point out that it is an “… abstraction of reality, transforming the all 
encompassing world into a more sparse simulation that includes specific aspects 
of reality but disregards others” (p.380). The necessary degree of simulator 
fidelity is the subject of constant debate; confounding findings prevail. Findings 
are based on research criteria such as the congruence between the simulated 
stimuli and reality (Schmid, 1995); nearness of transfer (Groeger (in SWOV, 
2006) and Tichon et al., 2006); learning domain under development (Alexander et 
al., 2005); training objectives (Dodshon, 2002; and Anon., 2007); effect on 
operators’ physical wellbeing (de Winter et al., 2007; Coelho et al., 2006; Pardillo 
and Troglauer, 2005; Anon., 2007 and Blana, 1996b); stakeholder acceptance 
(Baker et al., and Jentsch and Bowers (both in Mitsopoulos et al., 2005); cost-
benefit trade-off (Macdonald, 2006; Young, 2003; and Walker and Bailey, 2002) 
and the stage of operator development (Wallace et al., 2005). 
At the most extreme position in the debate, Lee (in de Winter et al., 2007) 
suggests that “... low fidelity simulators, or simulators that intentionally distort the 
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driving experience may be more effective than those that strive for veridical 
representation of the driving environment and vehicle dynamics” (p.3). However, 
the preponderant findings in the reviewed material suggest that the level of 
fidelity, to be specified by a purchaser, should be determined by the training 
requirements and that functional fidelity is more important than physical fidelity 
in satisfying these requirements (Hahn, 2010; Rushby and Seabrook, 2007; de 
Winter et al., 2007; Vlakveld, 2005; Brock et al., 2001; and Blana, 1996a). The 
writer adopted these findings when specifying I.É.’s equipment. 
Wallace et al. (2005) present a physical/functional fidelity matrix (Table 17) that 
proposes the varying degrees of fidelity apt to particular stages of development. 
Table 17: Levels of Fidelities Appropriate to the Different Stages of Trainee Development 
 Physical fidelity 










High Use of a real 
traction unit in a 
live environment 
High end full cab 
simulator 
Desk simulator High end 
desktop PC 
simulator 
Medium Use real traction 
unit in controlled 
environment 
Low end (part task) simulator Low end desktop 
PC simulator 
Low Static traction unit Arcade type simulator incorporating 
the functional fidelity of the 
Microsoft Train Simulator but within 
a traction unit-like enclosure 
Classroom 
lecture or lesson; 
Written material; 
Multimedia. 
Adopted from Wallace et al. (2005) 
Wallace et al. state that the training delivery methods in the lower right hand 
quadrant are typically used in the early stages of training process while those in 
the upper left are used in the latter stages of development. They believe that the 
combination of functional and physical fidelity in the upper right quadrant is 
required when there is a high cognitive element to the training objective and that 
the combination of fidelities in the lower left quadrant is required when there is a 
high psychomotor content in the training objective. 
7.3 Identifying the Value Detracting Properties 
Although simulator systems are complex and expensive, they provide value if 
implemented properly. The opposite is also true; value is lost if implemented 
poorly. As simulators are merely models of reality, use for assessment purposes 
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requires high verisimilitude and, given the assessment criteria, sufficiently-high 
fidelity may not be commercially available. For example, it is illogical to assess a 
driver’s response rate on the approach to a restrictive signal if there is a mismatch 
between perceptible train speed, and that calculated by the simulator’s physics 
engine. RSSB (2007) opine that “… wherever possible, assessment [should be] 
conducted in the workplace… The method of assessment should be selected to 
ensure that the conditions under which competence is tested are as close to the 
actual working environment as is reasonable and safe to achieve” (p.19). 
Excluding ethical concerns regarding the possible creation of an unhealthy 
training environment for the operators, the occurrence of simulator sickness 
detracts from its acceptance and puts simulator projects at risk. The findings of 14 
primary and 20 secondary research studies are presented in Appendix 15. These 
relate to the effects of motion, the method of image presentation and the FOV, on 
the likelihood of sickness occurring. In summary, simulator sickness can be 
mitigated by using single channel projection, a high refresh rate95 for the projected 
vista, a FOV of 40° in the vertical and 60° in the horizontal axes, presentation of 
the OTW view onto a display screen having reference edges, by limiting the 
exposure time and the use of static desks. Theoretically, motion platforms should 
ameliorate the problem of simulator sickness. 
7.4 The Use of Motion Platforms to Provide Cues 
The incorporation of motion platforms is invariably considered by simulator 
specifiers. To understand the possible need for motion, it is essential to first 
appreciate the difference between manoeuvring and disturbance cues. 
Manoeuvring cues are those which are presented as a direct result of the driver’s 
control inputs; disturbance cues are presented as a result of external forces acting 
upon the train independent of the driver’s control inputs. Drivers need to appre-
ciate the connectedness of their inputs with the generation of the manoeuvring 
cues that they experience. The manoeuvring cues, experienced in one particular 
operating context, are discussed in Section 7.4.3; more general cues include those 
that are experienced when driving routinely or when coupling vehicles etc. The 
                                                 
95 Achieved by the avoidance of very complex, non value-adding scenery 
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value of experiencing disturbance cues in the context of train driving is not clear 
cut. Cues experienced because train derailment or poor track structure are 
disturbance cues. Modelling such cues would present difficulties as they would 
have to be based on the nature of the permanent way (slab track, sleepered track, 
plain track, switches or crossings), train speed and the proximity of the derailed 
vehicle to the driver’s desk etc. Furthermore, it is unlikely that empirical evidence 
would be available to validate such models; leading to the possibility of negative 
training transfer. Motion cues are perceived visually through the photoreceptors 
and, non-visually, through the mechanical force receptors in the gravito-inertial-
somatosensory system (inner ear, kidneys, skin and muscles). Research shows that 
the gravito-inertial-somatosensory system detects accelerations quicker than the 
visual system96 (Bürki-Cohen et al., 2011 and Tydeman, 2004). 
To provide training in cue recognition and response, a full mission simulator, 
referred to as a Type I simulator (FRA notation), is used. A Type I simulator 
includes the equations appertaining to the physical properties of motion, response 
algorithms of the train’s controls and systems, equations that model 
environmental factors such as track elasticity, and the characteristics of the 
locomotive suspension and coupler systems etc. To increase immersion, Type I 
simulators are mounted on 6 DOF motion platforms that move the simulator 
workspace in response to operator control inputs, vehicle characteristics and 
environmental factors. 
7.4.1 Working Parameters and Limitations of Motion Platforms 
The more elegant hexapod motion platforms provide about 350 of pitch, roll and 
yaw, and about 2 m of linear displacement. Because of operating space 
constraints, simulator motion cues are attenuated deliberately by means of a 
‘washout filter’97, and are usually sustained for no more than 0·3 sec. A limitation 
of the human internal motion sensory system is that once a constant speed is 
                                                 
96 The brain processes information from the gravito-inertial-somatosensory system in about 1/100th 
of a second; processing information from the visual system takes about 1/10th of a second (Bürki-
Cohen et al., 2011). 
97 Linear and rotational displacements have to be achieved without allowing the simulator to move 
outside of its workspace. On a functional block diagram, the washout filter (a software component) 
is positioned between the vehicle’s dynamic model and the actuation system. 
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reached, it stops reacting. The brain now relies on visual cues until another 
acceleration occurs and the resultant kinaesthetic cues are presented, before the 
sensory system reactivates. In the interim, the operator thinks that he is moving 
continuously even though the system is operating in reverse. Imperceptible 
movement of the platform allows the simulator to return to its neutral position in 
readiness for the next movement. (See also Falkmer (in Dorn, ed., 2005).) 
Most germane, motion platform operation is characterised by acceleration limits 
and time delays. Control input time delays range from 300 ms for older platforms 
to 20 ms for the most recent servomotor hexapods (de Winter et al., 2012). These 
delays present problems in respect of the integration of the simulator’s motion and 
visual systems. The designer’s objective is to make movement of the operator’s 
workspace synchronous with the display. Although tightly coupled motion should 
reduce the incidence of simulator sickness, non-synchronised or poorly-tuned, 
motion will exacerbate the situation. 
7.4.2 Value of Motion Platforms 
The writer was unable to find any empirical evidence concerning the possible 
contribution of motion cues to rail accident prevention. However, in the 
directionally unconstrained domain of combat aviation, Gebman (in de Winter et 
al., 2012) found that 15% of US Air Force accidents involved situations in which 
motion cues were important. He concluded that simulators incorporating motion 
might prepare pilots better to deal with critical situations. However, confounding 
experimental study results exist. 
In their meta-analytical work, Bürki-Cohen et al. (2011) present the findings of 
several researchers in respect of the inability of motion platforms to increase 
training effectiveness: 
1. de Winter concludes that “... for experienced pilots, the effect of physical 
motion was calculated to be nil” (p.9); 
2. Experiments conducted at Volpe Center “... did not find a relevant benefit of 
motion” (p.10); 
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3. During their independent experiments, FAA/Volpe, and Lee and Bussolari 
concealed the motion status of the simulator from their subjects. In most cases, 
its disablement went unnoticed. See also Go, Bürki-Cohen, Chung, Schroeder, 
Saillant, Jacobs, and Longridge (all in Bürki-Cohen et al., 2011) who 
conclude that “... for recurrent training, no benefit of the motion provided was 
found” (p.6). 
Even in those studies that revealed a positive relationship between the motion 
cueing and training effectiveness, the results are marginal: 
1. In their true and quasi transfer experiments, Vaden and Hall (in Bürki-Cohen 
et al., 2011) found an insignificant effect in favour of motion; 
2. Lee and Bessolari (1989) found “... the absence of any reliable effects of 
motion… on pilot performance and subjective ratings would tend to support 
arguments for less complex motion systems” (p.140); 
3. Szczepanski and Leland (in Leland et al., 2009) reveal that “… motion cueing 
is [only] necessary when training ab-initio pilots or pilots who have limited or 
no experience in the particular flying task that is being trained” (p.2). 
In respect simulators used to train traction unit and car drivers, de Winter et al. 
(2009), Russell (2006), Greer (in Lockridge, 2006), Parkes (2005), Dodshon 
(2002) and Howells (2000) opine that the feature is unnecessary. Giving practical 
effect to this position, Virgin Trains decided not to retain the motion platform on 
the Pendolino driving desk at its training centre in Crewe as it was believed it did 
not contribute any significant benefit to competence development (Anon., 2007). 
A contrary position is held by Young (2003), Scott (1998), Blana (1996a) and 
Blana (1996b) who believe that the provision of motion cues is important. 
7.4.3 Value of Motion Platforms: a particular use case 
Train control and the management of in-train forces are crucial skills for the safe 
and effective operation of particularly-long and very heavy trains. Drivers use the 
brakes and, in some instances, a combination of brakes and throttle, to decelerate 
or accelerate a train. These non-intuitive combinative techniques are designed 
specifically to manage the in-train forces that are generated by slack in the 
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couplings between vehicles. Poor slack management can lead to derailment, 
broken couplings and time wastage. 
Drivers need to know how, and in what circumstances, to make a range of brake 
applications, i.e., service brake, emergency brake, blended brake, dynamic brake, 
independent brake or power brake applications, using either of the brake handles 
and/or end-of train (EOT98) devices. The circumstances necessitating such 
applications are multifarious, e.g., a running brake test, routine or emergency stop, 
holding application, and the need to prevent slack or to create it in the couplings. 
The situation is compounded when the effects of gradient and its direction are 
considered; in some instances the driver may need to accelerate the front portion 
of the train while, at the same time, decelerating the rear portion. 
Training this skill set requires theoretical and, most importantly, practical input. If 
using a simulator to develop these skills, the provision of kinaesthetic cues is 
essential. The driver needs to feel the effects of his actions on the train’s 
acceleration, deceleration and jerk forces. 
I.É.’s largest trains are 1,300 tonnes in weight and 450 metres in length. The trains 
are not loosely coupled and EOT devices are not used. Furthermore, as the 
strategy was to use the simulator to develop cognitive and procedural skills rather 
than kinaesthetic or tactile skills, I.É. would not extract value from a motion 
system. 
7.5 Simulator Sickness: a jeopardous occurrence 
Simulator sickness and motion sickness are similar in outcome but they have 
different causation mechanisms. Simulator sickness is caused by “... inconsistent 
information about body orientation and motion received by the different senses, 
known as cue conflict” (Kolasinski, 1995, p.vii). The primary conflict, believed to 
be at the root of simulator sickness, occurs between the visual and vestibular 
senses. The vestibular system, situated within the inner ear, sends signals to the 
                                                 
98 ‘Smart’ EOT devices send data concerning brake pipe pressure to the locomotive driver using 
radio-based telemetry. In emergency situations, the brake pipe can be discharged and the brakes 
applied from the end of the train using an EOT device. 
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nervous system about the body’s rotational and linear translations. Theoretically, 
the incorporation of motion platforms should solve the problem of simulator 
sickness that is caused by cue imbalance. However, even if implemented 
correctly, motion platforms seem to create the separate but related problem of 
motion sickness. This is induced in susceptible people when they are subjected to 
movements at a particular, usually low, frequency. 
The most common manifestations of simulator sickness include general 
discomfort, nausea, headache, disorientation, drowsiness and vomiting. Kolasinski 
(1995) identified forty factors that are associated with simulator sickness and 
categorised these into three global factors, i.e., subject, simulator and task. 
Factors, relevant to this thesis, are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18: Factors Affecting Simulator Sickness 
Global 
factor 
Factor General comments and relevance to traction unit driving 
Subject 
Age of subject The prevalence of simulator sickness decreases rapidly between 
12 to 21 years of age and is generally not found in those aged 
over 50. 
Contrary to Kolasinski’s (1995) findings, Reed et al. (2007) 
found that it was older drivers who were more prone to sickness. 
Concentration 
on task 
High levels of concentration are associated with lower levels of 
sickness. Hence, it is important to keep drivers engaged for the 
duration of the time they spend on the simulated driving task. 
Experience of 
the real world 
task 
Those subjects with more real world operational experience are 
more susceptible to sickness than those with less experience. 
Ab-initio drivers are less susceptible than the preponderant cohort 
of experienced drivers. 
Experience of 
simulator use 
Repeated immersion in a simulator will result in adaptation and a 
reduction in instances of sickness. 
Gender Females are more prone than males to simulator sickness due to 
their relatively larger field of view. 




Only subjects in good general health should operate simulators. 
By definition, drivers are in good health. 
Field 
dependence 
Field independent individuals are more susceptible to sickness. 
Field dependence is one of the criteria of medical examinations 




Presentation of a stereoscopic display leads to a higher incidence 
of sickness. (See also de Winters et al., 2007.) 
FOV There is a higher incidence of sickness associated with a wide 





Factor General comments and relevance to traction unit driving 
Motion 
platform 
Motion platforms are sometimes installed into simulators to help 
reduce simulator sickness by resolving cue conflict. Hörmann et 
al. (2003a) did not report any concern about simulator sickness 
during their experiment with aircraft pilots even though the key 
experimental and equipment parameters were extreme99. 
Scene content The more detail that is provided in the visual scene, the longer it 
takes for the graphics card to generate it; resulting in latency and 
cue conflict. Effective simulation depends on low latency 
between the time an input is made and the time that the operator 
perceives the effects of the input. To minimise latency, the 
instructor station computers must be located within 20 m of the 
simulator desks. (See also the note on the attributes of the Can-




Simulator systems that provide subjects with a high degree of 




Longer exposure results in a higher incidence of sickness. 
Kolasinski (1995) suggests that the propensity for simulation 
sickness peaks at a scenario length of 20 minutes. Coelho et al. 
(2008), Hoff (2001) and Haworth et al. (2000a) suggest limits on 
the duration of simulator runs of 22, 25 and 15 minutes 
respectively. In contrast, some SUG100 members in Britain run 
scenarios that are 2 hours in duration. 
Adopted from Kolasinski (1995) 
Some of these factors are managed routinely when candidates are being selected 
for the driving role or else when they are engaged in the simulation process. Other 
factors need to be managed by astute system design and usage. Understandably, 
the occurrence of simulator sickness detracts from the training experience and 
may lead to a reluctance to using the simulator. 
7.6 The Value of an Observer Station 
The provision of experiential learning in all its domains has been cited earlier as a 
key benefit of simulation. This benefit can be extended by applying the principle 
of social or vicarious learning (Bandura, 1977). In its evaluation of the importance 
of social learning, TUDO (2013) finds that as much as “... 60-70% of learning 
takes place not in the simulator but next to the simulator [in an observer station]” 
(p.20). 
                                                 
99 They included a simulator session of between 1 and 2 hours duration, a 150° FOV, travel 
movements between 1·7 and 2·8 metres, a yaw rotation between ±37·50°, and 
acceleration/deceleration forces between ± 1g (p.34). 
100 The Simulator User Group (SUG) comprises UK users of train simulators. Its goal is to share 
its considerable experience on all aspects of simulators towards the development of best practice. 
It provides advice to its membership and to companies considering purchase. 
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Criticism of the incorporation of observer stations usually centres on the effici-
ency of training delivery, i.e., trading in-seat time for observation time. Critics 
believe that the observation process usurps resources and contributes little value 
as the observers become bored. This may be true if the process is unstructured. In 
cases where observation facilities are implemented with aforethought, the peer 
group becomes fully engaged in the process as they conduct reviews of the 
communications exchanges and operator’s overall driving performance, and also 
identify and rate hazards that are presented within the scenarios. This epitomises 
the collaborative learning approach espoused by Eichinger (2004), Smith (2003), 
and Lave and Wenger (1991). Observer engagement in the process is also 
influenced by the elegance and functionality of the observation facility. In the 
crudest form, observers stand around the driving desk trying to catch sight of the 
scenario as they jostle for a vantage point. More engaging and less intrusive 
facilities have separate observation spaces where the operators’ OTW view, cab 
displays, interactions and performance can be observed. A description of I.É.’s 
observer station is contained in Appendix 7. 
Provision of feedback is important in the learning process as it helps to develop an 
understanding why some encountered scenarios were resolved satisfactorily while 
others were not. In the feedback process, “... the driver's own feelings are mirrored 
against the impressions of the observer. In order to objectify the statements of the 
observers, the trainer can draw on a number of documented data provided by the 
system as log data” (TUDO, 2013, p.19). In its field study, CRC for Rail 
Innovation (2013a) found that “In the driver’s opinion, the debrief was where the 
major learning took place” (p.21). The relative merits attaching to the possible 
sources of the performance feedback should be considered. Some believe that the 
operators are more susceptible and amenable to feedback provided by peers rather 
than by instructors (de Craen et al., 2005 and MB, CoE & TS, DoE&PS, 1996.) 
However, others believe that peer reviews or corrective comments are much more 
easily accepted if they are relayed through the instructor (TUDO, 2013). In I.É., 
performance feedback is provided by instructors and peers. 
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7.7 Strategic Imperatives of the Project 
In general, projects of the type which are described in this thesis are not well 
understood by resource allocators. Typically, they evaluate projects comprised 
mainly of tangible assets. The equipment described herein comprises an 
amalgamation of tangible assets (44%) and intellectually embedded assets (56%). 
There is greater risk associated with a project of this type, e.g., escalating software 
development costs and the derisory value realised from the disposal of a bespoke 
asset. From a corporate governance point of view and the desire of a semi-state 
organisation to avoid public criticism, the Board of I.É. needed to ensure that this 
particular project attained its goals. The Board’s objectives and the writer’s 
personal desire to succeed in his assignment determined the strategic approach 
that was adopted. 
7.7.1 Commercial and Contractual, Process and Strategy 
The commercial aspects of the project, contract risk and supplier dependencies 
were managed proactively to ensure that it would be delivered with the required 
functionality and within the allocated budget. Accordingly: 
1. All elements of the project were subjected to open competitive tendering 
processes; 
2. The procurement process was split into two distinct phases; 
2.1 A detailed functional specification was developed and agreed by both 
contracting parties. The contract allowed for the transfer of the design 
documents to a third party for implementation if irresolvable challenges 
arose; 
2.2 As no problems became manifest during Phase 1, the DFS was 
implemented by the extant contractor in Phase 2. 
This separation of project phases permitted I.É. to avoid escalating 
commitment irrationally and to halt the project if it became challenged. 
3. Ongoing dependence on the supplier was mitigated. A Track Builder Tool ™ 
was included in the scope of supply. A fixed price maintenance contract was 
contracted for also; 
4. Project risks were identified and mitigated: 
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4.1 As simulators need to be housed in a semi clean room environment, the 
provision of bespoke accommodation was scheduled into the project’s 
critical path; 
4.2 The matter of purchasing a distributed interactive simulation system 
incorporating integrated simulators for signalman and driver training was 
considered but was not pursued (see Section 5.5.1); 
5. The system was deployed proportionally to driver catchment areas; 
6. The number of desks purchased was based on the anticipated annual 
requirement pattern of the drivers, i.e., 250 drivers attending for a four day 
biennial refresher programme, plus 40 trainees requiring basic driver training, 
plus an additional capacity for drivers to attend remediation training on an as-
required basis: 
6.1 The anticipated class size was 4 drivers on refresher programmes, 8 drivers 
on ab-initio programmes, and individual tailor-made remediation 
interventions; 
6.2 I.É. would acquire eight desk type simulators, none of which would 
incorporate a motion platform; 
7. Not all classes of traction would be modelled. Only those classes that are 
significantly different and that were considered as having a long term future in 
I.É.’s fleet would be modelled. 
7.7.2 Operant Objectives and Strategy of the Project 
After consideration of cognitive constructs, the writer developed a clear set of 
output objectives for the project. He believed that: 
1. Training programmes must be improved; not necessarily shortened. The 
emphasis was on effectiveness rather than efficiency; 
2. The system must support the provision of experiential training in a broad 
range of normal, degraded and emergency conditions; 
3. The system must provide an interactive and collaborative training experience. 
The ambience within the facility would be relaxed, cordial but business like; 
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4. The simulator should not be used for the acquisition of route knowledge101, 
nor for the acquisition of basic driving skills. It would be used as a procedural 
training device and to develop NTSs. CRC for Rail Innovation (2013b) 
concurs with this approach noting that “... it is important to ensure that 
simulator-based training is conducted from a perspective that recognises that 
train-driving skills extend well beyond train handling or train control” (p.73); 
5. Simulation should be used in an integrated manner and facilitate a blended 
approach to learning. Operators would receive training in rules and 
procedures, using a range of training methods, and apply it in the simulated 
environment; 
6. The emphasis should be on driver development rather than on jeopardous 
assessment. Trainees would be afforded opportunity to learn by failing in a 
non-threatening environment. Inability to demonstrate competence during 
training would be seen as a development opportunity. The number of trials 
taken to achieve mastery of the skills was unimportant. Most importantly, 
trainees would not be allowed to exit the process before identified 
performance deficits were remedied; 
7. In principle, specific desk types should be located where particular types of 
traction were used. See point 5 of Section 10.3 for an elaboration of the 
methodology used to train a particular cohort of drivers who do not have 
access to a simulator of a specific traction type; 
8. The simulator system must be engineered to reduce the likelihood of 
simulator sickness; 
9. Formal and informal communications channels with drivers and their 
representatives must be used to inform them about the goals, equipment and 
the intended use cases. 
7.7.3 Use of the Systems Engineering Approach 
The systems engineering approach, which was used by the simulator supplier and 
I.É., and which enabled the realisation of the system, is shown diagrammatically 
in Figure 8. 
                                                 
101 Only between 13% and 17% of the respondents to the study by Air Affairs (2006) report using 
simulators to aid route knowledge acquisition of any sort. 
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Based on: Forsberg and Mooz (1998) 
Figure 8: Simulator System Engineering using the Vee Process 
The process steps, together with the verification and validation approaches, are 
presented in Table 19. The contributions of both parties, and the associated 
documentation that was used in the process, are also shown. The reader’s attention 
is drawn to the use that was made of the DFS when conducting the FAT and SAT 
verification processes. 
Table 19: Architecture Decomposition, Integration and Verification 
Decomposition and 
definition ↓ 
Performed by: Documents Reviews 
Mission analysis. 










Internal I.É. reviews and 
formal ‘sign off’ of the 
outline functional 




scope and features 
of the traction 
models and routes, 
and the system’s 
architecture were 
agreed. 
Developed by the 
suppliers and 
verified by the 






elaborated into a 
detailed functional 
specification (DFS). 
Test books were 
developed from the 
DFS. 
Joint system 
requirements reviews to 
ensure that the system 
requirements were 
comprehensively 
identified, and that a 
mutual understanding 






























Performed by: Documents Reviews 
Functional 
decomposition 
Suppliers with very 
limited involvement 
from I.É. 102 
Suppliers internal 
documents 
Joint design review; the 




Suppliers only Suppliers internal 
process 
 




I.É performed quality 




Performed by Documents Reviews 




manuals were used to 
test specific 
components 
Functionality review by 
I.É. of some train borne 
systems, e.g., train radio 
system 
Verify subsystems Suppliers only Suppliers internal 
processes 
 





2) Site acceptance 
testing (SAT) 
I.É. personnel at the 
supplier’s premises 
for FAT, and at 
I.É.’s Training 
Centres for SAT103. 
During SAT, the 
fully-integrated 
system was tested 





books104, which were 
developed from the 
DFS, formed the 
bases of the 
verification process. 
FAT was carried out on 
the CGI and train models 
as they were being 
implemented105. 
The duration of the SAT 
process was 3 months.  
The Mantis BT ™ ‘bug 
tracking’ tool106 was 
used to manage the 
resolution of the issues 
revealed through the 
FAT and SAT processes. 
Operation, upgrade 
and replacement 
The writer 1) A documented 
maintenance 
contract was put 
in place. 
2) A half life rebuild 
was provided for. 
Validation that the 
system achieved its 
mission is performed by 
the writer in this thesis. 
Successful equipment engineering was only one part of the overall mission. The 
situation is summarised by Hillson’s (2009) use of the proverb “A fool with a tool 
is still a fool” (p.17). Mission success was also dependent on the application of the 
system. The systems engineering approach, which was used to enable the reali-
sation of the system’s mission through the training design process, is shown dia-
grammatically in Figure 9. 
                                                 
102 I.É.’s input was confined to anthropometric aspects of the driving desks. 
103 SAT was undertaken to ensure that the system did not deteriorate during shipping, that it was 
installed correctly, that it interfaced correctly with other on-site systems and features, and that it 
performed as intended when it was fully integrated and was operated under full load conditions. 
104 One for generic tools (SPS, DAS, TBT etc.); one for system management tools (user interface 
tools); one for hardware and one for each of the nine train models. 
105 SMEs spent ca. 36 man-weeks at the supplier’s premises as part of the FAT process. 
106 Almost 900 observations were recorded on the Mantis BT ™ system for resolution. 
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Based on: Forsberg and Mooz (1998) 
Figure 9: Training System Engineering using the Vee Process 
The process steps for developing the training process, together with the validation 
materials and approaches, are presented in Table 20. 
Table 20: Entity Decomposition, Integration and Verification 
Stages of decomposition 
and definition ↓ 
Performed by: Documents Reviews 







included the list of 
scenarios to be 
simulated (see 
Appendix 10) 
Internal I.É. reviews and 
formal ‘sign off’ of the 









Peer reviews by Training 
Centre SMEs 
Training content (the 
method of elicitation is 
described in Section 5.4) 
I.É.’s Training 
Centre personnel 




Reviews by Training 
Centre SMEs 
Media107 selection I.É.’s Training 
Centre personnel 
 Peer reviews by Training 
Centre SMEs 
                                                 



























Stages of decomposition 
and definition ↓ 
Performed by: Documents Reviews 
Build lesson elements: 
1) Simulator operation; 
2) CSD elements; 
3) Lectures, quizzes and 
games; 
4) Communication 
scripts for actors; 
5) ‘Weekly circular’ etc. 
I.É.’s Training 
Centre personnel 




Performed by Documents Reviews 




Session plans Peer reviews by 
interdisciplinary Training 
Centre SMEs 









A ‘gap analysis’ was 








with DTEs and 
drivers 
  
Operation   Validation that the 
system achieved its 
mission is performed by 
the writer in this thesis. 
The Dual Vee model, which graphically illustrates the system of systems, i.e., the 
composite training delivery system, is presented in Appendix 16. 
7.8 Deployment and Description of Equipment 
The scope and deployment of the equipment was determined by I.É. following an 
analysis of the historic and projected usage requirements. Eight simulator driving 
desks are located in two centres; Inchicore and Mallow. The deployment of the 
desks and supporting tools is shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Deployment of System: traction types and classes 
Simulator deployment 
Desk Traction type Classes incorporated within desk Location and additional facilities 
1 DMU 22000, 29000, 2800, 2700 
Dublin – master location: 
2 observer stations, 
1 technical room, 
1 CSD, SPS and TBT ™ 
development area 
2 Same as desk #1 
3 Locomotive 201, 071 
4 Same as desk #3 
5 EMU 8500, 8100, 8200 
6 Same as desk #5 
7 DMU 22000, 29000, 2800, 2700 Mallow – slave location 
1 observer station, 
1 technical room 
8 Same as desk #7 
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The types of driving desks, the models contained within each type and the 
modelling methodology together with the degree of fidelity compromise are 
shown in Table 22. Supplementary information on the features, scope and 
configuration of the system can be found in Appendix 6. 
Table 22: Overview of Simulator Desks 
 
← Traction type - modelled primarily by hardware→ 
(the number of traction units in each I.É. fleet) 
Degree of engineering 
compromise of the 
operators’ MMI108↓ Locomotive type 
and consist 
DMU type and 
consist 




























201 (32) hauling a 
nine piece Mk IV 
passenger train 
22000 in a six car 
consist (177109) 
8520 in an eight 
car consist (68110) Very little compromise 
More compromise 
A great amount 
Most compromise 
071 (18) hauling 
an eleven piece 
freight train  
29000 in an eight 
car consist (116) 
8100 in a four car 
consist (76) 
 2800 in a four car 
consist (20) 
8200 in a four car 
consist (10) 
 2700 in a four car 
consist (27) 
 
1. Scope and features of the train models: 
1.1 Interchangeable handle boxes are used to reconfigure desks types between 
traction classes, e.g., to change the desk from a 201 class locomotive to a 
071 class. The use of a single type of desk to model a number of classes of 
traction resulted in engineering compromises; 
1.2 There is either a hardware or software interface for those elements of the 
cab equipment that add essential realism to the simulator. Only equipment 
capable of providing didactic value was modelled; 
1.3 Fault finding stations for each class of traction incorporate, on average, 30 
driver-rectifiable faults. These faults are interspersed throughout the train. 
The effects of faults on the instruments, gauges and systems’ behaviours 
are modelled accurately; 
1.4 Working advisory (CAWS) and supervisory (ATP) systems are 
incorporated; 
                                                 
108 Man machine interface 
109 This fleet comprises 15 sets of 6 cars and 29 sets of 3 cars. In addition, a further 57 cars were 
delivered in 2012. 
110 This fleet comprises three subclasses, i.e. 16 off 8500 (4 sets of 4 cars), 12 off 8510 (3 sets of 4 
cars) and 40 off 8520 (10 sets of 4 cars). From a driver’s perspective, there are very few minor 
differences between these subclasses. 
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1.5 The AEG 90 train radio is modelled accurately. SPTs are also provided for 
use when the train radio function is ‘unavailable’ to operators. Operators 
learn to adopt an alternative course of defensive action in such cases, i.e. to 
seek signal protection, to secure their train to prevent a runaway and to 
wear personal protective equipment when leaving the ‘cab’ to use an SPT; 
1.6 All of the elements within the train models are not active, e.g., not all of 
the circuit breakers have two states and not all of the isolating cocks in the 
pneumatic system are operable; 
1.7 A full range of aural cues is presented; 
2. Scope and features of the CGI: 
2.1 The CGI resembles the actual routes sufficiently realistically to obviate the 
need for route conducting; 
2.2 Four routes are modelled geospecifically. This amounts to 331 km and 
means that over 98% of I.É.’s drivers can traverse a route without the need 
of a route conductor; 
2.3 The routes include all permanent railway characteristics and artefacts, e.g., 
gradients, curves, point-work, PSR boards, station locations, crossings, 
mileposts and signals; 
2.4 Train performance is determined by a physics engine which models 
acceleration, speed and deceleration based on gradients, braking 
characteristics of traction, braking effort demanded and system delays etc.; 
2.5 Track circuits (lengths and codes associated with occupancy) are 
represented dynamically; 
2.6 In general, buildings that are contiguous to the railway line are not 
modelled accurately. However, notable landmarks are represented 
accurately to add realism to the OTW view, e.g., the Custom House and 
the Aviva Stadium etc.; 
3. Scope and features of the Instructors’ and Observers’ Stations: 
3.1 The system is managed through the Instructors’ Stations. The instructors 
set the simulation parameters, i.e. route, climatic conditions, train type, 
faults and events etc., through these workstations; 
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3.2 Instructors role play other actors through the train radio and passenger 
communications alarm facility; 
3.3 Instructors observe trainees’ actions by means of a dynamic desk report 
and CCTV footage. These reports are repeated in the observer stations to 
facilitate peer and instructor reviews. An image of the desk report of a 
22000 class DMU is provided in Appendix 7. 
7.9 Salient Features of Simulator Accommodation 
Bespoke accommodation is an intrinsic part of the system. It impinges on the 
layout of the equipment and its performance and, most especially, on the overall 
experience of the attendees. At a more abstract level, the quality of the 
accommodation and the ambience that it creates sends a powerful message to 
stakeholders about the value that an organisation places on the training activity. A 
comprehensive site specification was developed as part of the DFS to ensure that 
the accommodation complimented the projects goals and technical requirements. 
In addition to complying with building regulations, the facilities needed some 
noteworthy attributes, including: 
1. Sound insulation capable of inhibiting 40 dB(a) of inter-booth noise pollution. 
Trainees need to be isolated from aural cues emanating from contiguous 
booths; 
2. Air conditioning capable of dissipating over 1·5 kW of heat energy, emanating 
from the display screens and computers, within each booth. Because of the 
high standard of insulation in the booth, this energy would create operator 
discomfort very quickly; 
3. Air conditioning capable of dissipating the 3·5 kW of heat energy emanating 
from the computer racks in the technical rooms; 
4. Alarmed uninterruptable power supplies (UPSs) to facilitate an orderly 
shutdown of the equipment in the event of a power supply failure; 
5. It was critical to position the instructor station computers close to the driving 
desks. This spatial constraint was determined by the need to ensure that the 
video and data transmission cables were less than 20 m in length. This is 
necessary to minimise the latency of CGI presentation; 
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6. A ‘reference frame’ would envelop the display screen to help prevent the 
occurrence of simulator sickness. 
7.10 Conclusion 
Because of the risk associated with IT projects generally, I.É.’s management was 
anxious to avoid any commercial problems associated with the acquisition of the 
simulator. The acquisition process was split into two phases. 
Having considered the relevant fidelity criteria in the context of I.É.’s training 
requirements and output objectives, the writer adopted the preponderant finding of 
his literature review, i.e., a simulator’s functional fidelity is more important than 
its physical fidelity. He specified a networked desk type system with high 
functional fidelity. 
Operators’ welfare and concerns were considered at all stages of the project. 
Simulators will not garner acceptance if they create an unhealthy environment or 
if they are used unreasonably. Value can be lost because of the occurrence of 
simulator sickness, but mitigation measures can be taken at the design and use 
phases. Care needs to be taken if simulators are used for the assessment of 
performance because of the mismatch between the perceptible and calculated 
speeds, and the lack of psychological fidelity. 
Motion platforms are expensive, they necessitate a great deal of scarce 
engineering information, and are difficult to implement correctly. The benefits 
derivable from the provision of motion cues are questionable, and are dependent 
on particular railway operating methodologies and on the skill under development. 
In a great many cases, motion cueing provides little or no benefit. Because of its 
operational context and training goals, I.É. did not acquire motion platforms. 
Observer stations promote collaborative learning. However, the observation 
process needs to be managed and not left to chance. Observers need to undertake 
specific tasks; the provision of performance feedback in conjunction with the 
instructor is one key task. 
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Management of I.É.’s project was characterised by strategic thinking. Foreseeable 
project risks at the commercial and contractual levels were identified and 
managed. The equipment was engineered and the training programme developed 
using systems engineering principles. Project risks pertaining to the operant level 
were afforded the same importance. To ensure that the revised training process 
proceeded unhindered, the philosophy underpinning the change, and details of the 
equipment, the use cases, and the delivery process were communicated timely to 
the drivers and their representatives. The fundamental output objective was to 
improve the quality of the training programmes, leading to enhanced operational 
safety; not to reduce training costs. The emphasis was on effectiveness rather than 
efficiency. 
As well as providing the necessary functionality, the bespoke accommodation also 
helped to enhance the overall experience of training attendees. 
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8 Study Methodology 
In the preceding chapters, the writer explains the reasons why I.É. wished to 
change its training process, describes how simulators could conceivably improve 
training outcomes, details the underlying reasons for specifying particular features 
when developing I.É.’s procurement specification and describes the actualised 
system in detail. In this chapter, he presents the overall methodology that he used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the simulator enabled training process. There is a 
range of study designs but because of the regulated nature of the driving activity, 
the sense of urgency attaching to the project’s goals, the live operational 
environment containing the answers to the research questions and the global 
nature of the research questions, the use of I.É.’s NWRM is most appropriate. Its 
appropriateness is all the more justified as the relative value ensuing from the 
comparison of the ex ante and ex post analyses of driver relevant resident risk is 
used in the study (Smith, 1993). He also discusses the metrics and approaches that 
he draws upon for the financial evaluation. 
I.É.’s simulator system was purchased on foot of the belief that the extant training 
delivery process could be proactively improved; resulting in safer driving 
outcomes. There were professional and business imperatives as well as a moral 
duty on the writer to ensure that improvements would be made expeditiously. The 
simulator was not purchased for experimentation, and validation of its 
effectiveness had to be performed in this context. Furthermore, a main component 
of one of the research questions of this thesis (an identified reduction in I.É.’s 
overall driver-relevant operational risk) is global and does not lend itself to 
decomposition into smaller testable questions. Although the effectiveness criteria 
of other stakeholders were assessed, the writer set out principally to conduct a 
Level 3 evaluation of the contribution of the revised training process to safe 
operational performance. In turn, this facilitated the completion of a Level 4 
evaluation. The taxonomy of evaluation methods is presented in Appendix 17. 
This chapter is divided into nine sections, dealing with: 
8.1 Implications of Context on Study Design Approach; 
8.2 Risk Management 
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8.3 Description of I.É.’s Network Wide Risk Model; 
8.4 Network Wide Risk Model: its history and value; 
8.5 Value of Preventing a Fatality; 
8.6 Investments and Proportionate Returns; 
8.7 Choice of Financial Appraisal Methods; and 
8.8 Approach Used to Financially Evaluate Benefits. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.9. 
8.1 Implications of Context on Study Design Approach 
A randomised control study, however desirable from a study design point of view, 
is inappropriate in this case as: 
1. It would create an ethical issue in respect of the untreated group because, as 
believed, the training that this group would receive would be inferior, and 
would leave it and the organisation exposed to adversity; 
2. Differential treatment would lead to a situation where poor operational 
performance could be attributed to insufficient training; 
3. Control group members would feel professionally exposed in the belief that 
they did not receive the best available training; 
4. I.É.’s training process is standards-based; changes to it must be validated by 
its Safety Validation Panel. It would be incongruous and indefensible to 
operate two fundamentally different training processes concurrently; 
5. At an individual level of a treated driver, the effects of training transfer 
relevant to particular precursors culminating in hazardous events, are small 
and take a long time to manifest themselves. A study by Amalberti (cited by 
Moray, in TRB, eds., 2006b) finds that improvements emanating from safety 
initiatives, undertaken in what are regarded as ‘intrinsically safe’ industries, 
may take many decades before they become manifest. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to integrate improvements in the range of precursors and accident 
types (each with particular varying probabilities and consequences) into a 
single comparable and meaningful entity for a small study cohort. 
Although a pre-test and post-test study design, conducted within the simulated 
environment, could reveal changes to the experimental subjects’ recall of know-
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ledge and also to particular behaviours, it would not reveal the true transfer of 
training to the operational environment and, hence, it would not satisfy the 
requirements of this study. The limitations of these study designs are obviated by 
using a risk modelling tool that is populated with comprehensive ‘before and 
after’ data to assess the change to the risk profile that was achieved through 
project implementation. See Taig and Hunt (2012) in respect of the reliability and 
validity of risk modelling approaches. 
8.2 Risk Management 
The general safety responsibilities attaching to the operation of a business of any 
nature in Ireland, are set out in Section 8.1 of the Office of the Attorney General 
Act (2005b); those that are specific to railways are set out in Section 36 of the 
Office of the Attorney General Act (2005a). Both acts limit the scope of the res-
ponsibility of the employer or railway undertaking to acting in a manner that is 
reasonably practicable. 
The inherent subjectivity of the concept of reasonableness is recognised in George 
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, [1983] 2 
All ER 737. In respect of the malleability of reasonableness, the maxim that ‘hind-
sight is 20/20 vision’ (origin unknown) springs to mind: The perception of what is 
reasonable will, most likely, change after a negative event has occurred. Managers 
face a conundrum. On the one hand, the management of safety expenditure is “... 
part of risk management… [and safety expenditure] has an optimal level of 
activity beyond which there are diminishing returns” (Crowl and Louvar, 2002, 
pp.4-12). On the other hand, Roth and Meisel (in Eberwine, 2005) confirm that 
“... what is reasonable in a given situation cannot be determined with scientific 
precision, and when it is determined by a jury it is always after the harm has been 
done... reasonableness must be judged without the benefit of hindsight,... [which] 
cannot easily be put aside111” (p. 639). Post accident uncertainty about the 
perception of the reasonableness of managerial decisions may be one of the 
                                                 
111 It was not put aside in the case of Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority. Eberwine finds that “... the transit authority was justified to be nervous that the jurors 
would ‘update’ their perception of the reasonableness” (p.646). 
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reasons why projects with benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) of less than unity are 
implemented (see Section 8.6). 
Decisions to optimise the management of safety are made in the context of a range 
of criteria, e.g., ethical principles, regulatory compliance, commercial and opera-
tional constraints, a desire to avoid organisational and personal culpability, the 
non-definable concept of reasonableness and possible biases in the conduct of ex 
post facto accident analyses. However, more-defensible and expansive safety 
management decisions can be made, much more readily, using risk modelling 
tools (ERA, 2015). 
Railways are complex systems (Merkert, Nash and Smith, 2008; Lindfeldt, 2008 
and Peirone, 2005) and, as they become ever more complex, “... risks need to be 
identified, evaluated and managed in a formal system of control rather than the 
informal systems which have existed in the past” (Wang and Roush, 2010, p.12). 
Prospective safety management systems, using risk modelling methods to support 
decisions, are necessary as “... the practice of learning by mistakes [is] no longer 
acceptable” (Smith, 1993, p.4). In a diverse and dispersed business, which com-
prises a variety of activities (each with their own attendant risks), technologies 
and differing local conditions, risk models are necessary to evaluate the aggre-
gated risk, identify risk contributors and geographic areas, and enable intelligent 
and focussed spending on risk mitigation measures. 
Risk models are in common use within the European railway sector. The Euro-
pean Agency for Railways (ERA, 2015) surveyed the 28 National Safety Autho-
rities (18 responses112). ERA finds that risk models are not used in five of the 
states; five states use them qualitatively and eight states use them quantitatively; 
and that “… comparatively little use is made of quantitative risk models to sup-
port the justification for a safety investment or risk analysis” (p.37). This is not 
the situation in I.É.; its Network Wide Risk Model (NWRM) is used specifically 
for these reasons. 
                                                 
112 Including Switzerland 
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8.3 Description of I.É.’s Network Wide Risk Model 
The NWRM was developed as part of the Railway Safety Programme (RSP), to 
support a defensible and optimised risk based investment strategy for I.É. The tool 
is used to provide risk estimates covering all stakeholder groups affected by I.É.’s 
operations, i.e., passengers, members of the public, trespassers and staff. It is pre-
dictive and does not rely on past accident or incident data to estimate risk expo-
sure (Risk Solutions, 2008). Instead, the analysis is based on a wide range of pre-
cursor events. Fault and event tree methodologies are used to analyse and assesses 
how each of these precursor events can escalate to become an accident. The pre-
dictive ability of the NWRM is particularly valuable for I.É., as there have been 
few major accidents on its system (see Table 2). Inter-analyses comparison faci-
litates the identification of changes to I.É.’s risk exposure resulting from financial 
investment programmes and asset deterioration. A top level representation of 
I.É.’s NWRM, showing the inputs, process outline and outputs, is presented in 
Figure 10. 
The risk evaluation is based on what Wang and Roush (2000) refer to as the risk 
triplets, i.e., what can go wrong, the likelihood of failure occurrence, and the 
associated consequence (pp.4-5): 
1. The types of things that can go wrong are elicited by analysts’ reference to in-
cident experience, activity data and expert judgement (ERA, 2015); 
2. The likelihood of failure occurrence is evaluated using fault and event trees in 
combination; commonly referred to as the bowtie method. The two types of 
trees “… are related in that the top [or intermediate113] events for fault trees are 
the initiating events for the event trees. Both are used together to produce a 
complete picture of an incident, from its initiating causes all the way to its final 
outcome” (Crowl and Louvar, 2002, p.499). 
Fault and event trees are usually shown diagrammatically, as in Figure 11. This 
particular example relates to a driver’s failure to respond to a stop signal. 
Inputs to and outputs from the model, relevant to this particular event, are also 
shown. When used as part of a quantitative risk analysis, probabilities (P) are 
                                                 
113 See Crowl and Louvar (2002) for the suggested approach when choosing the initiating event for 
the event tree analysis (p.492). 
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assigned to the various base events which are then aggregated into probabilities 
for subsequent events using Boolean algebra operations. The simplified dia-
gram, provided to illustrate the aggregation methodologies, indicates that the 
probability of a driver’s failure to react to a stop signal is 
PE1⋃PE2⋃PE3⋃PE4⋃PE5 (from fault tree) while the probability of the 
occurrence of an exceedance of the signal overlap is PTE*Pf1*Pf2*Pf3*Pf4 
(from event tree). 
Sixty four precursor categories were modelled using the NWRM (Sotera Risk 
Solutions, 2010). The scenario exemplified in Figure 11, is particularly insight-
ful as it illustrates the connectedness between the relevant training lessons and 
this particular risk. In addition to contextualised general skill development, 
which is discussed in Section 5.8, training content that is relevant to the miti-
gation of this specific risk (SPAD), is contained in Lesson 5 (promoting the 
effective use of structured communications and workload management); 
Lesson 6 (addressing low rail adhesion and situational awareness); and Lesson 
7 (addressing CAWS, automaticity, overreliance and train operation in the 
absence of a functioning system) of the lesson plan. The full lesson plan is pre-
sented in Table 14 and the connectedness between changes to the range of re-
levant risk entities, the lessons delivered and the simulator’s scenario capability 
is presented in Column 2 of Table 27. Other key elements that are modelled in 
the NWRM and that are contained within the training programme relate to de-
fensive driving (avoiding a derailment or collision, and facilitating smooth ride 
quality), the correct application of parking brakes (avoiding a runaway), correct 
vehicle coupling (avoiding an unintentional divide in running), maintaining a 
sharp lookout when driving to avoid striking objects or persons on the line 
(avoiding personal injury or derailment), correct use of sanders (avoiding 
collisions with trains or buffer stops), correct response to hot axle box 
detections (avoiding derailment) and quick emergency response (avoiding a 
collision) etc.; 
3. Consequences, influenced by the usage of the system, are determined by 
estimating the impacts on the various stakeholders. 
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The model also contains an aggregation routine by which minor and major in-
juries are converted into the statistical equivalence of a fatality. The number of 
each injury type that is deemed to be statistically equivalent to one fatality is 
shown in Appendix 18. The weighting process directs “... safety expenditure 
towards those incidents and accidents that lead to the highest levels of risk 
without ignoring the types of incident that typically have less severe outcomes” 
(RSSB, 2013c, p.39). 
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Adapted from: Sotera Risk Solutions (2010) 
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1.4. Animals on the line;
1.5. Level crossing risk model;
1.6. Reliability rates (physical assets);
2. Databases in respect of operational inputs:
2.1. SPAD db;
2.2. Synergi accident and incident db;
2.3. Rail movement accident db;
2.4. Rail incident db;
2.5. Timetable data (number of trains, routes 
and type);
2.6. System usage (passenger.kms and 
tonne.kms);
3. Human error probability rates;
4. Expert judgement, failure rates from other 
railways;
5. Statistic equivalence fatality (EF) rules.
Outputs from model:
1. Overall resident system 
risk;
2. Risk value by event, 
location, route, asset type, 
railway actor role and 
exposed individual;
3. Run-on-run risk 
comparisons;
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contributors;
5. Changes to asset ratings;
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2. SPAD risk value by  
location, route, 
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railway actor role and 
exposed individual.
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8.4 Network Wide Risk Model: its history and value 
Before 2003, I.É. maintained a number of accident and incident databases and 
used their outputs for historic reporting purposes. When used in isolation from 
other quantitative metrics, their value in the assessment of resident risk and the 
prediction of future risk could not be exploited fully. (See also Taig and Hunt, 
2012.) IRMS (1998) recognised these limitations particularly in respect of 
infrequent and randomly occurring high-risk events. Accordingly, IRMS 
recommended that I.É. should “Develop the risk model prepared by the 
consultants to encompass a wider range of hazards114… to include staff error, 
movement and non movement accidents and occupational safety concerns” 
(Recommendation 12.6.3 (3)). The NWRM was developed in 2003 by Sotera Risk 
Solutions and has been maintained and run on a contractual basis ever since. 
The output of the NWRM was used to assess retrospectively the effectiveness of 
Phase 2 of the RSP and prospectively to develop Phase 3. Quantification of the 
risks that reside within many sectors of the business is achieved through the 
analysis of precursors, accidents and asset ratings while adjusting for the degree of 
risk exposure, i.e., changes to the number of train-kms and passenger-kms. 
Accident precursors are categorised into seven groupings (level crossings, rolling 
stock, structures, track, Signalling, electrical and telecommunications, interface 
(trespassers, animals/objects on line), and operations). Nineteen of these relate to 
operations. There are two hundred incident/accident types; eighteen of these are 
influenced by traction drivers’ actions. 
Full value has not been extracted from the NWRM; prompting Risk Solutions115 
(2013) to comment that “... the NWRM is not directly available to support 
decision-making processes in IÉ such as setting investment priorities. External 
support is used to produce periodic results, but the NWRM cannot be used on a 
more ad-hoc basis to respond to specific management decision issues” (p.47). The 
lack of ownership of the model by I.É., which results in less accessibility for one-
                                                 
114 IRMS had used the outputs of a risk model, which was specifically developed to evaluate the 
risks associated with infrastructure and equipment failures, to support its recommendations for 
asset renewals in RSP 1. 
115 Not to be confused with Sotera Risk Solutions 
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off small project evaluations, such as the project which forms the central plank of 
this thesis, has been criticised by Risk Solutions (2008) and IRMS (2000). 
However, restricting its use to the model’s developers and maintainers has 
benefits. These external service providers have a specialism and organisational 
capacity that the organisation may not have, nor deem cost effective to develop. 
Confinement of the model’s operation to external specialists ensures that the data 
will be inputted consistently and its outputs will be free from biases and errors. 
Sotera Risk Solutions completed a run of the model in 2010, and in 2012 (two 
years after the introduction of the simulator enabled delivery format) Sotera Risk 
Solutions facilitated the writer by completing a rerun of the model. The results of 
the 2012 evaluation were then compared with those of the 2010 evaluation. The 
changes to the simulator-relevant entities that influence I.É.’s risk have been 
aggregated with the values of preventing a fatality relative to the ‘duty of care’ 
and are presented in Table 27. 
8.5 Value of Preventing a Fatality 
To ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources, it is necessary to apply some 
monetary value on the prevention of a fatality when evaluating safety project 
investments. Early efforts to assign value to the prevention of a fatality centred on 
awards handed down in Court judgements while others were centred on net lost 
economic output116 and the direct costs associated with accidents, i.e., medical 
costs and damage. A change in thinking occurred in the early 1970s and efforts 
were made to estimate the value that people placed on their own safety by 
considering what they were prepared to pay in order to achieve marginal 
improvements. In 1982, a stated preference study (N = 1,103 respondents) found 
that the aggregation of the amounts that each individual was willing to pay was 
£800,000. This willingness to pay amount was subsequently reduced to £500,000 
(1987 prices). (See Jones-Lee and Spackman, 2013 for an exhaustive explanation 
of the reasons underlying this reduction). The VPF is calculated accordingly: VPF 
= WTP + NQ + MA where WTP is the willingness to pay component, NQ is the 
                                                 
116 Output losses were calculated on a net basis, i.e., the victim’s future output less the value of 
consumption. 
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present value of the saving of net output and MA is the avoided medical cost per 
statistical fatality (Jones-Lee and Spackman, 2013). The VPF is updated regularly 
in line with growth in real output per capita, and inflation. 
It should be noted that there is a lack of harmonisation of the VPFs that are used 
in respect of the country of application and also the transport mode concerned. In 
respect of variance in VPF application on a country-by-country basis, EMSA 
(2013) provides the VPFs for road transport that are used in 23 countries. These 
VPFs vary by a factor of ca. 57 times with a median value of €1·2 m. (€1,478,000 
at 2012 prices). However, there is little variation in the VPFs used on a country-
by-country basis for rail. In 2012, I.É. used a VPF of €2,222,713 for its NWRM117 
calculations which is slightly more conservative than that the amount of 
€2,264,000118 that is used in the UK rail sector (RSSB, 2014a). 
In respect of variances in VPF application by transport mode, Hiselius (2003) 
provides theoretical arguments119 “…for the use of a higher [VPF] within the 
railway sector than in the road traffic sector” (p.37). But this is not the practice in 
Ireland where the VPFs used to evaluate road projects120 are between 4% and 18% 
higher than the VPF used by I.É. Irish practice accords with the logic put forward 
by Fischhoff et al. and Slovic et al. (both in Hiselius, 2003), i.e., that “Road traffic 
is associated with… more dread than railroads” (p.13). 
Jones-Lee and Spackman (2013) considered whether the VPF should be increased 
to reflect the dread risk121. However, they find that the “... considerably lower 
baseline risk of being involved in a rail accident offsets any effect of dread” 
(p.38). The regression analysis, conducted by Chilton et al. (2006) supports this 
finding. Chilton et al. calculate that the ratios of           
          
 , prior to and after the 
                                                 
117 The VPF, used in I.É.’s NWRM, is very similar to the Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality 
which is calculated at €2,400,000 (CER, 2013). 
118 Converted from £1,763,000 using the Average Market Mid-Closing Exchange Rate (CBoI). 
119 Railway hazards are involuntary, uncontrollable, induce high degrees of social distrust and 
moral indignation, and resultant accidents tend to be large-sized (p.17). 
120 TII (2016) and DTTaS (2016), and RSA (2013) utilise VPFs of €2,350,500 and €2,625,000 
(2012 prices) respectively, when evaluating road projects 
121 Chilton et al. (2006) use ‘dread’ as a catchall term to include factors, such as, voluntariness, 
control, responsibility and catastrophic potential etc. (p.22). Jones-Lee and Spackman (2013) uses 
the term in the context of cause/manner of death and location, e.g., confinement in enclosed space. 
Page 148 
rail accident at Ladbroke Grove, had changed from 0·834 to 1·003, i.e., although 
the ratio had increased to slightly above unity, significantly greater dread was still 
not associated with a rail accident than with a road accident. 
In practice, the VFP is applied universally irrespective of the victims’ social class, 
age, health, personal circumstances, future earning capacity, or type or scale of 
accident. In most cases, it is discounted to reflect whether the organisation holds a 
primary or secondary duty of care, or if there was an illegal act involved, e.g., 
trespass. The adjustments applied by I.É. in such circumstances are juxtaposed 
with those suggested by other safety professionals in Table 23. 
Table 23: VPF Adjustments to Reflect Duty of Care 
 Primary duty Shared Duty Illegal Act 
CER (2013) 1·0 VPF 1·0 VPF 1·0 VPF 
RSSB (2008b) 1·0 VPF 1·0 VPF 0·4 VPF 
IRMS (2008) 1·0 VPF 0·429 VPF 0·215 VPF 
I.É. practice 1·0 VPF 0·333 VPF 0·166 VPF 
8.6 Investments and Proportionate Returns 
Normal commercial investment decisions are made on the basis of their ability to 
yield a positive financial return, i.e., having a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) in excess of 
unity. Many railways apply a different rationale to those investment decisions that 
are aimed at discharging their duty of care. In such cases, investments are made 
even when the BCR is less than unity. The argument used in support of this 
rationale is that if a known risk exists and if there is a safety measure available to 
mitigate it, it should be implemented. Failure to do so implies an acceptance of the 
risk. This position is laudable but raises the fundamental question of placing an 
appropriate limit on the BCR of the safety measure. The judgement in the 1949 
case of Edwards v The National Coal Board partly answers the question. In that 
case, Judge Asquith found that if: 
“… the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in 
the measures necessary for averting the risk… is placed on the other; and 
that if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them - the risk 
being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the Defendants discharge the 
onus on them” (in Jones-Lee and Loomes, 2006, p.5). 
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Although Asquith found that it is unnecessary for the duty holder to incur 
limitless expense, he did not suggest a BCR, commonly referred to as a proportion 
factor, which would discharge a duty holder’s obligation. The matter of 
proportionality is critical to the safety investment process. If a high BCR is used 
as the basis for safety project acceptance and the project does not proceed, the 
duty holder may face severe criticism in the event of an avoidable accident. If a 
low BCR is accepted, the organisation’s investment portfolio will not be 
optimised as any investment appraisal is almost bound to yield an acceptable 
result. The HSE has not formulated an algorithm which can be used to determine a 
PF and suggest that it should be set on a case by case basis. However, H+SAW 
(2016) provides top level diagrammatic guidance, and positively correlates the PF 
to the baseline risk of death (see also Hammerton et al. and Jones-Lee (both in 
Hiselius, 2003)). The writer has overlaid I.É.’s passenger risk data for two routes 
and the staff risk data onto this diagram, and presents the results in Figure 12. 
 
Based on H+SAW (2016) 



























































































This illustrates that, in these particular circumstances, the application of values in 
the range of 1+ < PF < 3+ is appropriate. This finding is useful as a sense check but 
the range of values is too imprecise and varied for the purpose intended. 
Supplementary findings are presented in Table 24 below. 
Table 24: Proportion Factors: used and suggested for various investments 
Proportion factor Rationale Source 
1) PF of 3:1 for risks to 
workers; 
2) PF of 2:1 for low risks to 
members of the public; 
3) PF of 10:1 for high risks. 
“The Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD) takes 
as its starting point the HSE submission to 
the1987 Sizewell B Inquiry”.  
HSE (2014) 
The Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) 
uses similar rules of thumb. 
1) PF of 20:1 
 
2) PF of 5·55:1 
3) PF of 8·3:1 
1) The PTC system got US Congressional 
approval in spite of the low BCR; 
2) TPWS (UK) 
3) ATP (UK) This project was not completed 
in spite of the fact that “There are often 
strong institutional, legal and political 
pressures towards adopting railway safety 
measures with [this ratio]” (p.146). 
Evans (2013) 
Possible PF of 3:1  TfL (2013) 
PF of 1·5:1 1) Fatalities on LU should be valued 50% 
greater than those on the roads; 
2) Fatalities in large accidents should not 




1) PF of 1·28:1 
 
2) PF of 1·12:1 
1) For a multiple-fatality accident caused by 
signal failure; 
2) For a multiple-fatality accident involving a 
fire in a tunnel. 
RSSB (2008b) 
PF of 4:1  This value was used specifically for the 





PF of 2·8:1 “[This PF] was adopted… by BRB for risk 
associated with multi-fatality train accidents… 
For other types of risk no multiplier was 
applied. [Afterwards], the industry stopped 
using this multiplier” (p.6). 
Bearfield 
(2006) 
PFs of 3·1. and 2·8 
respectively 
The installation of ATP between Paddington 
and Didcot, and Didcot and Oxford 
respectively did not proceed on these bases. 
Cullen 
(2001a) 
It is evident from Table 24 that a wide range of PFs is used by organisations when 
calculating the worth that they place on risk reduction initiatives. Unsurprisingly, 
anomalous applications have occurred; lower quality projects with higher PFs 
have been implemented (TPWS), while higher quality projects with lower PFs 
have been rejected (specific ATP installations). The average accepted PF of these 
examples is 4·88:1. Excluding the CBR of 20:1 in the PTC example, which may 
be an outlier driven by the American culture in respect of uncertainty 
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avoidance122, the average CBR is 3·37:1. This is in line with the upper value of 3+ 
that was extrapolated from the H+SAW diagrammatic guidance in respect of I.É. 
(see Figure 12), and is slightly above I.É.’s norm of 3:1. 
8.7 Choice of Financial Appraisal Methods 
The safety benefits accruing from the implementation of the project are 
enumerated in Section 9.1. Four appraisal methods were considered prior to 
making the financial evaluation of these safety benefits. Each method has its own 
limitations and merits: 
1. Using the payback period approach, the investment value is reduced by the net 
periodic income amounts until the expenditure is fully recouped. Time is the 
unit of measure. The time value of cash, or cash equivalent inflows, and 
outflows is not considered; nor are the flows after the payback period has been 
reached. 
2. Using the return on investment approach, the annual attributable profit before 
interest is expressed as a percentage of the investment expenditure. These ROIs 
are averaged over the lifetime of the asset to provide an average ROI value. 
The time value of inflows and outflows is not considered and it is difficult to 
evaluate projects with different life spans. 
Although the above methods are useful as initial processes for screening out 
clearly unattractive investment propositions, neither method is suitable for 
evaluating long life projects. 
3. Using the net present value (NPV) approach, all of the future net cash flows are 
discounted at the company’s borrowing rate. They are then netted off against 
the capital cost and the surplus amount constitutes the project’s NPV. The 
maximum cost of funding that the project is capable of bearing is not revealed 
using this method. 
4. Investment decisions are based on the extent that the cost of funding is 
exceeded by a project’s internal rate of return. The calculation method is 
explained fully in Section 9.3 where a financial evaluation of I.É.’s project is 
                                                 
122 The uncertainty avoidance indices (one of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede’s model) are 46 
and 35 respectively for the USA and the UK; Americans want to avoid uncertainty more than UK 
residents. 
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presented. This approach was chosen because it can be used to evaluate the 
attractiveness of competing alternatives and also of standalone projects; such as 
this case. Most germane, it is suitable to use for evaluating long life projects 
where the cost of funding is likely to fluctuate. 
8.8 Approach Used to Financially Evaluate Benefits 
I.É.’s NWRM was used to evaluate the changes to its driver-relevant risk profile, 
quantified in terms of the number of equivalent fatalities avoided per annum, over 
the period 2010 - 2012. Using the concept of the VPF, and adjustments to reflect 
the relevant duties of care, a financial value was placed on the achieved reduction 
in risk. In high risk and high profile industries, and in cases where risk owners are 
anxious to discharge their duty of care assiduously, a PF is used to reflect their 
aversion to risk. The writer adopted this convention. 
Two financial evaluations are presented in Section 9.3. i.e., an IRR evaluation 
based on a PF of 3 times the VPF which is the PF value normally used by I.É. for 
project evaluations, and an IRR evaluation based on a PF of 1 times the VPF. A 
set of scenario based IRR evaluations, showing the minimum PF necessary to 
yield an IRR equal to +3·42%, which was the prevailing costs of funding at the 
time of equipment purchase, is presented in Section 10.2. 
8.9 Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to ascertain the effect of the revised training 
process on the performance of a global skill set by I.É.’s cohort of drivers. The 
writer was constrained in the design of study that he could use to test the research 
questions. A randomised control study could not be carried out because of ethical, 
business and procedural reasons. 
He used the outputs of before-and-after runs of I.É.’s NWRM to assess the change 
in risk in the two year period immediately following the introduction of the 
amended training process. I.É.’s complement of 500 drivers had received 
simulator enabled training in this period. Because of contractual arrangements, 
this assessment was performed by Sotera Risk Solutions at his behest. 
Page 153 
Relevant financial values, based on the VPF and on weightings to reflect I.É.’s 
duty of care in particular harm categorisations, were assigned to changes to each 
component of the overall risk. The resultant value was adjusted by a PF to reflect 
I.É.’s willingness to pay a premium for measures to mitigate known risk. The 
VPF, adjustments to reflect I.É.’s duty of care and the PF that are used in the 
calculation are justified by reference to the project evaluation criteria that are used 
in other organisations and jurisdictions. For investment evaluation purposes, I.É. 
uses a PF of 3 which is at the lower end of the range of values employed in similar 
industries. The project’s IRR was calculated on these bases. 
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9 Measurement of Outcomes 
In the earlier chapters, the writer describes the task of traction driving and the 
ways that the training content can be elicited; concluding the description with a 
presentation of I.É.’s lesson plan. In intermediate chapters he provides a treatise 
on the range of simulators available to deliver the training content; going on to 
provide reasoned arguments for the type that he specified. In the previous chapter, 
he describes the approach that he uses to evaluate the effectiveness of I.É.’s 
system. He presents the results of his evaluation in this chapter. 
The effectiveness of an initiative can only be understood after the organisation’s 
overall goal, or mission statement as it is sometimes called, has been understood. 
I.É.’s mission is “To provide safe, accessible and integrated rail services that 
contribute to sustainable economic and regional development in an efficient 
manner” (I.É., Annual Report 2012, p.4). Railway systems are quintessentially 
open systems with complex stakeholder dependencies. Operative goals support 
the overall organisational goals and are realised through operating routines. The 
degrees to which stakeholders’ concerns are satisfied through these routines are 
measures of their effectiveness. 
The use of the stakeholder, or constituency approach as Daft (1995) calls it, to 
evaluate the change in effectiveness that resulted from the transition of I.É.’s 
training routine is appropriate. Railway organisations have to satisfy the diverse, 
and sometimes competing, effectiveness criteria of a range of internal and external 
stakeholders. It can be seen from I.É.’s mission statement that the provision of 
safe rail services is its priority. Improvement in operational safety is the criterion 
of particular interest in this thesis; the satisfaction of other criteria is dependent on 
this. The effectiveness criteria of the five stakeholder groups, relevant to I.É.’s 
simulator project are presented in Table 25. These criteria are not mutually 
exclusive to the respective groups. For example, operational safety is not the 
concern of the customer and community stakeholder group only, it is the concern 
of all of the stakeholders and this concern is included with the additional concerns 
of stakeholders as the hierarchy is ascended. As the focus shifts from the customer 
Page 155 
and community group towards the Irish Government, stakeholders rate the 
organisation’s effectiveness using multiple criteria. 
Table 25: Stakeholders and their Effectiveness Criteria 
Stakeholder group Effectiveness criteria evaluated in thesis 
Customers and community Improved operational safety 
Employees (drivers) Enhanced and valued training experience 
Iarnród Éireann An internal rate of return that exceeds the cost of the capital 
employed on the investment 
Railway Safety Commission Compliance with regulation 
Irish Government Governments do not wish to be associated with failed 
expenditure initiatives. Capital expenditure, raised through 
taxation, must be seen to be spent effectively. Capital projects 
must satisfy credible independent expert audit. 
Based on Daft (1995) 
This chapter is divided into six sections, dealing with: 
9.1 Improved Operational Safety; 
9.2 Enhanced Training Experience; 
9.3 Internal Rate of Return on Investment; 
9.4 Compliance with Regulation; and 
9.5 Independent Expert Audit and Comment. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 9.6. 
9.1 Improved Operational Safety 
Passengers and the community, that is contiguous to the railway, are affected 
directly by its operations and have an inalienable right to be unharmed by them. 
SPAD occurrence is a key determinant of operational risk. Being in a vehicle or 
adjacent to one, that has collided or derailed because of a SPAD, is a significant 
harm causation mechanism for this stakeholder group. In their ‘Value for Money’ 
audit of RSP 2, Risk Solutions (2008) notes that “One of the major investments... 
was the procurement of a train driver simulator... [that was] intended to directly 
address the risk from SPADs” (p.37). 
A review of the Railway Safety Performance reports (RSC, various dates) 
provides evidence that this goal of the investment was realised. It also supports 
the findings of the NWRM analysis in respect of SPAD risk (Row 5 of Table 27). 
The reports indicate that there was a moderate decrease in the number of SPADs 
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at running signals in 2010 followed by a sharp decrease in 2011 and 2012. 
Readers should note that simulator enabled training commenced on 30th June 
2010. (See Table 26 for the coincidence between SPAD occurrence and driver 
attendance at the new training process.) 
Table 26: Recent Trend in SPADs Juxtaposed with Phasing of Driver Attendance 
Year Number of SPADs 
at running signals 
Severity (as determined by 
I.É.’s ‘Risk Ranking Tool’123) 
Proportion and phasing of 
drivers attending new process 
2009 17124 (sic) 5 potentially significant risk Simulator unavailable 
2010 14 1 potentially severe risk Simulator unavailable until 
30th June. 29% of driver 
cohort attended in 2010. 
2011 7 2 potentially severe risk 51% of driver cohort attended 
2012 8 0 potentially significant or 
severe risk 
20% of driver cohort attended 
(to 29th June) 
2nd biennial refresher cycle 
commenced 01st July 
Sources: Railway Safety Performance reports (RSC, relevant dates) and I.É.’s training attendance 
records 
This reduction in SPADs led Risk Solutions (2013) to conclude that: 
“Evidence of the effectiveness of the Railway Safety Programme as a whole 
can be sought in lead indicators such as numbers of signals passed at danger 
(SPADs), and in overall network risk as determined by the network risk 
model (NWRM)” (p.6). 
Prospectively, the NWRM played a significant role during the project evaluation 
phase when the writer was seeking approval from the Board of I.É. for the 
project’s funding. On the commencement of the revised training process in 2010, 
and again in 2012 after a period of two years during which I.É.’s complement of 
500 drivers were trained, the writer utilised the NWRM as a fundamental part of 
the effectiveness assessment process. At his behest, Sotera Risk Solutions 
assessed the changes to the risk profile that were influenced by the change in 
driver performance during the period 2010 to 2012. It should be noted especially 
that no relevant operational changes were introduced by I.É. during this period 
                                                 
123 SPADs with calculated risk rankings in excess of 20 are classified as potentially severe; those 
ranked between 16 and 19 are classified as potentially significant, and those ranked between 0 and 
15 are classified as not posing a significant risk. 
124 There is a difference in the numbers of SPADs at running signals that are shown in Tables 11 
and 26 for 2009. This anomaly arises because of the different treatments of a SPAD that occurred 
on 29th May at a co-sited shunt signal. It was regarded by the RSC as occurring at a running signal. 
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which could confound these findings. The changes to operational risk and 
financial value associated with these changes are presented in Table 27. 
In this table: 
1. The nature of the relevant events or hazards are described; 
2. The reference numbers of the training scenarios that have the capacity to alter 
the risk associated with the events or hazards, and also the locations of these 
scenarios within the lesson plan are shown; 
2.1. The list of numbered scenarios, categorised by mode125 of operation, 
which formed part of the system’s outline specification, is presented in 
Appendix 10; 
2.2. An overview of the content of each individual lesson is presented in Table 
14 (Section 5.9). Each lesson is numbered and the term ‘overarching 
lesson’ is described; 
3. Explanatory comments of the analyst (Sotera Risk Solutions) are presented; 
4. The baseline risk values, measured in equivalent fatalities, which were 
associated with the events or hazards for 2010 are shown. These values were 
calculated using the NWRM prior to the introduction of the amended training 
process; 
5. The calculated change in risk that occurred in the period 2010 to 2012 is shown 
(see Smith (1993) in respect of the justifiable level of confidence in relative 
predictions vis-a-vis absolute predictions. Partly supportive evidence of the 
reduction in risk is presented in Table 26.); 
6. The extent of I.É.’s duty of care in respect of each event or hazard is shown; 
7. The adjusted values of preventing a fatality (VPF), based on the extent of I.É.’s 
duty of care for the events and hazards, are shown; 
8. The financial benefit of the reduced risk for each event or hazard is shown. 
These values are the products of the values in Columns 5 and 7. 
This analysis shows that an overall risk reduction of -1·2807E+00 equivalent 
fatalities was achieved over the two year period 2010 - 2012. The financial benefit 
of this reduction was €720,878 over the period; equivalent to €360,439 p.a.
                                                 
125 Normal, degraded or emergency mode 
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Table 27: Changes in Operational Risk (2010 – 2012): attributable to driver performance 
1) Description of 





in lesson plan) 
3) Comment 4) Risk resulting 
from the event 
or hazard in 
2010 (in EFs) 
5) Change in 
risk126 (EFs) 
(2010 - ’12)  
6) Assignment 
of ‘duty of 
care’ 
7) VPF relative 





‘12) (€)  
Passenger falls due to 
poor ride quality 
N 3.1; N 15 
(overarching lesson) 
 6·4125E-03 1·0039E-03 Shared €740,910 €744 
Passenger sustains 
scalding after spilling 
drink due to poor ride 
quality 
N 3.1; N 15 
(overarching lesson) 
 6·4125E-03 1·0039E-03 Shared €740,910 €744 
Train crew worker 
falls due to poor ride 
quality 
N 3.1; N 15 
(overarching lesson) 
 1·5775E-03 9·8536E-05 Shared €740,910 €73 
Train crew worker 
sustains scalding after 
spilling drink due to 
poor ride quality 
N 3.1; N 15 
(overarching lesson) 
 1·4789E-02 9·8536E-05 Shared €740,910 €73 








to running and 
shunting SPADs  
1·9697E-01 -1·4176E-01 Prime €2,222,731 -€315,088 
Cat. D SPAD (a 
runaway) 
N 10.1 (Lesson 4)  1·0190E-05 9·0619E-04 Prime €2,222,731 €2,014 
Dispatch staff fails to 
observe entrapment 
N 10.3; N 10.5 
(overarching lesson 
and Lesson 2) 
 2·2150E-03 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Hit by train after 
falling from train onto 
track 
N 10.5 (overarching 
lesson) 
 8·1915E-02 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Train separation 
occurs (auto coupler) 
N 16; E 5 (Lesson 
10) 




N 16; E 5 (Lesson 
10) 
 4·2062E-04 -3·9888E-08 Shared €740,910 €0 
Brakes/brake 
initiation failure 
N 20 (Lesson 4) The benefit is low 
as this is an activity 
which is well 
practiced and a 
simulator makes 
little difference. 
5·3948E-03 9·8642E-03 Prime €2,222,731 €21,925 
Object not detected by 
the driver on an 
adjacent line 
N 22; E 1; E 2 
(overarching lesson) 
 7·2028E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Train driver fails to 
stop short 
N 22; E 11 
(Introduction) 
The benefit is small 
as this is a hard area 
to improve. Often, 
the train will be 
going too fast to 
stop short. 
4·5023E-01 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Trespasser/surfer is 
injured 
N 22 (Lesson 5)  3·3403E+00 -1·1495E+00 Illegal €370,455 -€425,822 
Signalman or driver is 
slow to react, or reacts 
incorrectly, to an 
emergency, or an 
emergency call to stop 
trains 
N 28 (Lesson 5) Changes in risk 
profile are less 
sensitive to driver 
performance; 
signalmen play a 
major part in this 
scenario. 
3·5447E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Overspeeding through 
speed restriction and 
derailing 
N 30 (overarching 
lesson and, 
Introduction) 
 9·0322E-03 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Collision during 
permissive working 
due to driver 
misjudgement of 
speed or braking 
N 1; N 32 
(overarching lesson 
and Lesson 4) 
 1·4478E-02 -9·5393E-04 Prime €2,222,731 -€2,120 
Train driver misjudges 
buffer approach speed 
N 1; N 32 
(overarching lesson 
and Introduction) 
 4·1102E-03 -1·8233E-04 Prime €2,222,731 -€405 
Train unable to stop N 37; E 1; E 11 
(Lesson 4) 
 1·1690E-01 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Train driver fails to 
observe road vehicle 
in time 
N 37; E 1 
(Introduction) 
 1·0036E-04 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Miscommunication 
between signalman 
and train driver results 
in unsafe movement 
D 2; D 11 
(Lesson 5) 
 5·7577E-03 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Poor visibility 
conditions 
D 3; D 4 (Lesson 8)  4·7650E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
                                                 
126 A negative value indicates a reduction in risk. 
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1) Description of 





in lesson plan) 
3) Comment 4) Risk resulting 
from the event 
or hazard in 
2010 (in EFs) 
5) Change in 
risk126 (EFs) 
(2010 - ’12)  
6) Assignment 
of ‘duty of 
care’ 
7) VPF relative 





‘12) (€)  
Insufficient time to 
apply/respond to 
detonator protection 
D 7 (Lesson 5)  7·8200E-03 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Wrong side failure of 
train vigilance device 
or bypassed 
D 9 (Lesson 7)  2·7160E-06 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Train door interlock 
wrong side failure or 
bypassed 
D 10 (Lesson 2)  1·5212E-02 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Train driver fails to 
follow a TSR 
approaching worksite 
or SPAD entering 
possession 
D 18 (Introduction 
and Lesson 1) 
 2·7417E-03 0·0000E+00 Shared €740,910 €0 
Driver unaware of 
wrong side failure 
E 4 (overarching 
lesson and Lesson 7) 
 9·4154E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Driver/guard of train # 
1 slow to apply 
protection after 
collision 
E 6 (Lesson 5)  3·0156E-05 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Driver fails to stop 
short of a set 
[reversed], or clipped 
points - low speed 
move 
E 8 (Introduction)  3·7666E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 




E 9 (Lessons 8 and 
10) 
 2·2488E-03 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Object placed on line 
by vandals 
E 12 (Introduction) The benefit is small 
as there is only a 
small chance of 
detecting the object 
in advance. 
7·6770E-02 -1·3566E-03 Prime €2,222,731 -€3,015 
Hot axle box not 
detected by HABD 
before derailment 




dominate over staff 
response errors. 
3·3911E-03 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
Buffer locking results 
in a derailment 
E 14 (overarching 
lesson) 
 3·3224E-02 0·0000E+00 Prime €2,222,731 €0 
    -1·2807E+00 Financial value of risk reduction -€720,878 or 
-€360,439 p.a. 
Sources: Analyses by Sotera Risk Solutions in 2010 and 2012 
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9.2 Enhanced Training Experience 
Operators were asked to complete end-of-course evaluation questionnaires. A 
copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 19. The questionnaire 
comprised three main sections in which attendees were asked to: 
1. State their levels of (dis)agreement in respect of global attributes concerning 
the equipment, the training experience and the achievement of the output 
objective of the training process. The writer converted the forced Likert scale 
to an interval scale. Values, ranging from -2 to +2, indicate levels of 
(dis)agreement from strong disagreement to strong agreement; 
2. State the extent to which they (dis)liked each of the four elements of the 
process. Values, ranging from +1 to +5, indicate weak to strong approval for 
each activity of the process; 
3. Comment openly on any aspect of the process. A ‘free text’ non-directive 
section was provided on the course appraisal form for this purpose which 
elicited 1,905 responses in total. 
Details of the results of the survey, in respect of the levels of (dis)agreement with 
the global and process elements, are presented in Tables 28 and 29, and are shown 
graphically in Figures 13 and 14. A summary of the most common ‘free text’ 
comments is provided in Table 30. These tables and figures show the disclosed 
beliefs of 397 drivers; a response rate of 80%. Almost unanimously, respondents 
believe that the use of simulation supports their learning. As importantly, they 
consider that there were no barriers to learning and that the simulator enabled 
training process is enjoyable and that the system is easy to use. Furthermore, 
respondents disclosed that the provision of feedback by the instructor and peers, 
facilitated by remote observation, is valued. In addition to the high mean values of 
the responses on each dimension, the readers’ attention is drawn to the small 
margins of error. 
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Table 28: Summary of Feedback on Global Attributes 
Level of agreement with statements → 
on a forced Likert scale which have 
been converted to (interval scale) 
The simulator 
equipment is 







Strongly disagree (-2) 1 0 1 
Disagree (-1) 3 3 2 
Agree (+1) 212 205 173 
Strongly agree (+2) 181 186 221 
Total number of valid responses 397 394 397 
Average of values 1.4332 1.4594 1.5390 
Standard deviation 0.5674 0.5429 0.5565 
Margin of error (95% CI) 0.0558 0.0536 0.0547 
 
Figure 13: Operators’ Views on their Experience and Value of the Simulation 
Table 29: Summary of Operators' Liking for Each Element of the Process 
Interval scale The classroom The driving  The observation The feedback 
Not liked at all (+1) 1 0 2 0 
Disliked (+2) 2 4 1 3 
Average (+3) 26 18 14 13 
Liked (+4) 119 102 114 93 
Highly liked (+5) 247 271 261 282 
Total number of 
valid responses 
395 395 392 391 
Average of values 4.5418 4.6152 4.6097 4.6726 
Standard deviation 0.6638 0.6274 0.6212 0.5768 
Margin of error 
(95% CI) 

























Figure 14: Operators' Views on the Constituents of the Revised Training Process 
The writer’s view on the value of peer review, performed using the observation 
facility, is vindicated. The inclusion of an observation facility is sometimes 
advised against as it is considered wasteful to have non-operant drivers observing 
the actions of their colleagues. 
Table 30: Free Text Comments of Simulator Operators 
Essence of respondents’ 
comments 
Number of operators who choose to comment on the 
particular issue (N = 397 possible contributors) 
‘Opportunity should be 
provided to allow operators to 
practice particular skills.’ 
One hundred and ninety (48%) would like to see more 
faultfinding included in the training programme. 
‘Satisfaction with the degree of 
immersion, and perceived need 
for motion’ 
Ninety five (24%) commented on the realism of the 
simulator and the scenarios. The corollary is that only one 
commentator (0·25%) “Would like movement or motion, by 
means of a shaker seat, incorporated into the simulator.” 
‘Simulator scenarios [EBAT] 
added to the experience’ 
Seventy seven (19%) concurred with this sentiment. 
‘It prepares drivers for 
emergency situations and calls.’ 
Fifty eight (15%) thought that being practiced in handling 
emergency situations was beneficial. 
‘The course is too short.’ Fifty seven (14%) wanted to spend more time on the 
simulator enabled training course. 
‘The new training process is 
better than the old process.’ 
Fifty two (13%) liked the new delivery format better than 
the old one. 
‘The new delivery process is not 
boring, or as boring, as the old 
process.’ 
Forty six (12%) did not think that the new process was 

























Essence of respondents’ 
comments 
Number of operators who choose to comment on the 
particular issue (N = 397 possible contributors) 
‘Gaining an appreciation of the 
nature and demands of each 
other’s work, i.e., joint training’ 
Thirty two (8%) welcomed the concept of interactive 
training with signalmen. No one expressed adverse 
comment. 
‘It provides a learning 
opportunity to train for novel 
situations.’ 
Twenty eight (7%) learned how to cope with situations that 
were novel or that they had no opportunity to practice in the 
real world. It should be noted that the preponderance of 
operators had in excess of 5 years driving experience, 
highlighting the stochastic nature of event exposure in the 
real world. 
‘The training allowed me to 
learn from mistakes.’ 
Twenty two (5%) believed that the simulator facilitated the 
learning-by-failing process. 
‘The relaxed training 
atmosphere’ 
Sixteen (3%) appreciated the relaxed atmosphere and 
thought that it contributed to the intervention. 
‘Increased confidence in future 
performance’ 
Ten (2%) felt more confident that they would perform their 
duties better after simulator training. 
Non-jeopardy training Five (1%) believed that the facility allowed them to make 
mistakes in a risk free environment without the fear of 
recrimination. 
‘Allowing scenarios to unfold to 
their logical conclusion’ 
Four (1%) welcomed the idea of playing out scenarios to the 
end. 
‘Professional driving’ Two (1%) felt that the training would add to their 
professionalism. 
The operators’ responses, presented in the above table, should be interpreted in 
accordance with this example. The fact that forty eight percent of the respondents 
expressed the view that they would like to see a greater faultfinding element in the 
training programme, should not be taken to imply that 52% would prefer to have 
the faultfinding content reduced. It simply means that 190 respondents chose to 
state their preference; the balance chose not to express any view on the matter. 
9.3 Internal Rate of Return on Investment 
Capital and ongoing costs were, and continue to be, incurred in order to achieve 
the reduction in the quantum of risk that is shown in Table 27. The internal rate of 
return (IRR) is the financial calculation that is used by the writer to evaluate the 
merit of investing in this project. The monetary value of the risk reduction that 
was realised (from Table 27), other financial savings achieved, and the costs that 
were incurred because of project implementation are presented in Table 31. The 
IRR is the discount rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all cash flows 
equal to zero. Use of the word ‘internal’ in the term denotes that external 
environmental factors, such as interest or inflation rates, are not considered in the 
calculation. The higher a project's internal rate of return, the more desirable it is as 
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an investment opportunity. The calculation shows that, based on the non-adjusted 
value of risk reduction (PF = 1), the nett cash flows need to be discounted at a rate 
of - 19·20% before an NPV of €0 is reached. The IRR for any project can be 
calculated manually using the formula:           
      
 
  where n is a 
positive integer; N is the total number of periods; C is the cash flow (in or out); r 
is the IRR and NPV is the net present value which by definition is 0. It can be 
calculated with ease using the IRR function in Microsoft Excel. 
As mentioned in Table 1, the project was funded under the RSP 2 initiative. Even 
if this was not the case and if I.É. had to fund the project using the normal 
commercial borrowing facility, because of its prestigious borrowing position of 
being a semi-state organisation, it was able to borrow money at the ECB AAA 
lending rate of 3·42% per annum in 2010. As the IRR, based on a PF = 1, falls far 
short of the cost of funding (-19·20% versus +3·42%), this project would not be 
countenanced on commercial grounds alone. But this project was not unique in 
respect of RSP 2 as a whole, Risk Solutions (2008) “… found that in strict cost 
benefit terms [PF = 1], the safety dividend was less than the cost of the 
investment” (p. 6). 
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Table 31: Cash Flows and Internal Rate of Return Resulting from I.É.’s Project Implementation 
 Cash Outflows (all values in €)  
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15  
Capital cost -4,600,000                 
Additional staff costs at 
Training Centre 
 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700 -168,700  
Additional insurance  -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900 -10,900  
Electrical energy  -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500 -6,500  
Maintenance of equipment  0 0 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350 -53,350  
Additional costs for 
maintenance of facilities 
 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667 -33,667  
‘Half life’ rebuild          -902,367        
Total annual outgoings -4,600,000 -219,767 -219,767 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -1,175,484 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117 -273,117  
 Cash (or cash equivalent) inflows (all values in €)  
Safety benefits   360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439 360,439  
Reduced fuel and maintenance 
of traction unit127 
 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000  
Ongoing reduction in energy 
use (eco-driving initiative) 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Residual value of buildings                0  
Total annual savings  3,000 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 363,439 IRR 
Net flows -4,600,000 -216,767 143,672 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 -812,045 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 90,322 -19·20% 
 
  
                                                 
127 Used for basic driving and fault-finding courses 
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Notes in respect of outflow amounts of project’s elements: 
1. To facilitate the espousal of the new technology and to provide the extra Staff 
Trainer resources, which enabled the transition of the training delivery 
process from broadcasting to narrowcasting, additional staff costs amounting 
to €168,700 p.a. gross were incurred. 
2. Insurance costs of €10,900 have been included in the calculations. These were 
not incurred as I.É.’s general policy is to carry the risk on facilities and 
equipment up to a threshold of €5 m. A premium of €10,900 would be paid 
annually by a company with a different outlook on risk exposure. 
3. The system consumes 33kWh of electrical energy at a cost of €6,500 p.a. 
4. To ensure whole life reliability, I.É. placed a contract with the supplier to 
provide preventative and breakdown maintenance services. Defects that 
occurred during the first two years of service were remedied under warranty 
arrangements. 
5. The cost of additional bespoke accommodation at the two centres (Inchicore 
and Mallow) was €673,348. In addition, it is customary for I.É. to provide 5% 
of the capital cost annually to cover building maintenance activities. 
6. Although the project has a working life of 15 years, the writer recognises the 
impact of obsolescence, e.g., computer operating systems go unsupported and 
user expectations increase. An amount of €902,367 is provided for a ‘half 
life’ rebuild. This represents 23% of the initial cost of the simulator 
equipment. 
Notes in respect of inflow amounts of project’s elements: 
1. Risk reduction has a financial value. Neglecting the practice of applying a PF 
to the VPF on the basis of reducing the risk to as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP), the financial value of the reduction in risk is €360,439 p.a.; 
2. Simulator usage reduced the necessity to have a real traction unit made 
available on the basic driving and faultfinding courses. This has saved €2,000 
on fuel costs and a further €1,000 on maintenance costs p.a. Standing charges 
on the traction unit are excluded from the calculation as they are not an 
avoidable cost; 
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3. Evans (2013) highlights the difficulty in evaluating the peripheral benefits that 
safety related projects can bestow. He notes that “... it is possible that 
[projects] could provide benefits other than improved safety... such other 
benefits may be their main justification... identifying and quantifying these 
benefits more precisely is proving elusive” (p.143). The benefits attributable 
an enhancement of faultfinding skills, achieved through simulation, could not 
be ascertained by the writer and, hence, are ignored in the calculations; 
4. The matter of training driving techniques to reduce energy consumption (eco-
driving) deserves special mention. Ireland’s transport sector consumed 32% 
(4,326 ktoe128) of its primary energy demand in 2013. The rail sector 
consumes 42 ktoe and produces about 138 kt of CO2 annually (SEAI, 2014). 
As well as being costly to the environment, it is also costly to the company. 
The financial cost to provide I.É.’s energy requirements was €31·6 m (8·6% 
of total costs) (I.É.’s Annual Report, 2011). The use of simulators is seen as a 
means to develop energy efficient (eco) driving skills, and the savings 
achievable through this use case are often the main identified advantage in the 
cost-benefit analysis to justify their purchase (Rushby and Seabrook, 2007). 
Ironically, when they surveyed ten British operating companies about 
achieved fuel efficiency through simulator usage, “... only one reported great 
improvements, one reported a little improvement and five recorded no change. 
Three [respondents] recorded the question as not applicable” (p.34). The 
reasons why there was such a mediocre response may be found in the desktop 
study by RSSB (2011a). Whilst acknowledging the potential to save between 
1% and 10% of energy costs, they expressed caution in respect of the possible 
ensuing safety and operational performance consequences. RSSB finds that 
distraction caused by eco-driving may result “... in overspeeding or a failure to 
see a sign or an obstruction on the line” (p.16) but acknowledges that the 
probabilities attaching to these precursors are either low or very low. The 
concept of eco-driving is congruent with defensive driving. Both techniques 
improve the passenger experience by enabling a smoother drive and by 
reducing the risk associated with LMA exceedence. The results of the studies, 
                                                 
128 Kilotonnes of oil equivalent 
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in Appendix 9, show the potential gains of eco-driving. The reason why there 
is so little take up of eco-driving lies in the principle ‘safety over performance 
and performance over eco-driving’. In an environment that is characterised by 
the pursuit of adherence to the running schedule, performance wins out. The 
benefits of eco-driving were not realised in I.É.’s case because of a policy 
decision not to adopt the initiative; 
5. It cost €673,348 to provide bespoke training facilities. Readers should note the 
non-conventional treatment of this amount. Normally, the buildings would be 
revalued on foot of a valuation certificate and shown as a cash inflow at the 
end of the project. However, this inflow is unrealisable as the facilities have 
niche suitability. The incorporated functionality has no use other than for the 
accommodation of a simulator system. Perpetual use of simulator equipment is 
necessary to reap future value from the monies already expended in the 
facilities. Thus, in this analysis, the facilities are shown as having no residual 
value. When the system is replaced at some point in the future, the overall 
capital cost will be lower as the facilities are already in situ and, ceteris 
paribus, the IRR for that expenditure will be higher than for this project. 
In respect of I.É.’s policy decision not to train eco-driving skills, the annual nett 
savings foregone are calculated at €0 in Year 1, €113,000 in Year 2 and €226,000 
for subsequent years. From his research, the writer concludes that it was possible 
to achieve a minimum gross saving of €316,000 p.a. (1%) on I.É.’s overall annual 
energy expense. To achieve this saving, it would be necessary to incur additional 
training costs of €90,000 p.a., based on a burdened training cost of €300 per day 
training for 300 trainees per annum. The impact of achieving the savings on the 
project’s IRR is evident from rows 1 and 2 of Table 32. 
The principle of ALARP, and the appropriateness of assigning PFs to the financial 
value of a reduction in risk when completing a cost-benefit analysis are discussed 
in Sections 8.5 and 8.6. To reflect I.É.’s aversion to risk, a PF of three times the 
financial value of the safety benefits is applied when completing the scenario 
based IRR calculations. This is the convention that is normally used in I.É. The 
effect on the project’s IRR of using a PF = 3, without implementing the eco 
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driving initiative, is evident by comparing rows 1 and 3. The effect on the 
project’s IRR of delivering eco-driving training and applying a PF of 3 is evident 
by comparing rows 1 and 4. 
Table 32: Scenario Based IRR Values (based on delivered scope) 
Scenario IRR value 
1) Actual IRR of I.É.’s project as implemented - based on the application of 
a PF of 1 times the VPF and training for eco-driving was not delivered 
-19·20% 
2) Estimated IRR of I.É.’s project as implemented - based on the 
application of a PF of 1 times the VPF and if training for eco-driving was 
delivered 
-3·13% (est.) 
3) Actual IRR of I.É.’s project as implemented - based on the application of 
a PF of 3 times the VPF and training for eco-driving was not delivered 
+10·99% 
4) Estimated IRR of I.É.’s project as implemented - based on the 
application of a PF of 3 times the VPF and if training for eco-driving was 
delivered 
+15·28% (est.) 
There are vastly different viewpoints in respect of the application of PFs to the 
financial value of safety benefits. To achieve an IRR of 3·42%, i.e., the ECB 
AAA lending rate at the time of the investment, iterative backward calculations 
show that it is necessary to apply a PF of 2·1675 to the safety benefits. It would 
have been necessary to apply a PF of only 1·512 times to the safety benefits if 
these benefits had been supplemented with eco-driving benefits. 
9.4 Compliance with Regulation 
Although the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (OJEU, 2007) state 
that simulators may have application in the training and certification process of 
train drivers, they stop short of mandating their use. 
The RSC was set up under ‘The Railway Safety Act 2005’. Its mission129 is to “... 
advance the safety of railways in Ireland through diligent supervision and 
enforcement”. The commission is far less ambivalent in respect of simulators and 
considers their use to be: 
“... mandatory for the effective training and continuous training of drivers... 
every initial training and examination and continuous training and 
examination [process] shall employ a simulator element on abnormal 
working conditions and for rules infrequently applied” (RSC, 2012, p.17). 
                                                 
129 As communicated on its website: http://www.rsc.ie/. (Accessed: 15.01.’15.) 
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By embedding simulator enabled training into its training processes since 2010, 
I.É. has surpassed the guidance in OJEU (2007) and has proactively complied 
with the mandate of the RSC. 
9.5 Independent Expert Audit and Comment 
History is replete with instances where IT projects did not achieve their intended 
objectives. Senior office holders, particularly those in government departments, 
are desirous to avoid negative public criticism in respect of their involvement in 
ineffective spending. To avoid allegations of misspending and to demonstrate 
good corporate governance, they frequently obtain ‘second opinions’ and 
evidence from independent auditors and reputable industry lead bodies. 
I.É.’s simulator project was subjected to a disproportionate level of scrutiny. The 
Irish Government commissioned two consultations from Risk Solutions130 to 
evaluate the effectiveness of Phases 2 and 3 of the RSP. I.É.’s simulator project 
was an enabler of the human performance component of Phase 2. At the pre-
implementation stage of the project, Risk Solutions (2008) made two salient 
comments: 
1. “I.É.’s original intention was to purchase a single simulator in the form of a 
replica cab mock-up... the requirements were redefined. Instead of a single 
simulator, the decision was made to procure [PC-based simulators]... is likely 
to prove better value for money than the original proposal. We commend I.É. 
for recognising that [a full cab type] was not the best option” (p.37); 
2. “Assuming that they are well specified and properly implemented, the 
simulators should prove an invaluable training aid in the future and be good 
value for money” (p.37). 
At the post implementation review, Risk Solutions (2013) found that “... drivers 
have embraced [the simulator] with enthusiasm... [it is] in keeping with this adult 
learning thinking... [and there is] good evidence of a positive change in this 
indicator (training attendance and influence on SMS outcomes)” (p.93). The 
authors conclude that that “[I.É.’s] performance [0·44 SPADs per million train-
                                                 
130 Trading name of Risksol Consulting Ltd 
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kms in 2012131] compares very favourably with UK figures, where a running 12-
month average of 0·68 per million train-kms [was recorded for] July 2012” (p. 7). 
Further supportive independent evidence is provided by the UK based industry 
lead body in RSSB (2013a). Its review is fulsome in its praise, commenting that 
“[I.É. is] an example of a company that takes a competence-based approach to 
competence review and assessment rather than just doing it for compliance” 
(p.48). See also RSSB (2011b, p.68) in respect of the alignment of the training 
environment created by I.É. and the environment deemed necessary to sustain the 
purpose of SMSs. RSSB (2013a) also notes that I.É.’s training and competence 
development activities “...encompass many of the points within this guide” (p.94). 
The author concludes that: 
“From a business perspective, the investment had to be justified; the 
simulators [etc.] had driven up the cost of training... However, the training 
process is more effective. There is value to be added by investing in the 
technology especially when it is part of an overall strategy to improve 
training” (p.100). 
9.6 Conclusion 
The perspective triangulation technique provided an opportunity to address the 
research questions from multiple perspectives. Most saliently, the project satisfied 
I.É.’s fundamental goal of improved operational safety performance. The project 
also improved the training experience of attendees. However, the project did not 
make financial sense when normal commercial criteria are applied; applying a PF 
of 1 to the VPF results in an IRR of -19·20%. When a PF of 3 times the VPF is 
used however, the project’s IRR is +10·99%; well in excess of the cost of funding. 
A ‘backward pass’ of the IRR calculation reveals that a PF of 2·1675 times the 
VPF is necessary for the investment to cover the normal cost of funding, i.e., to 
achieve an IRR of 3·42%. 
                                                 
131 Eighteen million train kilometres were operated (Annual Report, I.É., 2012) and eight SPADs 
occurred in 2012 (Table 26) 
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The project surpasses the requirements of EU directive 2007/59/EC and has 
proactively satisfied local regulatory requirements. The project drew very 
favourable comment from government appointed auditors in respect of key 
implementation decisions, and also outcomes. 
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10 Other Findings from Project Implementation 
Findings in respect of a range of stakeholder criteria, relating to the achieved 
outcome effectiveness of I.É.’s simulator system, are presented in Chapter 9. 
These findings are of particular interest to those who are interested in ‘what’ was 
achieved. The background narrative in respect of ‘how’ these outcomes were 
achieved is contained in this chapter. The achieved outcomes cannot be 
considered as being mutually exclusive to the strategies and implementation 
methods that were involved in achieving them. This narrative is intended to 
provide guidance to those who hold dual organisational roles, i.e., the Operations 
Training Officers. This cohort is sometimes involved in the specification and 
delivery phases, but is always involved in the use phase of the equipment. The 
onus is on them to ensure that the system will be implemented correctly and that it 
will deliver the intended outcomes. A suggested extension to the use cases that are 
currently performed, and chosen specifically to create extra value and increase the 
IRR of the investment, is also proposed. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections, dealing with: 
10.1 Findings in Respect of the Commercial Aspects; 
10.2 Findings in Respect of the Strategy Employed; 
10.3 Findings in Respect of the Equipment Attributes; 
10.4 Findings in Respect of the System Usability; 
10.5 Findings in Respect of the Unrealised Value-adding Capability; and 
10.6 Recommendations from Research Activity. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 10.7. 
10.1 Findings in Respect of the Commercial Aspects 
The commercial aspects of the project had the potential to influence the initial and 
recurrent costs and, hence, were determinants of its IRR. The three most 
significant aspects were: 
1. The two unforeseen challenges that were encountered in respect of providing 
accommodation at the slave site: 
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1.1 A late managerial decision to redeploy the equipment from Portlaoise to 
Mallow partly usurped the monetary contingency that had been provided 
for that element of the project; 
1.2 The construction company, engaged to complete the works at Mallow, 
became insolvent. The necessity to engage another contractor to complete 
the work, and adverse on-site weather conditions delayed completion. 
I.É. incurred a cost of €33,000 to resolve these difficulties. However, the 
scheduled commencement date for training delivery was not affected. 
2. The development of the DFS during Phase 1 of the project was essential to its 
success. In total, almost 900 observations were made on the behaviours of the 
train models, on the hardware and on the CGI during the acceptance testing 
process. Of these, only 5 items (< 0·6%) were outside of the project’s scope as 
defined in the DFS. 
No cost overruns were incurred as a result of out-of-scope items. 
3. The users of new technology are instrumental to its successful introduction. 
Instructors, who constitute the main user group, are the subject matter experts 
and soon become the simulator experts. In the case of I.É., they were involved 
in all stages of the project. 
It is not surprising that their remuneration expectations rise and they seek 
financial recognition for their involvement in such projects. 
10.2 Findings in Respect of the Strategy Employed 
The elaborateness and scope of the project were determined by I.É.’s strategy in 
respect of its intended use cases and usage rate. These criteria had a direct bearing 
on the capital cost. The three most influential issues in respect of the criteria are: 
1. As shown in Section 7.8, the project involved ambitious equipment modelling. 
These modelling objectives were achieved fully but resulted in an over-
elaborate system insofar as one of the key objectives is concerned, i.e., training 
NTSs. 
It would have been sufficient to model just the predominant class within each 
type of traction, i.e., to develop train models for the 22000, 8520 and 201 
classes only. 
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2. The poor reliability of I.É.’s 8200 class EMU and 2700 class DMU fleets had 
prevented their continuous use over protracted periods of time since 2010. 
Several unsuccessful attempts were made to increase their reliability metrics 
and they were removed from service before value could be extracted. 
Spending €115,000 to model these fleets proved futile. 
3. The number of driving desks exceeds I.É.’s revised requirements. Due to the 
collapse in I.É.’s business resulting from the general economic recession, the 
anticipated requirement to train 48 ab-initio drivers per annum did not 
materialise; it was only necessary to train 8 per annum. The simulator content 
of ab-initio training programmes is thirteen days; a duration that reflects the 
novelty of the tasks, the rate of absorption of the material and the necessity to 
provide opportunity to practice. In addition, qualified drivers of autonomous 
traction attend refresher training biennially for two days. Under the previous 
training process, they attended for four days. The duration of the refresher 
programme for EMU drivers remains unchanged at two days. The capacity of 
the system was based on an annual throughput of 48 ab-initio drivers, a four-
day refresher programme, and the writer’s intention to include training to 
develop eco-driving skills and more comprehensive modules on non-technical 
skills. In the event, eco-driving skills are not developed and training in NTSs is 
limited to awareness training. (See Sections 9.3 and 10.5 for an elaboration of 
the opportunity that was missed because of the non delivery of eco-driving 
training.) Based on these changes, only 5 driving desks are necessary (see 
Table 34). A full set of calculations of simulator usage and requirements is 
provided in Appendix 20; a summary of the design usage and the achieved 
usage is presented in Table 33. 
It should be noted that I.É.’s position is not unique in respect of achieved 
utilisation rates. From the limited data available, it appears that the 
achievement of very high utilisation rates is unusual (CRC for Rail Innovation, 
2013a and Hartmann132, 2011). 
                                                 
132 Hartmann (2011) indicates that, even by operating a two cycle shift, an average utilisation rate 
of ca. 43% was achieved by Deutsche Bahn AG in 2010. 
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Table 33: Effects of Changed Refresher Training Duration and Business Downturn on Usage 




Refresher 63% 40% 
Ab-initio 26% 5% 
Remediation 1% 1% 
Total 90% 46% 
Dublin – electric 
traction 
Refresher 16% 11% 
Ab-initio 10% 5% 
Remediation 0% 0% 




Refresher 79% 25% 
Ab-initio 0% 0% 
Remediation 1% 1% 
Total 80% 26% 
Table 34: Revised System Scope and Deployment: traction types and classes 
Revised simulator deployment strategy 
Desk Traction type Classes incorporated within desk Location and additional facilities 
1 DMU 22000 Dublin – master location: 
2 observer stations, 
1 technical room, 
1 CSD, SPS and TBT ™ 
development area 
2 Same as desk #1 
3 Locomotive 201 (required for conversion 
training) 
4 EMU 8520 
5 DMU 22000 Mallow – slave location 
1 observer station, 
1 technical room 
The reduced modelling requirements from 9 classes to 3 classes, coupled with the 
reduction in scope from 8 driving desks to 5, would have resulted in a capital cost 
saving of €315,000. Based on the same calculation process and values, except for 
the capital cost, upon which Table 31 is based, the effects of reduced scope of 
supply on the project’s IRR are presented in Rows 1 to 4 of Table 35 below. Rows 
5 to 8 of this table show the PFs that it is necessary to apply to the benefits in 
respect of the four conditions, i.e., the actual delivered scope, the reduced scope, if 
Eco driving benefits were realised and if they were not, before the project would 
cover the normal cost of funding of +3·42%. 
Table 35: Scenario Based IRR Values 
Scenario IRR based 
on reduced 
scope 
IRR based on 
delivered 
scope 
1) IRR of I.É.’s project (without delivering eco-driving 
training and without the application of a PF adjustment to 
VPF values) 
-18·83% -19·20% 
2) Estimated IRR of I.É.’s project if eco-driving training was 
delivered as part of the implemented project (without the 
application of a PF adjustment to VPF values) 
-2·37% -3·13% 
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Scenario IRR based 
on reduced 
scope 
IRR based on 
delivered 
scope 
3) IRR of I.É.’s project (without delivering eco-driving 
training) but with a PF adjustment of 3 times the VPF 
applied 
+12·15% +10·99% 
4) Estimated IRR of I.É.’s project if eco-driving training was 





5) Delivered scope and ECO driving benefits were 
not realised (the actual situation) 
2·1675 
6) Delivered scope but if ECO driving benefits had 
been realised 
1·5120 
7) Reduced scope and if ECO driving benefits were 
not realised 
2·0852 
8) Reduced scope and if ECO driving benefits were 
realised 
1·4297 
10.3 Findings in Respect of the Equipment Attributes 
Specific attributes were incorporated into the system that increased the produc-
tivity of training delivery, supported extant safety improvement initiatives, and 
facilitated contextualised learning of non-technical skills. Cost effective ways to 
supplement simulator training, features and usage patterns to prevent simulator 
sickness, approaches to allay operator concerns and interface issues between the 
equipment and power supply were also identified and managed successfully. 
1. Geo-specific modelling of the strategically identified routes for the CGI, al-
though difficult to achieve, proved worthwhile because of the improved sense 
of presence that it created. This helped greatly to garner operator acceptance. 
The quality of the modelled routes is such that route conductors are not re-
quired. Although it was costly to produce, it is labour saving from the perspec-
tive of the provision of training resources. 
2. Modelling the advisory and supervisory systems exactly proved to be a chal-
lenging but necessary requirement. The modelled systems are used to train pro-
cedures in respect of the ‘running release’133 feature of ATP, systems’ bypass 
procedures, operation in areas that are not fitted with the CAWS, and general 
training in the hierarchy of signal perception, i.e., the priority of actual signal 
observation over incongruent indications presented on the advisory system. 
                                                 
133 An override feature that allows a train to move at restricted speed in the absence of a code. 
Page 181 
3. Exact modelling of the AEG 90 train radio created a dilemma. It was I.É.’s in-
tention to replace the AEG 90 system by a Global System for Mobile com-
munications for Railways (GSM-R) system but the timeframe for the replace-
ment, and the characteristics and features of the substitute model had not been 
decided at the time. As safety critical communications training is a facilitative 
element of many of the training scenarios, the writer opted for the inclusion of 
a model of the extant train radio. The model has full modality, and a full range 
of verbal messages and telegrams can be sent to and from the radio by the 
various actors. 
4. Train faults are advised through the simulator’s TDMS, and by means of the 
indications and gauges on the driver’s desk. Driver-correctable repairs or resets 
are executed on a 14” touch sensitive screen that is located on the rear wall of 
the simulator booth. In addition to learning how to correct a fault, training is 
also provided on contextual procedures, i.e., the simulation scenarios contain 
lessons on obtaining signal protection, placing the track circuit operating 
device on the opposite line and keeping customers informed of service delays. 
5. It should be noted from Table 21 that a locomotive simulator desk is not 
provided at the facility in Mallow. However, some drivers from this catchment 
area drive locomotive hauled Mk IV trains. Because of the lack of redundancy 
with single point traction, and the imperative to minimise service recovery 
time, the writer amended the scope of supply of the contract to include an 
emulator. This is used to train the drivers to correct faults on locomotives. 
6. I.É.’s system features static simulators, each using projectors to present narrow 
FOVs for the OTW vistas. Furthermore, the amount of time spent actually 
driving during the scripted scenarios is purposely kept short. Typically, it is 
about 15 minutes per hour per driver. These features and the operating metho-
dology were selected to reduce the likelihood of simulator sickness. This stra-
tegy has proven to be successful. None of the drivers taking part in simulator 
enabled training, in the 2 ½ year period between its introduction and the time 
of writing, became ill during a training session, or experienced illness to the 
extent that training had either to be suspended or where feelings of nausea 
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impacted negatively on its receptivity. The mitigation approaches, outlined in 
Appendix 15 accomplished the objective. 
7. A great deal of accurate quantitative material, relating to operators’ perfor-
mance, is available in the post run analyser; a tool that is similar to an event 
recorder. The PRA is included in the simulator manufacturer’s standard 
offering. For railways operating an aggregated training and jeopardy assess-
ment regime, it is attractive to use the PRA. However, its perceived benefit 
may be illusory as: 
7.1 The simulated driving environment and conditions do not replicate exactly 
those pertaining to the real world. Performance deficits in the simulated 
environment could legitimately be attributed to the mismatch of the per-
ception of speed and the calculated speed, sighting distance for signals or 
the lack of psychological fidelity; 
7.2 The PRA cannot capture some really meaningful results, i.e., the NTSs of 
the operators. (See Kyriakidis, 2013; and Blickensderfer (in CRC for Rail 
Innovation, 2013a)). Good, qualitative instructor judgement, followed by 
facilitative and non-threatening feedback, is more valuable and beneficial 
than jeopardous use of the PRA (RSSB, 2009b). 
8. The design of the electrical circuitry at the training facilities specified the 
incorporation of 30 mA residual current devices (RCDs) to protect equipment 
users. However, nuisance tripping can occur anywhere from 15 to 30 mA. In 
respect of the facility at Inchicore only, the sum of the standing earth leakage 
current of the fully operational system and the flow from the capacitive touch 
screens is within this range. This necessitated modification to the protection 
arrangements. 
10.4 Findings in Respect of the System Usability 
Some features of the system have the ability to constrain potential use cases, 
whereas other features provide unanticipated benefit. 
Although the physical characteristics of the trains and routes are modelled 
accurately, there is a mismatch between the perception of the speed of movement 
at higher speeds, and the speed that is shown on the speedometer. Operators 
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perceive the speed to be lower than that calculated by the physics engine and 
displayed on the speedometer, and this can influence operator behaviour (Kim, 
2015, and Diels and Parkes, 2010). At low speeds there is no perceptible 
mismatch. Mismatch is attributable to the accuracy of the artefacts in the visual 
database, and the speed of computation necessary to draw the wireframes of the 
objects and to render them. Unhappy with the perceived mismatch, the writer 
conducted a small experiment using the CSD. Based on the finding of Kwon et al. 
(2006), the writer moved the operators’ eye point by +8º in the horizontal plane, 
i.e., he foreshortened the vanishing point of the horizon. A single blind test was 
performed with the instructors (N = 8). All of them noticed that there was a very 
slight improvement in speed perception at higher speeds. A further improvement 
could have been achieved by reducing the dot density for the texture of the 
permanent way (Kwon et al., 2006). However, this makes the model of the route 
appear more artificial and less lifelike. As a very high proportion (87·25% - from 
Table 11) of I.É.’s SPADs occur at low speed and are contained within the 
overlap distance, i.e., during shunting movements, when entering or exiting 
engineering possessions, SASPADs or when starting in advance of a signal etc., 
this mismatch is not problematic in such cases. The speeds of the train 
movements, involved in the remaining 12·75% of SPADs where the movements 
exceed the overlap, are not known. 
Significant effort and money was expended in creating very detailed train models 
that can be used to train basic tasks. This may appear wasteful but the approach 
garnered a high level of operator acceptance and facilitated near transfer learning 
also. As a peripheral benefit, all of the instructors who were engaged in the 
delivery of ab-initio training programmes (N = 6) found that the simulator 
experience prepared trainees better for the upcoming ‘training train’ module. For 
example when audible alarms sounded on the real traction unit, because of their 
prior experience in the simulator, the trainees knew where the sounds were 
emanating from and could cancel them before incurring a time penalty. 
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10.5 Findings in Respect of the Unrealised Value-adding 
Capability 
The provision of training to develop energy efficient driving has been found to 
yield financial benefits. Findings from five railway specific studies in respect of 
the achievable gains are provided in Appendix 9. These indicate that an overall 
average reduction of 8·4% in energy consumption may be achievable. The writer 
took an ultra conservative position when calculating the relevant scenario based 
IRR values that are contained in Table 32 and in Table 35 by basing the 
calculations on the assumption that a 1% reduction of I.É.’s energy costs could be 
achieved. Attention is drawn to the significant effect of eco-driving savings on the 
project’s IRR. The IRR improves from -19·20% to -3·13% (PF = 1) and from 
+10·99% (est.) to +15·28% (est.) (PF = 3). However, this initiative was not 
pursued because of a perceived negative effect on operational performance. 
10.6 Recommendations from Research Activity 
Simulators should not be used merely to train technical skills. CRC for Rail 
Innovation (2013a) suggests that: 
“Merely mimicking aspects of the task, such as applying correct procedures, 
may not be sufficient to produce the behaviours which will enhance safety 
and performance… [simulators] need to be treated as sites for simulating the 
whole job of train driving and the range of skills involved” (p.25). 
The value, derived by I.É., was achieved by the concomitant development of 
technical and non-technical skills. However, the full extent of this value was not 
realised; I.É. should invest more time and effort in the development of the NTSs. 
In Australia for example, initial training programmes, dedicated to the subject of 
rail resource management have durations of two to three days134 (Rail Safety 
Regulators' Panel, 2007). In the US, the programme duration is 1 day (Roop, 
2007). Increased investment by I.É. would facilitate more extensive training of the 
NTSs currently under development, and the development of other NTSs that are 
not being addressed in the extant programme, e.g., risk management, emergency 
                                                 
134 Recurrent training courses have a duration of one day. 
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and crisis management, self evaluation of performance and meta situation 
awareness. 
Undoubtedly, instructors are experts in the development of technical skills. This 
expertise is insufficient in an era where the emphasis has shifted to encompass the 
development of NTSs. To improve trainees’ experience and training outcomes, 
instructors need: 
1. To understand relevant cognitive psychology and ergonomic constructs. They 
need to be able to utilise this understanding when scripting scenarios in order 
to elicit specific responses from which desired learning will occur; 
2. To be able to provide qualitative and defensible feedback on performance. This 
is an essential element of the training process as it prevents trainee 
miscalibration. Instructors should receive additional training to develop this 
skill, most especially, in respect of the use of behavioural marker techniques; 
3. To change further from being SMEs merely, to being observers of behaviour 
and mentors as well. 
A training simulator is one tool in the instructor’s armoury. The training process 
should not become means-end inverted by using it in every conceivable instance 
just because it is available (see Pennant, 2004). The suitability of each training 
tool in the armoury should be assessed with regard to the training content, the skill 
under development and the trainees’ stage of development. 
Training experiences can be enriched by animating some of placements that are 
included in the simulator system. The inclusion of road vehicles traversing a 
crossing, or a shunter passing between vehicles etc. would improve the sense of 
presence within these scenarios. 
10.7 Conclusion 
Although I.É’s project was an overall success as defined by the stakeholder 
criteria, there is no idea that good that cannot be improved on135. There were a 
number of areas at the strategic, implementation and operational levels where 
                                                 
135 This maxim is attributed to Michael Eisner; a proponent of the Quality and Lean initiatives 
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excessive costs were incurred and where benefits were not maximised. Most of 
these costs were incurred because elements of the intended strategy were not 
realised; lesser additional costs were incurred because of unforeseen challenges. 
Although the excessive sunk costs can never be recovered, the possibility of 
maximising the benefits remains. Utilising the system’s potential to enhance 
training in respect of the unrealised value adding capability will increase the IRR 




In this chapter, the writer reviews his research approach, makes suggestions for 
further research to facilitate generalisation of the outcomes that he has presented 
in Chapter 9, and makes his concluding comments. 
11.1 Review of the Approach Used by the Writer 
The work undertaken for this thesis is an extension of the writer’s MSc 
dissertation entitled ‘Employing New Techniques to Improve the Effectiveness of 
the Training Process for Traction Drivers’ (2003)136. In that prospective report, he 
investigated the merits of introducing simulation tools and techniques into I.É. 
While it contained a recommendation to procure a number of desk simulators, it 
did not consider adequately the extent of the achievable outcomes or the 
functionality, or the engineering and staff issues necessary to achieve them. This 
report is written retrospectively; the achieved outcomes of the initiative and the 
challenges that were faced in their realisation are grounded in experience. 
The research reported in this thesis supported the realisation of the project from 
goal elicitation, through the equipment specification, procurement, systems 
engineering, installation and value extraction phases. The acknowledged success 
of the project by industry specialists is a testimony to the extent of the research 
activity and its value. 
Four types of research methods were used by the writer: 
1. A review of relevant cognitive psychology constructs highlighted weaknesses 
in the extant training delivery process which the writer believed could be 
resolved through the use of simulation. The overall literature review, together 
with field research, also informed him about simulator attributes and 
implementation approaches that could help to ensure success; 
2. A collaborative action research approach was taken. In addition to I.É.’s 
training practitioners, the external community of practice contributed to the 
research process. The community shared its experiences and suggested 
                                                 
136 Available at the University of Sheffield 
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solutions to issues that members had encountered when implementing similar 
initiatives; 
3. Quantitative studies were carried out by Sotera Risk Solutions which revealed 
the nature and extent of driver relevant risks. These were used to reveal the 
change in the risk profile that occurred in the two years period immediately 
following the introduction of the new training process. On the basis of this 
change, it was possible to complete a scenario based analysis of the project’s 
IRR; 
4. Qualitative studies revealed user satisfaction ratings. 
It was appropriate to adopt a combined study approach for a translational study 
such as this as it coalesced of a range of assets and approaches, i.e., a combination 
of desktop research and field practice coupled with domain specific primary 
analyses, towards the achievement of the research goal. 
11.2 Suggested Further Research to Generalise Outcomes 
The output of I.É.’s NWRM and the resultant financial analysis has provided 
evidence that simulator enabled training has been effectively employed in this 
case. The increase in training effectiveness was achieved through the exploitation 
of general cognitive psychology constructs. The findings of this research can be 
extended and further generalised by using the following five approaches: 
1. By conducting a series of repeat biennial analyses over the lifetime of the 
project. Using this approach, the training programme would not be altered for 
what would essentially constitute a longitudinal study over the project’s life. 
This approach is not favoured by the writer as: 
1.1 The programme would become dated and boring, and the initiative would 
regress; leading to a deterioration in operator satisfaction ratings; 
1.2 Additional identified risks would not be mitigated and associated benefits 
would not be realised. 
2. By conducting a repeat analysis based on an amended training programme. The 
operational risks to which I.É. is exposed do not remain constant over time. 
Because I.É. managed specific risks using the simulator enabled training 
programme, the associated quanta were reduced. As a consequence, other 
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theretofore lesser-addressed risks come to the fore and need to be similarly 
managed. Just as I.É.’s risks do not remain constant, so too, I.É.’s simulator 
enabled training programme should change to reflect the changed risk profile. 
The risk profile should be recalculated to reflect the amended programme. The 
project’s IRR, based on the altered risk profile and any additional costs 
incurred in modifying the simulator system to cater for the amended 
programme, should be reappraised as part of the change process. Expanding 
the scope of usage in line with emerging risks will demonstrate the 
generalisability of benefits across a broader skill set. This is the writer’s 
preferred approach. 
The four largest risks in descending order, as determined by the NWRM, are 
accidents involving trespass and surfing; slips, trips and falls on the railway 
infrastructure; train collisions with road vehicles at level crossings; and 
accidents at the platform/train interface. Not all of the risk elements within 
these classifications are influenced by the behaviours of train drivers. For 
example, train collisions at level crossings represent 12% of I.É.’s overall risk 
but 95·2% of this type of risk is brought about by user behaviour and, hence, is 
not reducible by traction driver training (Sotera Risk Solutions, 2010). A 
greater proportion of accidents that occur at the platform/train interface can be 
influenced by driver behaviour. An annual average of 80·4 accidents occurred 
at the platform/train interface over the seven year period 2005 to 2011. This 
shared risk represents 8% of I.É.’s overall risk (Sotera Risk Solutions, 2010). 
Simulator enabled training could be provided for about 34% of these accident 
types (see Table 36). It would be appropriate to redesign I.É.’s training 
programme to focus on those particular hazards, that can be influenced by 
driver training and can be accommodated by the simulator system, and to 
assess the resultant changes to risk. In addition to ascertaining the extensibility 
of the effectiveness of simulator enabled training, this approach would also 
provide evidence as to the durability and the permanence of the behaviour 
modification that has already been achieved by the current training programme. 
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Comments on the suitability of 
I.É.’s simulator and the required 








Additional value can be created by 
including dynamic platform CCTV 
monitors in the OTW view. CCTV 
images should include the train 
dispatch operation in crowded 
environments. 
Passenger hit 
by train door 












Door operation is controlled by 
drivers’ actions only. The software 
commands to facilitate an onboard 
‘passenger’ making an ‘open door’ 
request are not in the train models. 
(See RAIB, 2016). The equipment 
is suitable to train other aspects of 
door operation, e.g. managing 








4 (5%) Possibly Possibly Development and inclusion of 
some additional dynamic avatars is 
required to add realism. 
Train stopped 
at incorrect 
location – fall 
from doors 
1 (1%) Yes Yes Some of the consists of the 
modelled trains may require to be 
increased. See Table 22 for a 
description of the extant consists. 
Short platform 1 (1%) Yes Yes 
Other 1 (1%) It is unclear if training can 
ameliorate this situation 
 
Source: Sotera Risk Solutions (2010) 
3. Improving the effectiveness of training is, undoubtedly, the goal of training 
mangers in all railway organisations. Affirming the contribution of simulators 
towards the achievement of this goal has common benefit and is worthy of 
cross-industry support. To this end, an industry wide analysis, similar to the 
one conducted in this thesis, should be conducted in other railway operating 
companies. Almost inevitably, this would entail the use of different simulator 
systems with varying degrees of elegance, different use cases and different 
delivery methodologies. However, the operational risk profile of each railway 
undertaking is particular to it, and is a reflection of its culture, values and state 
Page 191 
of organisational development. Acknowledging this caveat and the necessity to 
avoid study confounds, the design of such a study would require careful 
consideration. If properly implemented however, it would provide sufficient 
data to enable the completion of a meta analysis and, thus, enhance the 
reliability and generalisability of this study. 
4. By changing the focus of the study to address non-safety critical training 
objectives. For example, it is feasible to conduct a randomised control study 
into the use of simulation to train drivers in the maintenance of sectional 
running, customer care or the mean time to repair train faults; 
5. By conducting a before and after quasi study in which randomly selected 
subjects would undertake a different and unsanctioned lesson plan, i.e., one 
that does not form part of I.É.’s competence management system. Such a study 
would loosely approximate to a Level 3 evaluation and be based on 
performance evaluations by SMEs. However, the outcome of the study would 
be dependent on high inter-rater reliability. Furthermore, it would not inform 
researchers about the durability of the delivered training, nor its transfer to the 
workplace. 
11.3 Concluding Comments 
I.É.’s management has always vigorously pursued stringent safety objectives but, 
by the turn of the millennium, it was becoming increasingly concerned with key 
safety metrics in respect of traction driving performance. An attempt to redress 
this situation contextualises the training initiative that is described in this thesis. 
The context defined the type of study that should and could be undertaken. It was 
important to the writer to measure the true transfer of the global skill set that 
affects driver relevant safety risk; not just isolated skills that are used in non-
safety critical situations. The highly regulated operational environment 
determined the type of study that could be undertaken. All of I.É.’s processes, 
including training, are prescribed in standards and regulation. 
It was important to take an organisational perspective on the evaluation of training 
effectiveness for the constituency of stakeholders, as the satisfaction of criteria 
that are important to one stakeholder group may have been achieved at the 
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expense of another group, e.g., the provision of a simulator system with high 
functional fidelity and a good degree of presence was costly to the organisation 
but was valued by the operators. At the outset of his research, the writer set out to 
establish what benefits, if any, I.É.’s stakeholders realised when the company 
changed the training delivery process for its drivers from the traditional lecture 
based process to a simulator enabled one. He also wished to make a financial 
evaluation of the resultant change in driver-relevant operational risk, which had 
been revealed through before and after analyses of the outputs of I.É.’s risk 
model, to ascertain if the cost of the change was justified. 
The writer made five findings in respect of I.É. stakeholder groups: 
1) I.É.’s exposure to driver-related risk decreased by -1·2807E+00 equivalent 
fatalities over the two year period 2010 - 2012; 
2) Almost unanimously, the drivers endorsed the change in training process; 
3) The answer to the cost justification element of the research question is that the 
costs were justified in the case of I.É. However, from a financial perspective 
only, the project would not merit the investment in those organisations that use 
a PF of 1 for project appraisal. The analysis shows that an organisation must be 
willing to pay a cost of 2·1675 times the value of the risk reduction before the 
investment makes financial sense; 
4) The Irish ‘Competent Authority’, the CRR, made the guidelines of the 
European Parliament and the Council of Europe mandatory; 
5) The simulator equipment and the training process received positive 
endorsements at the specification and use phases by auditors who were 
engaged by the Irish Government. The training process was also endorsed by 
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Appendix 1: Operational Safety Rules 
Safe systems of working are usually defined by a set of rules and procedures 
which are written by functional specialists, and communicated to the workforce 
for implementation. In work situations which involve many actors, they also 
define areas of responsibility and thereby lessen the probability of an undesired 
event occurring because of a lack of role clarity. Organisational controls can cover 
a wide spectrum, from being largely discretionary to being highly prescriptive 
process controls. Railway safety rules are part of the apparatus to render the 
behaviour of the system’s actors sufficiently predictable that open loop operation 
can succeed in most of the situations encountered. 
Control mechanisms attempt to standardise the work processes by using 
prescriptive rules and procedures. These are backed up by monitoring and 
supervision to ensure compliance, and sanctions are imposed on deviants for non-
compliance. This type of control process is referred to as feedforward or open 
loop control. (See Figure 15.) An open loop system can only work with sufficient 
certainty if predictability is ensured by compliance with the rules. The system 
achieves an economy of effort by the operators as they do not have to develop 
responses from first principles. They simply have to remember the responses that 
have been pre-scripted and to apply them. Free (1994) believes that “... working to 
rules often requires little understanding of the system” (p.376) and that this can 
reduce the skill [and the training] necessary to do the job. (See also HSE, 1999.) 
As a corollary, there is an inverse relationship between the duration of training 
interventions and the amount of rules; the longer and more intensive an 
individual’s training, the less likely it is that the person will be governed by rigid 
feedforward controls (Reason et al., 1998 and Reason, 1997). 
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Source: Reason et al. (1998) 
Figure 15: The Feedforward Control Process 
Initial training and subsequent refresher training is provided to people in all safety 
critical roles on the railway to ensure that a common understanding of the 
company’s extant processes is achieved. This common understanding must be 
maintained in a context where additional rules are generated as a result of 
accidents and incidents. These restrict further the courses of action that are 
available to operators. Accidents are analysed up to the point “… where it became 
clear that someone had broken a rule (at which point discipline was appropriate) 
or that there was no rule for this eventuality (in which case a new one was made)” 
(Hale, 2000, p.7). 
Tichon (2007) points out that there is a general preference for prescriptive 
responses but that this has the effect of limiting an individual’s development of 
critical thinking and problem solving skills. Some railway companies are taking a 
different approach. StateRail, latterly known as RailCorp, has furnished its staff 
with a new, simplified book of rules and procedures. SGI (2003) report that: 
"To improve safety, the StateRail Authority instituted a dramatic change in 
its operational structure, switching from a rule-based to a risk-based 
operating environment. As a result, the former 17 volumes of regulations 
had been whittled down to one; employees would now be expected to act 
less according to strict rules and more through the use of critical thinking" 
(p.1). (See also Kecklund et al.138, 2001b; Coplen, 1999; and Reason et al., 
1998.) 
                                                 
138 Kecklund et al. (2001b) point out that the amount of written material that Swedish drivers 
receive each year exceeds 20 kilograms (p.27). Their research subjects also “... considered the 















Intermittent additions to rules 
and procedures as a result of 
incidents and accidents
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At an organisational level of analysis, there are disutilities in the imposition of 
detailed rules (Wilson and Norris, 2005; Hale et al., 2003; van Vollenhoven, 
2002; Reason et al., 1998; Reason, 1997; Free, 1994; and Reason and Free, 1993). 
Reason et al., (1998) suggest that “… all hazardous operations routinely involve a 
commission of actions that lie outside the prescribed boundaries, yet remain 
within the limits of what would be judged as acceptable practice by people sharing 
comparable skills” (p.3). 
 
                                                                                                                                     
excess of written information was regarded as a very serious problem; second only to the concern 
that drivers have of running over a person on the line. 
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Appendix 2: Decomposition of the Railway System (IDEFØ technique) 
The benefit of using modelling tools, such as the IDEFØ approach, is that they 
facilitate researchers to identify key inter, and intra, interface issues among the 
system elements at the various levels of analysis by permitting the researcher to 
change the focus of inquiry (Hockey and Carrigan, 2003). When viewed at level 
0, i.e., at the context level, the function of transporting people or goods is a simple 
input/output process with a feedback control loop (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16: IDEFØ (level 0) representation of the system railway 
The value of the tool increases as the system is decomposed to lower levels of 
abstraction (see Figures 17 to 19). Level 1 depicts the railway system at the 
concept, development and operational functions. The dependencies that exist 
between functions start to manifest themselves, e.g., failure to identify and plan 
the system’s requirements correctly will have an effect on its operation. 
For the purpose of this thesis, analysis of the level 2 functions is crucial. At this 
level of abstraction, dependencies and potential conflicts manifest themselves. To 
fulfil the service obligation, functions must coexist. For example, the system must 
be maintained and operated concurrently. It would be a simple task to maintain 
the system if operations could be suspended. The controls to facilitate 
concomitant maintenance and operational activities are depicted as arrows 
entering the functional boxes from the top. These controls are imposed to govern 
Transformation or 
process:









Staff, Finance, Power, Equipment,  Infrastructure, 
Organisational Capability, Knowledge
Constraints: 
Resource availability, Rules, Standards, 
Political, Environmental, Social, Technical 
Page 235 
or constrain the functions. Quite often, problems arise because of the competing 
imperatives of the maintenance and operating functions. 
The necessity to provide competent crewpersons to satisfy demands for train 
movements is depicted in the level 3 representation. The scope and content of 
training becomes clear at this level. 
 
Figure 17: IDEFØ (level 1) first level view of the system railway 
 
Figure 18: IDEFØ (level 2) second level view of ‘operate railway system’ 













































































































Appendix 3: Task Analysis 
The key technical skills of a driver’s job are to: 
1. Adhere to signals, trackside signs, boards and indicators. This requires: 
1.1 Vigilance to notice the informational artefacts; 
1.2 Recollection and application of rules and route knowledge; 
1.3 Ability to assimilate information; 
1.4 Decision making skills; 
1.5 Ability to mount a fast response to the information. 
2. Monitor the trackside and the track ahead for trackside workers, trespassers and 
obstructions. The requirements for this task group are: 
2.1 Vigilance; 
2.2 Fast reactions; 
2.3 Decision making skills. 
3. Monitor and adjust the speed of the train. This necessitates: 
3.1 Observation of the speedometer, and the assembly of data from late notice 
cases, weekly circulars and lineside signage into information; 
3.2 Cognisance of train make up, train performance and metrics, permissible 
speed and gradients. 
4. Respond to advisory systems. This requires vigilance to ensure that a signal is 
not missed and that there is correspondence between the displayed aspect on 
the ADU and the lineside signal. This process involves recollection and 
application of route knowledge; 
5. Respond to the SCE. This involves application of traction knowledge; 
6. Attendance to informational cues. The requirements for this task group are: 
6.1 Attendance to internal inputs, e.g., TDMS, train radio messages and 
passenger communications system; 
6.2 Attendance to external cues. 
Adapted from: Porter (in Whitlock, 2002) 
While accepting that staff needs to be technically competent; on its own, it is 
insufficient for effective task performance. Complimentary non-technical 
competence is also required. This skill set includes: 
1. Situational awareness: 
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1.1. Attention to detail; 
1.2. Overall awareness; 
1.3. Ability to maintain concentration; 
1.4. Ability to retain information; 
1.5. Ability to anticipate risk; 
2. Conscientiousness: 
2.1. Ability to apply a systematic and thorough approach; 
2.2. Constant checking; 
2.3. The display of a positive attitude towards rules and procedures; 
3. Communication: 
3.1. Ability to listen and take the intended message out of the verbiage; 
3.2. Ability to communicate clearly and assertively; 
3.3. Willingness to share information; 
4. Decision making and action; 
4.1. Ability to make effective and timely decisions; 
4.2. Possession of diagnostic and problem solving skills; 
5. Cooperation and working with others: 
5.1. Considers others’ needs; 
5.2. Supports others; 
5.3. Treats others with respect; 
5.4. Ability to deal with conflict or aggressive behaviour; 
6. Workload management: 
6.1. Ability to multi-task and to selectively attend; 
6.2. Ability to prioritise; 
6.3. Ability to remain calm under pressure; 
7. Self-management: 
7.1. Is motivated; 
7.2. Is confident and can take the initiative; 
7.3. Maintains and develops skills and knowledge; 
7.4. Is prepared and organised; 
8. Fatigue management: 
8.1. Can identify symptoms of fatigue; 
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8.2. Recognises effects of fatigue; 
8.3. Can implement coping strategies. 
Source: RSSB (2012) 
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Appendix 4: Degraded Operating Scenarios 
Scenario Possible cause(s) and conditions (examples) 
1. The signaller authorises a driver to pass a signal at danger in connection with: 
1.1. Movement to, or from, a possession; 
1.2. Single Line Working; 
1.3. Working of Single Line by Pilotman; 
1.4. Passing section signal; 
 
1.5. Train starting ahead of signal; 
1.6. Train passing a signal that is protecting an isolation; 
1.7. Defective or disconnected signal; 
1.8. Failed signalling or level crossing equipment; 
1.9. Examination of the line; 
1.10. Providing assistance to a failed train; 
1.11. Next train after removal of a failed train; 
1.12. Train entering section after clearance of a runaway or a divided train; 
1.13. Obstruction ahead of next home signal; 
 
1.14. Train to pass signal protecting T (II) work. 
 
1.1. Engineer’s train to enter or leave possession; 
1.2. SLW is introduced because of line blockage; 
1.3. As shown in Rule Book Module P2: 
1.4.1. Shunting movement into forward section; 
1.4.2. Finding out why next signal box is not open; 
1.5. Train to continue in reverse direction; 
1.6. Movement required towards isolation limit; 
1.7. Train to pass defective or disconnected signal; 
1.8. Train(s) to proceed through affected area; 
1.9. Using next train to check if the line is clear; 
1.10. Using next train to remove failed train; 
1.11. Checking section clear; 
1.12. Checking section clear; 
1.13. Train to proceed into section with clearing point ahead 
obstructed [AB and ETS systems]; 
1.14. To gain access to station, siding or SLW. 
2. Train passes signal at danger on driver’s own authority where SPT is defective at: 
2.1. An automatic signal; 
2.2. Any signal where the signal box is closed. 
 
2.1. Loss of communication with signaller; 
2.2. Loss of communication with signaller. 
3. Signaller authorises driver to make unsignalled movement in the wrong direction 
in connection with: 
3.1. Movement to or from a possession; 
3.2. Single Line Working; 
3.3. Train overrunning platform; 
3.4. Train taking a wrong route; 
3.5. Line blocked by an accident, failure or obstruction; 
3.6. Failed train. (See Cherryville Junction rail accident that occurred on 
21.08.1983.); 
3.7. Front portion of divided train setting back to rear portion; 
3.8. Loco or MU proceeding around a failed train; 
3.9. Shunting through ground frame points. 
 
 
3.1. Engineer’s train to enter or leave possession; 
3.2. SLW introduced because of line blockage; 
3.3. Need for train to set back; 
3.4. Need for train to set back; 
3.5. Need for train to set back from or towards blocked line; 
3.6. Train to set back because it cannot be driven forward; 
3.7. Need to recouple divided train; 
3.8. Need for assistance to reach front of failed train; 
3.9. Shunting movement needs to set back through ground 
frame points. 
4. Signaller authorises passenger train to proceed on authority of shunting signal(s). 
This is not considered good signalling practice and is avoided normally. 
4. Unable to set route with main aspect(s) and passenger train 
requires to proceed 
5. Signalling of trains after receipt of report of signal failures and irregularities and 
cautioning following trains as necessary 
5. Initial report from a driver of signal failure or irregularity and 
following trains require to proceed 
6. Actions after reports of failures and irregularities with the (C)AWS, TPWS and 
ATP systems 
6. Initial report from a driver of a failure of the (C)AWS, TPWS 
or ATP systems 
7. Train to proceed to an out-of-service location with the (C)AWS isolated 7. Defective on-board (C)AWS equipment (see Southall rail 
disaster - Case study 2) 
8. Temporary Block Working 8. Extensive failure or disconnection of signalling equipment 
9. Failure or disconnection of signalling equipment. (See Buttevant rail accident that 
occurred on 01.08.1980.) 
9. Failure or disconnection of signalling equipment for 
maintenance or renewal 
10. Manual operation of power-worked points 10. Points failure or disconnection for maintenance or renewal 
11. Handsignalling duties at signals and other protection locations. 11.1. Signal failure or disconnection; 
11.2. Temporary block working; 
11.3. SLW; 
11.4. Protection of engineering work or isolated sections. 
12. Driver accompanied by a conductor driver 12. Driver not in possession of route knowledge (normally 
relates to a diverted train) 
13. Guard accompanied by person with route knowledge 13. Guard not in possession of route knowledge (normally relates 
to a diverted train) 
14. Use of emergency call procedure from on-board radio 14. Need to alert signaller to an emergency that is threatening the 
safety of trains 
15. Use of emergency stop message from signaller to driver by radio 15. Need to alert driver to stop immediately 
16. Speed restrictions on light locomotives and short formation trains 16. Reduced braking capability 
17. Train required to stop in section 17. Engineering or freight train requirements or Officers’ Special 
18. Assisting locomotive at front (double heading) 18. Train load requires additional locomotive 
19. Assisting locomotive at the rear 19.1. Where authorised as a regular arrangement; 
19.2. In failure conditions. 
20. Guard’s advice to passengers when the train not fully accommodated at the 
platform 
20.1. Train too long for platform and is not fitted with 
selective door enabling controls; 
20.2. Driver stops train in incorrect position. 
21. Permissive working: 
21.1. On platform lines; 
21.2. Other lines where authorised. 
 
21.1. To enable trains to couple up; 
21.2. Local arrangements. 
22. Hauling of failed traction units 22. Failure of traction unit 
23. Advice to drivers and the control of trains where exceptional rail head conditions 
exist 
23.1. Weather alert; 
23.2. Leaf fall; 
23.3. Contamination. 
24. Emergency protection of the line by: 
24.1. Person working or walking on or near the line; 
24.2. Train crew. 
 
24.1. Person sees danger to approaching trains: 
24.2. Train crew sees danger to other train(s); 
24.3. Train derailed. 
25. Driver sounds the ‘train in distress’ warning. 25. The driver cannot control the speed of train. 
26. The train explodes detonators. 26. Emergency protection is placed on the line. 
27. Train is stopped by PCA alarm 27. Passenger communicating with train crew 
28. Abnormal brake application 28. Train divided or other loss of brake continuity 
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Scenario Possible cause(s) and conditions (examples) 
29. Defective, isolated or damaged on-train equipment 29.1. Failure or isolation of the (C)AWS, brakes or driver’s 
vigilance device; 
29.2. Driver’s reminder appliance; 
29.3. DSD; 
29.4. Electronic brake system; 
29.5. Power-operated doors; 
29.6. Headlight; 
29.7. Speedometer; 
29.8. Damage to side window of passenger train; 
29.9. Damage to cab windscreen; 
29.10. Hot axle box. 
30. Special signalling arrangements for certain mobile on- track machines and 
vehicles with low axle loads 
30. Track circuit assistors are provided on on-track machines and 
DMUs that cannot be relied upon to actuate track circuits. 
Particular rules and procedures apply when dealing with TCA 
failure; depending on the vehicle’s position within the 
consist. 
31. Shunting movements 31.1. Where regular movements take place; 
31.2. Unplanned movement. 
32. Driver of train is detained at signal and is using the NRN139 radio to contact 
signaller. 
32.1. SPT defective; 
32.2. Unsafe to use SPT because of limited clearance. 
33. At level crossings: 
33.1. Driver cautioned over (AHB) crossing; 
33.2. Driver told to obtain green handsignal before passing over MCB140 or AHB 
crossing; 
33.3. Driver to stop before passing over AOCL141 or ABCL142 crossing where 
trains not normally required to stop; 
33.4. Driver cautioned over occupation or accommodation crossing; 
33.5. Road traffic authorised by Police Officer to pass red flashing lights. 
 
33.1. Equipment failure; 
33.2. Crossing under local control; 
 
33.3. White flashing light not showing; 
 
33.4. User has not advised signaller that the crossing is clear; 
33.5. Failure of telephone at crossing; 
33.6. Failure of equipment. 
34. Train crew carry out emergency protection of line(s). 34. Train is stopped by accident, fire or accidental division. 
35. Train crew carry out assistance protection. 35. Failed train requires assistance. 
36. Single Line Working by Pilotman 36. One line of a double line is blocked by: 
36.1. Engineering work; 
36.2. Obstruction. 
37. Working of Single Line by Pilotman 37. The circumstances are listed in the rule book. 
38. Blockage of the line for engineering work under Rule T2 38. Engineering work not requiring use of engineer’s trains 
39. Blockage of the line for engineering work under Rule T3 39. Engineering work which may require the use of engineer’s 
trains 
40. Blockage of siding for engineering work under Rule T3A 40. Engineering work in a siding which requires the stoppage of 
all train movements 
41. Imposition of temporary speed restriction 41. Condition of track or track renewal 
42. Imposition of emergency speed restriction 42. A temporary speed restriction which is not shown (or not 
correctly shown) in the Weekly Operating Notice 
43. Passing trains over a broken rail 43. Broken rail 
44. Passing trains over or under damaged bridges 44. Bridge strike 
45. Trains running in severe adverse weather 45. Snow, flood or fog 
46. Switching off electric traction current in emergency 46.1. Derailment; 
46.2. Fire; 
46.3. Person in contact with OLE or conductor rail; 
46.4. Damaged OLE or conductor rail; 
46.5. Accident. 
47. Signaller is signalling trains by bell code or telephone at a TCB box. 47. Unable to use train describers 
48. Signaller needs to stop trains in an emergency. 48. Obstruction of the line 
49. Signaller requires train to be stopped and examined. 49. Visible defect with train, e.g., door open, hot axle box or fire 
50. Signaller needs to deal with a train proceeding without authority. 50. Train running away (includes a SPAD) 
51. Signaller needs to establish why the train is delayed in section. 51.1. Train failure; 
51.2. Accident; 
51.3. No communication from driver. 
52. Signaller needs to establish why the train is proceeding without tail lamps. 52.1. Tail lamp extinguished; 
52.2. Train divided. 
53. Signaller requires the line to be examined. 53. Following a previous incident: 
53.1. Report of defect; 
53.2. Track circuit failure. 
54. Signaller needs to admit an assisting train into the section. 54. Failed train 
55. Failure of individual track circuit 55.1. Rail defect; 
55.2. Signalling equipment defect. 
56. Failure of a group of track circuits 56.1. Rail defect; 
56.2. Signalling equipment defect. 
57. Power failure of the main supply only; the standby system is working 57. Public supply failure 
58. Power failure of both the main and standby systems 58.1. Public supply failure; 
58.2. Poor maintenance of the uninterruptable power supply. 
59. Interlocking remote control failure (but duplicate system working)  
60. Interlocking remote control failure (main transmission path failed but standby path 
working) 
 
61. Interlocking remote control failure (but ability to set one route at a time 
remaining) 
 
62. Interlocking remote control failure (but ability to set ‘through routes’ remaining)  
63. Interlocking remote control failure (interlocking not under control)  
64. Signal lamp first filament failure  
65. Signal lamp out but ‘lamp or controls’ applied  
                                                 
139 The NRN is an old British system. It operates on open channel principles and does not provide discrete communications between the transmitter and receiver. 
140 Manually controlled barrier 
141 On an automatic open crossing, there are no physical barriers. The road traffic signals are monitored by the train driver. 
142 Automatic barrier crossing whose operation is monitored by the train driver, i.e., he ensures that the barriers have lowered before he proceeds. 
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Scenario Possible cause(s) and conditions (examples) 
66. Signal lamp out; signal in rear held at red  
67. Loss of points detection 67.1. Track geometry out of specification; 
67.2. Signalling equipment defect. 
68. Loss of points operation 68.1. Track geometry out of specification; 
68.2. Signalling equipment defect. 
69. The driver is cautioned over CCTV level crossing where the CCTV feature has 
failed and an attendant has not taken control. 
 
70. Failure of a trainborne signalling subsystem. For example: 
70.1. CAWS or AWS; 
70.2. TPWS; 
70.3. ATP System; 
70.4. European Rail Traffic Management System. 
 
70.1. Trainborne equipment hardware or software fault; 
70.2. Track based equipment failure; 
70.3. Incorrect data programmed into the subsystem. 
71. Failure of tilt or tilt authorisation and speed supervision (TASS) system 71.1. Evident System Faults: 
71.2. Trainborne equipment hardware or software fault; 
71.3. Track based equipment failure. 
72. Hidden system faults 72. Incorrect data programmed into subsystem 
73. Failure of the automatic brake 73.1. WSP system fault; 
73.2. Brake module fault; 
73.3. Brake pipe failure. 
74. Loss of brake continuity 74.1. Train divides unintentionally; 
74.2. Brake pipe ruptured or lost; 
74.3. Control system fault. 
75. Failure of an external door 75.1. Door not correctly closed; 
75.2. Door control system fails to prove that door is correctly 
closed; 
75.3. Central door locking system failure; 
75.4. Selective door operation system failure; 
75.5. Door control system failure, e.g., traction interlock 
and/or door interlock. 
76. Failure of the driver’s reminder appliance 76. Equipment fault 
77. Failure of vigilance or driver’s safety device 77. Equipment fault 
78. Broken or obscured windscreen 78.1. Vandalism; 
78.2. Windscreen wiper failure; 
78.3. Windscreen washer failure. 
79. Fire detection and/or fire extinguishing system failure 79.1. Equipment fault; 
79.2. Fire extinguisher bottle pressure low or bottle empty. 
80. Headlamp failure 80.1. Bulb failure; 
80.2. Battery discharged. 
81. Tail light failure 81.1. Bulb failure; 
81.2. Battery discharged. 
82. The hot axle box detector (HABD) activates. 82.1. Axle box running hot due to inadequate maintenance; 
82.2. Trainborne HABD system failure; 
82.3. Trackside HABD system failure. 
83. Locked wheels, damaged tread or slipped tyre 83.1. WSP system failure; 
83.2. Brake system failure; 
83.3. Poor adhesion. 
84. NRN or CSR failure 84.1. Equipment fault; 
84.2. Inadequate radio coverage. 
85. On-train monitoring recorder (OTMR) 85. Equipment fault 
86. Sanders inoperative 86.1. Equipment fault; 
86.2. No sand supply in the reservoir. 
87. Speedometer inaccurate or inoperative 87. Equipment fault 
88. Track circuit assistor ineffective 88. Equipment fault 
89. Horn inoperative 89. Equipment fault 
90. Partial loss of engines or traction drives 90. Equipment fault 
91. Complete loss of brakes 91.1. Equipment fault; 
91.2. Loss of supply to electric trains. 
92. Defective cab heater or air conditioning system 92. Equipment fault 
93. Bodyside saloon window broken 93. Vandalism 
94. Loss of saloon heating AC lighting 94. Equipment fault 
95. Buffer or coupling failure 95.1. Component failure; 
95.2. Couplers not correctly engaged. 
96. Pantograph drops or fails 96.1. Overhead line fault damages pantograph head; 
96.2. Automatic drop device operates incorrectly; 
96.3. Excessively worn pantograph carbons. 
97. Monitor operation of interference current monitoring unit (ICMU) to ensure that 
the 50 Hz component of the traction return current does not interfere with the 50 
Hz track circuit and result in a wrong side failure. A circuit breaker opens at 
currents of 0·5A at 50 Hz and cuts traction power. 
97. Equipment fault 
98. Automatic power control (APC) system failure 98. Equipment fault 
99. Gapped train requires recovery 99.1. Technical defect; 
99.2. Driver fault. 
100. Loss of auxiliary power 100. Loss of energy source (diesel engine, electrification supply, 
auxiliary supply equipment) 
101. Fire 101.1. Electrical fault; 
101.2. Diesel engine fault; 
101.3. Vandalism. 
102. Suspension failure 102.1. Component failure 
102.2. Inadequate maintenance 
103. Item or equipment on train out of gauge 103.1. Train incorrectly routed; 
103.2. Component failure leads to equipment detaching from 
train, e.g., traction motor or cardan shaft; 
103.3. External door open when leaving station; 
103.4. External door opens in traffic; 
103.5. Freight wagon has shed its load. 
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Scenario Possible cause(s) and conditions (examples) 
104. Earth faults 104.1. Cable fault; 
104.2. Equipment fault; 
104.3. OHL failure and/or vandalism. 
105. Excessive axle forces damage rail, bridges or other structures. 105.1. Suspension failure; 
105.2. Incorrect train routing (with respect to the route 
availability number); 
105.3. Train carrying an excessive load relative to load 
restrictions imposed on bridges. 
106. Passenger communication is inoperative. 106. Component failure 
107. Public address system is inoperative. 107. Component failure 
108. Driver to guard signal buzzer is inoperative. 108. Component failure 
109. Bodyside light(s) fail. 109. Component failure 
110. Passenger saloon lighting is inadequate. 110.1. Component failure; 
110.2. Power supply fault. 
111. Traction interlock switch fails. 111. Component failure 
Adapted from: Hughes (2004) 
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Strengths of a simulator as a training tool 
at this stage of development 
Weakness of simulator at this 
stage of development 
Cost considerations 
Knowledgeable: 
transfer of prior 
learning to the skill 
domain 
Self directed, or instructor-led 
learning, using written multimedia 
materials and, possibly, static real 
equipment 
Simulators do not add commensurate value to this stage of the learning 




on a wide range of 
tasks in the real 
world requires 




the functionality and 






dealing with cognitive and 
psychomotor aspects using 
classroom and real equipment 
Simulators can be used to provide expert 
demonstrations and visualisations to 
support rule-based training.  
Poor visualisation capability of 
a system may lead to the 
development of inappropriate 
mental models. Each trainee 
needs in-seat time. 
Trained: initial 
skill practice 
Instructor-guided practice on a 
real traction unit. Operation is 
confined to driving within a 
confined area, or operating out-of-
service trains on the mainline 
under instructor guidance. 
They can be used to provide supervised 
learning with the provision of feedback 
from trainers and peers, and through self 
discovery. Depending on the scope of the 
system, greater opportunity may be 
provided to gain experience as only one 
training train is deployed typically. 
Accurate modelling of the 
traction units and routes is 
essential. Incorrect modelling 
may lead to negative transfer, 




Under the tutelage of mentor 
drivers, trainees gain independent 
practice by driving in-service 
trains on the mainline. In these 
cases, mentor drivers perform two 
roles, i.e., driving and mentoring, 
thereby creating a risk of divided 
attention. 
Using a simulator that has full fidelity 
with the type of traction that will be 
operated in the real world, a full range of 
supported learning experiences can be 
provided. A wide range of performance 
parameters can be monitored and 
assessed to provide feedback for 
remediation. NTSs can be developed in 
training scenarios. 
Instructors must be competent 
in the use of behavioural 
marker techniques. Most 
simulators cannot provide the 
psychological fidelity of real 
operations. 
Expert: far transfer Trainees get independent practice 
by operating solo on the mainline. 
They review their own 
performance but are subjected to a 
series of periodic assessments; the 
frequency decreasing with 
experience accumulation. 
A simulator can be used to provide 
knowledge-based training in contrived 
environments. A wide range of scenarios 
and contexts, including emergency and 
crisis conditions, can be implemented. 
Simulator based training is 
provided during relatively 
short periods in the overall 
training programme. More 
practice is achievable, albeit 
over a smaller range of 
naturally occurring tasks, in the 
real world. 
Based on: Wallace et al. (2005) 
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Generators for audio and
visual system














Generate and store 
records of results
End of run reports
 
Three computers per 
driving desk (Total = 24) 
Computers in technical 
racks (Total = 8)
One communications computer
per instructor station (Total = 4) 
TBT, SPS and DAS
tools (Total = 3)
CCTV display of 
in-cab activity




Hierarchy and Functionality of Simulator System’s Computers 
Thirty nine computers are used to operate the system which extends to eight 
driving desks deployed at two locations. These are deployed as shown below. 









Type of desks Locomotive DMU EMU DMU  
Number of desks 
(computers) 
2 (three in 
each desk) 
2 (three in 
each desk) 
2 (three in 
each desk) 
2 (three in 
each desk) 
24 computers 
in 8 desks 
Number of 
technical racks 
1 1 1 3 
Type of technical 
rack 
Locomotive and DMU 
computers are combined in 





channel rack  
8 computers 





This is a dual instructor 
workstation. It incorporates 
































An instructor station for each driving desk is located in the technical rack. All of 
the data are physically stored in this location. The device on the instructor’s desk 
is merely an interface with the IS. The train models and line data are stored on the 
hard drive of the IS computer. There are three computers located within each 
driving desk: 
1. The 3D computer imports data from the IS and renders it for presentation to 
the operator in the OTW views; 
2. A control computer manages the simulator desk activity. A CAN-bus is used 
to manage the data flows from all of the input devices to the control computer 
and to manage the outputs back to the displays, sound matrix and desk 
illuminations etc. The control computer uses the data that are stored on the 
hard drive of the IS computer. It computes the train model files to create the 
physical behaviours; 
3. The VCR manipulates the data that are located in the hard drive of the IS 
computer and the line data to generate the platform views. It records the 
CCTV footage of the operator’s activity in the booth also. 
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The performance of each operator can be stored on the DAS and a report can be 
burned onto a DVD. If this option is not exercised, the video of operator 
performance is lost. 
The CAN-bus deserves special mention because of the critical role it plays in the 
information exchange between the simulator artefacts. It is an input/output device 
that facilitates the communication of vast amounts of information between the 
subsystems. The train model receives inputs from the driver’s controls and from 
the instructor station143. In turn, the CAN-bus sends outputs to the cab indicators 
and artefacts. It drives the vision and sound systems to create the impression of 
movement. The inputs are either in digital or in analogue format; the latter are 
converted into digital approximations. Outputs are in digital format; they are what 
the driver sees, hears or feels. The rate of information transfer is determined by 
the length of the bus. A bus of 40 metres long can accommodate a transfer rate of 
1 Mbit/second. For this reason, the IS must be accommodated adjacent to the 
driving desks in the training facility. As simulators are not safety critical pieces of 
equipment, information on the CAN-bus is not accompanied by a cyclic 
redundancy check to verify accuracy. 
  
                                                 
143 The controller area network also receives inputs from other devices. Some of these devices are 
implemented through touch screens, i.e., fault finding, air pressure gauges, CAWS and door test 
buttons etc., using the Swing Process ™. 
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Appendix 7: Observer Station and Dynamic Desk Report 
The observer stations are located adjacent to the simulator booths (booth doors are 
on the RHS in the photograph). The photograph shows the simulator repeat screen 
on the rear wall (illuminated for illustrative purposes only), while the instructor 
makes a presentation using a SMART Board ™ interactive whiteboard on the 
RHS. Training content is previewed using the whiteboard, applied in the 
simulator, and reviewed using the repeat panel. This layout fosters collaborative 
learning. 
 
The dynamic desk report, shown below, represents the main artefacts on the 
driving desk. The desk elements repeat the readings on the instruments, and the 
control and switch positions in real time. They are presented, in one of the 
available displays, to the trainees in the observation station who are monitoring 
the actions of the simulator operators. The range of available views is presented in 
Appendix 6. Observers critique the driving style of the simulator operators by 
assessing the speed of approach to a station, the response to abnormal displays in 





Appendix 8: General Findings on the Effectiveness of Simulator Enabled Training for Traction Drivers 
Researchers Type of study, 
domain and 
skill type 
Study design Main findings and conclusions Does the study’s 
findings support the 





study based on 
the beliefs of 
training 
managers;  
The researchers reviewed the experiences of 24 simulator users in the rail sector (6 
training companies, 12 TOCs/FOCs and 6 other types of rail organisations). The 
participants were asked to evaluate the extent of improvement that they experienced 
across four commonly accepted improvement areas. 
The readers’ attention is specifically drawn to the significant degree which 








The Norfolk Southern Corporation evaluated (a level 2 evaluation) the improvement 
in trainees’ knowledge achieved through simulator usage.  
An average improvement of 5% in the assessment scores of trainee drivers has been achieved, i.e., 






Russell conducted an attitudinal study (a level 1 evaluation) (N = 54 drivers) to 
determine the operators’ perceptions of simulators. 
Satisfaction statements  Number (%) in agreement Yes 
The equipment was easy to use. 46 (85%) 
The training experience was enjoyable. 52 (96%) 
I am happy to use it again in the future. 54 (100%) 










Eichinger and Geraghty conducted a level 3 evaluation of a simulator’s 
effectiveness to train drivers in the management of in-train forces. The company 
(Mackay Sugar) trained 200 drivers on a simulator that was owned by Queensland 
Rail. It had low physical and functional fidelity relative to Mackay’s operation. The 
simulator did not replicate the terrain, the train models or the driver’s desk. Some 
minor software modifications were made to the simulator’s train model to match the 
performance characteristics of the sugar train better.  
The immediate reduction in major dynamic induced derailments from 10 to 1 per year was 
attributed wholly to simulator based training. 
Although early success was achieved using Queensland Rail’s simulator, the most common request 
from drivers was for a simulation that was based on their (Mackay’s) trains and their operating 
environment. In addition, Mackay’s investment in professional driver training sent meta messages 





study of safety 
performance 
Greufe presents the findings of a level 3 evaluation and highlights the success in the 
reduction of operational incidents at Houston Metro since the introduction of 
simulation in 2002. 
Houston Metro experienced a 15% drop in accidents overall in 2002; followed by a further drop of 
10% in 2003 and another drop of 8% up to June 2004. 
Remedial training for existing drivers reduced accident rates by 34%. 
Yes 
Naef (2002) A quality 
assurance 
audit 
Naef describes the efforts that were made by DBAG to improve continuously the 
quality of its driver training programme, and to implement a quality assurance 
process by measuring the performance of 24,500 drivers in 15 simulators. 
The drivers “... achieved a great improvement in terms of quality and effectiveness of training and 
checking” (p.4). Naef received very positive feedback from the drivers who reported that “... 
[historically] instructors out on real locomotives were not consistently telling them the same things; 
whereas simulator instructors achieved highest scores in correspondence... [simulator instructors] 
were highly appreciated as being professionals, trustworthy and informative” (p.12). 
Yes 








The researchers conducted a study of unintentional train divides at BHP Iron Ore 
railroad in Australia. The solution included an enhanced maintenance regime and 
engineering modifications. Drivers received simulator training on the management 
of the power and brake controllers. Training provided guidance on which individual 
locomotive, of the four in the consist, should be braked dynamically and taken off 
load, and which locomotive should be developing low power as the train traversed 
the undulating terrain. 
Damage after train divide 1994 to 1995 1999 to 2000 Improvement attributable to: Yes 
The coupler was not damaged 107 3 Modifications to the coupler  
Broken coupler 43 23 Improved driving practices 
Damaged air hoses (main 
reservoir and brake pipe) 
86 2 Combination of improved 




A study of 
precursors 
Southeastern report the findings of a level 1 and level 3 evaluations of the 
operational performance of 994 train drivers. 
Southeastern achieved a reduction in SPADs in 2002/03, and a 35% improvement in safety critical 
communication partly to simulator usage. In addition, operator satisfaction was rated at over 85%. 
Yes 
  
                                                 





















Shorter learning time Greater depth of learning Effective transfer of learning to  
the workplace More people trained in the same  time 
Percentage improvement 
Training company TOC/FOC Other rail organisation 
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Appendix 9: Findings in Relation to Training Energy Efficient Driving Techniques (eco-driving) 
Researcher(s) Study design Main findings and conclusions 
RSSB (2011a) In this comprehensive and diverse study, the energy consumption of four UK operating companies, in respect of 5 diesel and 2 electric train types, travelling over 15 routes was analysed by the researchers. The potential 
energy savings identified were between 1% and 12·3% (mean saving of 4·4%) for diesel traction. In the case of electric traction, the energy reductions were between 0·6 and 15·4% over one route (mean saving of 5·2%) and 
between 0·3% and 6·3% over another route (mean saving of 2·3%). The general conclusion is that “... potential savings of between 1% and 10% could be obtained” (p.103). However, none of the companies installed meters 
to measure actual energy usage. The analysis was based on estimates derived from a combination of data downloaded from the on-train monitoring and recording facility (showing time spent in each power notch) which was 




The authors undertook a three year long longitudinal study in Greece, Slovenia, Italy, 
Netherlands and Slovakia. The results of a desktop analysis are presented in the case of the 
Slovakian railway company ZSSK Cargo; empirical studies were conducted in the other 
jurisdictions. 
ZSSK CARGO (Slovakia) report an estimated improvement of 0·1% following the delivery of a two hour theoretical training 
programme to its 1,800 drivers. 
Trenitalia (Italy) achieved a 3% reduction in energy consumption on the Milan - Verona route as a result of the provision of 
simulator enabled training, practical train handling and lectures. 
Slovenske Zeleznice (Slovenia) achieved reductions in energy consumption of 10%, 8% and 5% in respect of local, regional 
and high speed services as a result of the provision of simulator enabled training (using desk type simulators) and conventional 
lectures. 
NS Reizigers (Netherlands) achieved a 30% reduction in energy consumption on The Hague – Venlo route as a result of the 
provision of simulator enabled training (using full scope simulators) and conventional lectures. 
OSE (Greece) achieved reductions in energy consumption of 47% and 35% on the Athens-El. Venizelos airport route. 
Conventional training, seminar attendance and practical training on operational trains, was delivered to 600 drivers. Training 
was not the only enabler of this achievement; operational changes were also made. If travel time was increased by 11%, a 
saving of 47% in electricity consumption was made; if train speed was reduced by 10%, a saving of 35% in electricity 
consumption was made. 
Union Pacific 
(2006). 
In 2005, UP introduced its successful Fuel Master Programme with the intention of 
conserving fuel. Train drivers (N = ca. 6,500) receive financial incentives, in addition to 
simulator training and counselling by mentor drivers, to conserve fuel.  
For FY 2005, the programme saved more than 16 million gallons of diesel and $30 million for UP. Improvements of up to 6% 
were achieved on specific trips. 
CER (2004) The Energie Sparen project was introduced in October 2002 by DBAG. The aim of the 
project was to reduce traction energy consumption by 10% through the adoption of energy 
efficient driving practices. In the period between October 2002 and November 2004, 14,000 
DBAG drivers partook in the training initiative. The programme commenced with a four-
hour theoretical lesson on energy the driving techniques. This was followed by one hour of 
simulator training and subsequently by one hour of practical on-train training and coaching 
by the trainees’ line managers.  
Initial measurements reveal a saving of over €8 million. It is anticipated that the provision of ongoing information and advice 
will result in full achievement of the goal of a 10% energy saving. 
Doucouliagos and 
Sgro (2000) 
Subjects (N = 60 drivers) from Queensland Rail attended a simulator enabled, 3 day ‘Train 
Dynamics Concept Development’ course. It addressed the topics of train running times, fuel 
consumption, and draft and buff forces. The researchers conducted pre training and post 
training evaluations of performance on these criteria which enabled them to perform a cost 
– benefit analysis subsequently. 
Performance measure Pre-training average score Post training average score Change (%) 
Time 35·69 35·75 +0·17 
Fuel usage (raw) 132·44 126·84 -4·42 
Fuel per load usage 0·19 0·178 -6·42 
Draft forces 104·78 71·03 -47·52 
Buff forces 119·94 99·41 -20·65 
“The training program involved the use of a simulator which has proven to be an effective medium for on-the-job training... the 
estimated benefit - cost ratio was 130 per cent and the estimated minimum ROI was 30 per cent” (pp.42-43). 
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Appendix 10: Typical Operating Scenarios to be Simulated 
Appendix 4 provides readers with an understanding of the number of different 
ways that the railway system can degrade and the types of emergencies that can 
arise in the operating core. Operators must be trained to respond to these events. 
Additionally, there is a range of normal operating conditions that cannot be 
trained adequately during line operations. 
Normal operating scenarios 
Number Description of scenario Other comment 
N 1  Spatial perception/judgmental training, 
e.g., stopping the train with precision 
Due to technical limitations, the 
perception of speed is poor in a 
simulator. This disparity can be 
reduced by manipulating the operator’s 
eye point. 
N 2  Defensive driving policy guidelines  
N 3  Correct accelerating and decelerating 
techniques 
 
N 3.1  Passenger comfort and service (smooth 
acceleration/deceleration and proper 
passenger announcements into saloon) 
 
N 3.2  Efficient energy usage Using the eco-driving feature of the 
simulator 
N 4  SPAD risks – using actual material from 
I.É.’s SPAD awareness programme 
Complete range of types, e.g., 
SASPaD, SOYSPaD, entering/exiting 
possession 
N 5  Shunting risks  
N 6  Electric token system (ETS), Absolute 
Block, Track Circuit Block, bi-directional 
and reversible working operation 
Lines worked under ETS and Absolute 
Block principles were not modelled 
because of systems’ obsolescence. 
N 7  Efficient train operation  
N 7.1  Efficient energy usage  
N 7.2  Minimisation of wear and tear on rolling 
stock and infrastructure 
Trainees are encouraged to drive 
sympathetically. Peer and instructor 
observations of the dynamic desk 
report in the observer station form the 
basis for a critique of driving style. 
N 7.3  Better adherence to the train running 
schedule (on time or minutes late) 
Simulated run using actual timings 
N 8  Shorter time to diagnose and rectify 
faults. 
 
N 9  Trains running beside one another (3 
roads reversibly signalled or quadruple 
main line) with interactive traffic 
 
N 10  Starting train  
N 10.1  Train rolling back on a gradient – purpose 
and effect of holding brake 
 
N 10.2  Doors open  Using the traction interlock as an 
engineering safeguard to prevent 
accidents at the platform/train interface 
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Number Description of scenario Other comment 
N 10.3  Look back feature with passenger trapped 
in the doors of the train 
Passenger entrapment is presented 
(through failure to restore ‘blue light’ 
and unavailability of traction and OTW 
cues) within the simulation as a door 
obstruction 
N 10.4  Door operation Dwell time management 
N 10.5  Making an emergency stop after starting 
the train, on receipt of a hand danger 
signal from platform staff 
 
N 11  Driving onto a dead-end platform when 
WSP activated 
 
N 12  Non-verbal messages (aural, tactile and 
visual cues) 
 
N 13  Passing rear of train on opposite line with 
a trespasser on the line immediately 
behind it 
Achieved through the use of the CSD 
facility 
N 14  Road traffic lights competing for attention 
against railway signals (field dependence) 
Can be implemented more realistically 
in simulators using MATRIX ™ 
software. 
May also be implemented using the 
TBT ™ to develop a fictitious section 
of line 
N 15  Optimising control skills, accelerating, 
decelerating (minimisation of jerk rate) 
and coasting 
Use simulator, end of run report (the 
train performance display) 
N 16  Preventing train division  
N 17  Maintaining sectional running – linked to 
WTT or running/shed notices 
 
N 18  Use of cab controls  
N 19  Systems’ checks  
N 20  Carry out brake test In conjunction with another crew 
member or platform staff 
N 21  Person on line (permanent way/member 
of public with flag) 
 
N 22  Animals/person on line (trespasser)  
N 23  Prolonged wheel slip/slide illumination 
(aural tone from the engine is out of 
synchronisation with the line speed and 
indications are illuminated) 
 
N 24  Loss of main reservoir and brake pipe 
pressures 
 
N 25  Loss of “blue light” in running (visual 
display of door integrity) 
 
N 26  Passenger communication applied 
(emergency brake or audible tone) 
 
N 27  Air usage because of repeated application 
(correct braking techniques) 
 
N 28  Train radio telegrams (to measure the 
speed and accuracy response of drivers to 
emergency calls) 
 
N 29  Working in tunnels  
N 30  Logic of interaction between track and 
train (effect of running through points and 
crossings at excessive speed 
 
N 31  Penalty brake applications  
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Number Description of scenario Other comment 
N 32  Failure of speedometer – (provide drivers 
with an intuitive sense of speed without 
reference to instrumentation). The 
instructor must be made aware of the 
actual speed of the movement 
 
N 33  Display of signals from signal 
box/permanent way personnel (normal 
and emergency) 
 
N 34  Routing through a complex junction  
N 35  Setting up the passenger information 
system while a signaller call comes 
through on the train radio, all this 
occurring close to a signal displaying a 
danger aspect 
 
N 36  Working in tunnels, the noise and 
deterioration in lighting conditions must 
adjust automatically to this location 
feature 
 
N 37  Approach to automatic half barriers 
(AHBs) while cars are driving around 
lowered barriers 
 
Degraded operating scenarios 
Number Description of scenario Other comment 
D 1  Traction equipment faulted. Range of 
equipment faults of different traction-
specific faults. This includes fault-
manifestation, fault effects, and a fault 
finding menu 
Training in fault rectification can be 
achieved using the fault finding panel 
in the simulator or on an emulator 
D 2  Signal failure and authorised passing 
signals at danger 
 
D 3  Driving in conditions of poor visibility 
and poor adhesion 
 
D 4  Lineside fires, fog/adverse weather/night 
driving, glare from sun 
 
D 5  Abnormal downgrade/upgrade on CAWS  
D 6  Runaway train/out-of-control sensation 
(demonstrating the effect of the wheel 
slide protection system on stopping 
distance) 
 
D 7  Explosion of detonators on line with and 
without trackside personnel present (to 
check for drivers’ response) 
 
D 8  Brakes dragging on train (to gauge the 
tactile response) 
Not in delivered scope 
D 9  Faulty CAWS, deadmans, vigilance (to 
test rule compliance) 
 
D 10  By-pass of traction interlock  
D 11  Temporary block working  
D 12  CAWS – audible and visual outputs, 
failure/abnormal display –defects & 
reasons for isolation 
 
D 13  SCE – audible outputs, failure – defects & 
reasons for isolation 
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Number Description of scenario Other comment 
D 14  SLW and WSLP The simulator is ideal for joint training 
interventions with the pilotman, driver 
and signalman 
D 15  Failure of wipers/horn/headlights  
D 16  TCA failure  
D 17  Running signal not visible from usual 
sighting distance due to lineside 
vegetation 
 
D 18  Entering and exiting possessions  
Emergency operating scenarios 
Number Description of scenario Other comment 
E 1  Obstruction on line, e.g., car on crossing, 
fallen tree, animal on line 
Use simulator and CSD 
E 2  Opposite line obstructed Use simulator and CSD 
E 3  Signal reversions (Category B SPAD)  
E 4  Lineside and CAWS aspect displays out 
of correspondence 
 
E 5  Broken couplings/unintentional divide  
E 6  Collision  
E 7  Emergency handsignal responses Use simulator and CSD 
E 8  Points incorrectly set - shunting operation  
E 9  Fire on train – message from on-board fire 
system 
 
E 10  Observation of the passage of a train on 
the opposite line that has a notifiable 
defect, such as, fire on train, open door 
etc. 
Use simulator and CSD 
E 11  Emergency stop signal delivered from a 
passing train 
 
E 12  Person acting suspiciously on or near the 
line 
 
E 13  Operation of hot box detector  
E 14  Buffer lock Not in delivered scope 
E 15  Incorrect routing  
E 16  Assisting a failed train (passing signal at 
danger, going to protection point and 
thence to failed train) 
Use simulator. The assistance process 
is achieved from the perspective of the 
assisting train only. (Movements to 
assist can take place in both directions.) 
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Appendix 11: Percentage of all SPADs by Error Type (1995 - 2003) 
 1996/’97 1997/’98 1998/’99 1999/’00 2000/’01 2001/’02 2002/’03 Average Type of error (based on SA 
model) 
Anticipation of signal clearance 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5·29% Projection 
Failure to check signal aspect 18% 18% 17% 20% 16% 20% 17% 18·00% Perception 
Failure to locate signal 10% 7% 9% 8% 12% 12% 7% 9·29% Perception 
Failure to react to caution signal 20% 25% 24% 27% 27% 25% 15% 23·29% Action 
Ignorance of rules or instructions 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 0% 1% 1·29% Comprehension 
Violation of rules or instructions 5% 4% 6% 7% 8% 7% 5% 6·00% Model does not apply 
Wrong information given 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 3% 1% 1·86% Perception (communication) 
Ambiguous or incomplete 
information given 
2% 1% 1% 3% 3% 1% 3% 2·00% Perception (communication) 
Information not given 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0·14% Perception (communication) 
Correct information given but was 
misunderstood 
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1·14% Perception (communication) 
Viewed wrong signal 7% 5% 6% 5% 5% 8% 5% 5·86% Perception/comprehension 
Viewed correct signal but misread 
aspect 
2% 2% 2% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2·86% Perception/comprehension 
Misread previous signal 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 0% 1·14% Perception 




8% 7% 7% 5% 4% 3% 3% 5·29% Comprehension/decision 
making 
Other reason 5% 6% 3% 4% 2% 1% 0% 3·00%  
Equipment or environment (not 
the driver) 
6% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3·43% External factors 
Not yet categorised 1% 3% 1% 0% 0% 1% 26% 4·57%  
Based on: RSSB (2003) 
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Appendix 12: Findings in Relation to Usage Patterns, and Acceptance for Training and Assessing Traction Drivers 
Researcher(s) Does simulation and CBT satisfy the requirements of regulatory authorities, industry lead bodies and internal processes? 
Schmitz and 
Maag (2008) 
Trenitalia permits the substitution of a simulator drive for one of the quarterly real cab rides that it uses to assess the competence of its mainline 
and regional drivers. 
Hawthorne 
(2006) 
The American Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) accepts simulator certification for driver competence if it (a) uses the same control panel as 
the locomotive that the driver operates; (b) provides a graphic representation of the forward view from the locomotive; and (c) generates sound. 
Endres (2005) Since 2002, Die Bahn utilise 29 simulators, deployed in twelve locations, to provide basic and refresher training. Each of its 21,500 drivers attends 
a simulator centre on a yearly basis for a one-hour assessment run. In addition, they use simulation for training drivers on the operation of the LZB, 





According to the FRA, the simulator based performance skills test is a more thorough observational test than is achievable during a monitoring 
check ride on a locomotive. A performance test for recertification is only required every three years145 while the check ride is required at least 
annually. 
Depending on class size, Amtrak provides between 1 and 2 weeks of simulator-based training on its basic training programmes. They also provide 
3 days refresher training annually but they do not use simulators during its delivery. 
Hansen (2005) BNSF drivers are required to train on a simulator not just as part of their basic training but when they are qualifying on new routes also. Trainees 
do not learn the routes on the simulator but learn the specific route risks before they operate a real train over the routes. In addition, experienced 
drivers who require recertification are able to complete this process on their home computer terminals. The networked simulators are deployed via 
the corporate intranet from the training centre. Twenty seven system-wide locations have this facility. 
Cullen 
(2001b) 
Japanese railway companies make extensive use of technology with a considerable concentration on simulators. These are programmed to help 
drivers learn about train failures and emergencies. Drivers are expected to demonstrate their capabilities to their supervisors and peers during a 
two-monthly simulator test. 
Abbott et al. 
(2000) 
At JR Central, qualified drivers receive 2 hours simulator training per month dealing with systems’ failures mostly. Emphasis is placed on peer 
review, and all of the class attendees do not drive the same scenario serially. 
Drivers at the Odakyu Electric Railway Company receive 37 hours simulator training as part of the basic training programme. 
Luczak (2000) Norfolk Southern (NS) provides a four-week classroom and simulator training module for its trainee drivers prior to them undertaking an 8 to 10 
month on-the-job training module. The simulator training is provided to make them more susceptible to the cues that they will need to recognise 
during the on-the-job module and also to provide them with train management skills (slack management) that may avert a failure or derailment. 
Watanabe 
(1997) 
JRE provides at least 37 hours of simulator training during ab-initio training. This includes 52 scenarios in respect of abnormal and emergency 
working. 
                                                 
145 Federal Railroad Administration Regulation No. 49CFR240 
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Appendix 13: Physical Differences between a Full Scope Replica and a Desk Simulator System 
  
Full cab replica showing views of  a fully functioning driving desk. The desk is integrated into a cab which may, or may not, be mounted on a motion platform.
Desk simulator (old generation)
Part task trainer with basic controls
New generation of a desk simulator that incorporates value adding controls only 
 Images of the new generation 
of simulator desk showing 
(clockwise from top LHS):
1) Screen for platform view, 
passenger communications 
handset, engine start panel, TDMS, 
main desk  controls and gauges, 
safety control equipment, 
emergency brake plunger, LHS 
door controls, alarm cut out; 
2) OTW view, door test button, 
incident light, train radio head, 
RHS door buttons,  uncoupling 
cock, coupler buttons and lamp;
3) Door of technical cabinet, switch 
panel (non-functioning foot 
warmer, wiper, saloon heat), radio 
handset;
4) Faultfinding panel (situated on 
rear wall of simulator booth). This  
fully functioning panel shows a 
navigable train  on the bottom, the 
circuit breaker and cut out panels,  
pneumatic cut out cocks and 
deployable safety equipment.
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Appendix 14: Types of Simulators Used for Driver Training 
Type I Simulator means a replica of the control compartment of a locomotive with 
all associated control equipment that: 
1. Functions in response to a person's manipulation and causes the gauges 
associated with such controls to appropriately respond to the consequences of 
that manipulation; 
2. Pictorially, audibly and graphically illustrates the route to be taken; 
3. Graphically, audibly, and physically illustrates the consequences of control 
manipulations in terms of their effect on train speed, braking capacity, and in-
train force levels throughout the train; and  
4. Is computer enhanced so that it can be programmed for specific train consists 
and the known physical characteristics of the line illustrated. 
Type II Simulator means a replica of the control equipment for a locomotive that: 
1. Functions in response to a person's manipulation and causes the gauges 
associated with such controls to appropriately respond to the consequences of 
that manipulation; 
2. Pictorially, audibly, and graphically illustrates the route to be taken; 
3. Graphically and audibly illustrates the consequences of control manipulations 
in terms of their effect on train speed braking capacity, and in-train force 
levels throughout the train; and 
4. Is computer enhanced so that it can be programmed for specific train consists 
and the known physical characteristics of the line illustrated. 
Type III Simulator means a replica of the control equipment for a locomotive that: 
1. Functions in response to a person's manipulation and causes the gauges 
associated with such controls to appropriately respond to the consequences of 
that manipulation; 
2. Graphically illustrates the route to be taken; 
3. Graphically illustrates the consequences of control manipulations in terms of 
their effect on train speed braking capacity, and in-train force levels 
throughout the train; and 
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4. Is computer enhanced so that it can be programmed for specific train consists 
and the known physical characteristics of the line illustrated. 
Source: FRA (2012) and FRA (2010_49 CFR 240.7) 
Key differences between Type II and Type I simulators are that Type II simulators 
do not incorporate a ‘control compartment’ and do not ‘physically illustrate the 
consequences of control manipulations’. 
Key differences between Type III and Type II simulators are that Type III 
simulators do not ‘pictorially ... and graphically’ illustrate the route to be taken’ 




Appendix 15: Prevalence of Simulator Sickness Identified in Research Studies 
Table 1/3 - Primary Research 
Researcher(s) Context/study details Propensity and suggested causation Recommendations and amelioration methods 
Kennedy et al. (in 
Coelho et al., 
2008.)  
This experiment involved the use of head mounted equipment for the treatment 
of acrophobia (the fear of heights). 
 Short repeated sessions should be separated by intervals of a few 
days; 
Short sharp exposures to the simulator are most effective; 
Avoid alcohol and sleep normally before each session; 
Operators should avoid sudden head movements. 
Reed et al. (2007) This research study assessed the viability of using simulators to train 
professional truck drivers in advanced skills, such as energy efficiency, vehicle 
sympathy and hazard awareness. 
24·5% of the subject group (N = 640) were unable to complete the 
trial. Older operators are more prone to sickness when using both 
types of display. Analysis reveals that the dropout rates were 
significantly lower when the motion system was inoperative (a 
period of 6 months). This suggests that the motion cuing system was 
not functioning correctly. 
Simulator sickness is affected by the type of OTW display system. 
Subjects using a simulator with the display mounted on the floor 
had a higher sickness rate than those using a simulator with a 
‘flying screen’, i.e., where the projector moved in unison with the 
moving cab; 
The dropout rate decreased to 13·2% by improving the visual 
database, motion system, by screening out subjects who were pre-
disposed to illness and by providing more familiarisation time. 
Mitsopoulos et al. 
(2006) 
The researchers correlated the participants’ intentions of what they would do 
(the simulator was in automatic mode and they had no control over it) with their 
actual performance on a subsequent simulator task (when they had control over 
it). 
The output objective of this study was to establish the extent of the ‘knowing-
doing’ gap (N = 30 novice and 30 experienced car drivers). The stated intentions 
of the participants (‘I would do this, if I was in control’) were compared with 
their actual behaviours when they were in control of the simulator (‘this is what 
you actually did when you were in control of the simulated run’). 
7·4% withdrew from the study due to sickness  
Kappé and van 
Emmerik (in 
SWOV, 2006) 
 Subjects who have real word operating experience are more prone to 
sickness. 
 
Tichon et al. 
(2006) 
The objective of this study was to measure ‘presence’ in a train simulator, to 
inoculate drivers against stress and to prepare them for novel events (N = 12 
participants). 
Attention is diverted away from the driving task to concern over the 
unpleasant physical symptoms; 
Some individuals are predisposed towards sickness; 
8% became ill during the study. 
 
Parkes (2005) This review paper focuses on visual databases that are constructed as a result of 
an analysis of training needs, i.e., the construction of fictitious locations rather 
than the recreation of real world scenes. 
 Motion systems, if required, should be accurate or they will lead 
to increased levels of sickness; 
Diminished aspects of colour, tint, texture and object obscuration 
may result in a loss of face validity but produce a driving 
environment of high utility. 
Allen et al. (2003) During this trial (N = 111 novice car drivers), each driver received 6 trials on a 
range of OTW presentations (narrow/wide FOV and single/multiple monitors) to 
assess the effectiveness of the various means to present the graphical images. 
91·7% were ‘fine’, 2·8% were ‘a little queasy’, 3·2% were ‘moderate 
but could continue’ and 2·4% ‘would like to stop’; 
The gender effect was statistically significant, females were more 
prone to sickness; 
Simulator configuration was not significant. Data did not support the 
view that the FOV was a significant factor; 
Single monitor displays can result in trainees driving at excessive 
speeds because of lack of peripheral cues. 
The feeling of sickness diminished with the number of trials. 
FAA (2003) Aircraft operation  Limit the duration of simulator exposure initially and increase it at 
a later stage; 
Subjects should be provided with plenty of fresh air; 
Medications, like Dramamine, may help but these cause 
drowsiness. 
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Researcher(s) Context/study details Propensity and suggested causation Recommendations and amelioration methods 
Masciocchi et al. 
(2003) 
This study considers the effectiveness of using simulators to provide training to 
snowplough operators (N = 174). Operators are trained, off road, in road skills 
and energy consumption. The simulators used three monitors with a combined 
180° FOV, and five to ten minutes were spent on the simulated run. 
3% felt so ill that they were unable to complete the experiment; 
Generally, sickness scores were low, equating to below a ‘slight’ 
sensation of sickness; 
Sickness increased with the age of the subject. 
Provide time to acclimatise operators. 
Smyth (2001)  A field comparison of performance when driving military vehicles using (i) 
natural OTW views and (ii) indirectly by monitoring CCTV monocular images 
of the route on monitors in the cab 
Most subjects (N = 8) reported symptoms of discomfort associated 
with motion sickness; 
Subjects drove faster with natural vision; 
Workload increased when the FOV was presented by indirect means. 
 
Durlach and 
Mavor (in Emery 
et al., 1999) 
Literature review 10% of the population are susceptible to simulator sickness; 
Bright imagery is more likely to induce sickness, rather than night 
scenes; 
A wide FOV exacerbates condition; 
Curve negotiation [high lateral acceleration cue] exacerbates the 
condition; 
Older persons are more affected. 
Sickness effects can be countered by limiting the duration of 
simulator exposure and by filtering out persons who are 
susceptible. 
Blana (1996a) Survey of the state of development of car simulators Barrett et al. (in Blana, 1996a): sickness affected 64% of study group 
in a car driving simulator; 
Breda et al. (in Blana, 1996a): 7·5% of subjects had to quit the 
validation process; 
Blaauw (in Blana, 1996a): None of the subjects in the study 
experienced sickness; 
Reed and Green (in Blana, 1996a): 8% of the experiment group 
experienced sickness. 
Experiments in a simulator should not be too long; 
A motion platform will decrease the likelihood of simulator 
sickness. 
Kennedy et al. (in 
Kolasinski, 1995)  
This study examines the potential of simulator sickness to detract from the 
benefits of equipment usage in the US Navy and Marine Corps. 
Between 20% and 40% of military pilots have experienced at least 
one of the symptoms of the sickness; 
The symptoms were not prevalent in subjects over 50 years of age; 
Subjects who have real word operating experience are more prone to 
sickness. 






Barrett and Thornton (1968) conducted research to establish the relationship 
between field dependence, i.e., the ability to find target figures embedded in the 
environment, and accident involvement. They assessed the subjects’ ability to 
detect and identify the onset of an emergency situation, i.e., the emergence of a 
pedestrian onto the road. 
52% of the subjects suspended the trial.  
Table 2/3 - Secondary Research 
Study conducted by: Number of participants and age 
groupings 
Dynamic (D) or 
Static (S) simulator 
Type of scenario Picture presentation technique Number of persons with 
symptoms of sickness or 
needing to suspend the 
experiment 
Bolstad (2001) 16 young, 16 middle aged and 
16 old 
S 2 off 5 minute exposures to varying traffic 
environments 
Computer monitor 5 experienced sickness 
symptoms; 1 suspended the 
trial. 
Catlin, Blouin, Simoneau and Teasdale (2004) 15 young and 25 old S 16 km route with 26 junctions 19 inch monitor One in each group had to 
suspend the trial. 
Cox, Quillan, Thorndyke, Kovatchev and Hanna 
(1998) 
29 with Alzheimer’s disease and 
21 without 
S Varying Three monitors with 160° FOV 2 suspended the trial (both were 
sufferers of Alzheimer’s 
disease). 
Dymott et al. (2003) 12 young, 12 middle age and 12 
old 
S Public highway, urban environment and garage 100°X60° projected image 3 young and 1 old subject 
experienced symptoms in one 
trial; 1 young subject 
experienced symptoms in 
another trial. 
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Study conducted by: Number of participants and age 
groupings 
Dynamic (D) or 
Static (S) simulator 
Type of scenario Picture presentation technique Number of persons with 
symptoms of sickness or 
needing to suspend the 
experiment 
Edwards, Creaser, Caird, Lamsdale and Chisholm 
(2003) 
12 young and 12 old S Road junctions Three projectors with 165° FOV 2 young and 5 old subjects had 
to suspend the trial. 
Freund, Gravenstein, Ferris, Burke and Shaheen 
(2005) 
119 old S 30 minute simulation in urban environment and 
vehicle manoeuvring 
135° 10 suspended the trial. 
Hagenmeyer and Sommer (2004) 13 young and 12 old S Urban environment and public highway Three monitors with 120° FOV 2 young and 10 old suspended 
the trial. 
Hakamies-Blomqvist, Östlund, Henricksson and 
Heikkinen (2000) 
35 old D 8·6 km of public highway with gradual turns Arched monitor providing 120° FOV 1 suspended the trial. 
Hakamies-Blomqvist, Henricksson, Lundberg and 
Östlund (2001) 
41 old D 30 and 35 km in summer and winter conditions 
respectively 
Arched monitor providing 120° FOV 2 suspended the trial. 
Henricksson (2005) 52 old D Urban environment and public highway Three monitors with 120° FOV 42 suspended the trial. 
Lee and Drake (1998) 10 old ex drivers and 23 old 
active drivers. 
S 15 km with 8 staged events One computer monitor 3 suspended the trial and 7 
experienced sickness symptoms. 
Lee, Cameron and Lee (2003) 129 old S Junctions and lane changing for 45 minutes 
duration 
One computer monitor 11 experienced slight sickness 
symptoms. 
Lee and Lee (2005) 129 old S Junctions and lane changing for 45 minutes 
duration 
One computer monitor 9% reported simulator sickness. 
Lee, Drake and Cameron (2002) 29 old and 24 very old S 15 km with 8 staged events One computer monitor 4 experienced sickness 
symptoms. 
Lundqvist, Geredle and Rönnberg (2000) 24 stroke patients and 29 
healthy persons 
D 80 km of public highway with off-peak traffic 
conditions 
Arched monitor providing 120° FOV 1 suspended the trial. 
Merat, Anttila and Luoma (2005) 24 young and 24 old S Public highway Semi-circular monitor providing 230° 
X39° FOV 
80% of the old population 
suspended the trial. 
Reed and Green (1999) 6 young and 6 old S Straight public highway for 40 minutes duration Monitor 2·5 m X3·7 m 1 experienced sickness 
symptoms. 
Rizzo, Sheffield, Stierman and Dawson (2003) 164 old persons S 30 minutes on public highway with critical events One projector with 155° FOV 34 suspended the trial. 
Roenkler, Cissell, Ball, Ball, Wadley and Edwards 
(2003) 
3 old groups of 26, 51 and 27 
respectively 
S Reacting to stimuli presented 35 mm projection system Respectively, 3, 2 and 2 persons 
suspended the trials. 
de Waard et al. (1999) 21 young and 16 old D Junctions in an urban setting (15 minutes 
duration) 
Monitor 2 m X 2·5 m 2 young and 6 old persons 
suspended the trial. 
Source: Henricksson (2007) 
Table 3/3 - Summary of Research Findings by Henricksson (2007) and Option Selection by the Writer 
Dimension Total participants in the studies Number experiencing varying degrees of illness % Option selected by I.É. 
Dynamic simulator 218 54 24·7 I.É.’s specified a static system 
Static simulator 1,014 161 15·9 
OTW view presented on monitor 785 153 19·5 I.É.’s specified projection as the means 
to present OTW views. OTW view presented by projector 447 62 13·9 
Wide OTW FOV 659 154 23·4 I.É.’s specified a FOV of 40° vertical 
by a 60° horizontal Narrow OTW FOV 469 54 11·5 
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Appendix 16: The Dual Vee Model 
 




Appendix 17: The Kirkpatrick Model for Measuring Training Effectiveness 
The framework, proposed by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2005), and referred to 
in Table 37, is useful when considering the types of effectiveness evaluation 
studies study that can be undertaken. The value obtained from a particular study 
increases in proportion with the degree of difficulty to complete it, i.e., as one 
moves from level 1 to level 4. From a business perspective, a level 4 evaluation is 
very desirable type but, because of implementation difficulties, it is only achieved 
in 7% of studies. 





Evaluation measures Appropriate method of 
evaluation for this level 
Frequency 
of use 
1 Individual Reactions of training 
recipients 
Completion of course 
evaluation forms 
78% 
2 Changes to 
participants’ learning 
Examination or assessment 32% 
3 Business Changes in observable 
on-the-job behaviour 
Observation of behaviour 
in the work setting; change 
in performance metrics 
9%146 
4 Changes in resultant 
financial metrics 
Financial appraisal 7% 
Source: The Report of the American Society of Training and Development (in Arthur et al., 2003) 
  
                                                 
146 Typically, behavioural change is assessed by supervisors. 
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Appendix 18: Fatalities and Weighted Injuries 
Injury degree Definition Ratio 
Fatality  Death occurs within one year of the accident. 1 
Major injury Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public as defined in 
schedule 1 to RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012. This includes losing 
consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations, loss of sight 
(temporary or permanent) and other injuries that resulted in hospital 




Injuries to passengers staff or members of the public, which are neither 
fatalities nor major injuries and: 
- for passengers or public, result in the injured person being taken to 
hospital from the scene of the accident (as defined as reportable in 
RIDDOR 1995147 amended April 2012) 
- for workforce, result in the injured person being incapacitated for their 
normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar days, not 




All other physical injuries. 1000 
Class 1 
shock/trauma 
Shock or trauma resulting from being involved in, or witnessing, events 
that have serious potential of a fatal outcome, e.g., train accidents such as 




Shock or trauma resulting from other causes, such as verbal abuse and 




                                                 
147 RIDDOR refers to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
a set of health and safety regulations that mandates the reporting of, inter alia, work-related 
accidents. These regulations were published in 1995 and amended in 2012. 
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Appendix 19: Course Evaluation Questionnaire 
Driver Simulator: Attendee Questionnaire 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to help in promoting best practice for training 
design for safety critical roles. 
Please take the time to complete this questionnaire and return it to your trainer at 
the end of the course. 
Attendee’s name: 
Date: 
Please tick the box that best describes your opinion. 
Q1: The simulator is easy to use 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree 
    
 
Q2: Using the simulator was enjoyable 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree 




Q3: The simulator supported my learning 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree 
    
Do you think it may help you on the job; if so how? 
 
 
Q4: What was the one thing you liked most about using the driver simulator 
today? 
 
Q5: Would you change anything that was done on the course? 
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Q6: Is there a subject that you would like to see covered? 
 
Q7: Each session is composed of 4 parts: 
 The classroom portion; 
 The driving of the simulator; 
 The observation; 
 The feedback. 
Please rate each individually between 1 and 5, 5 being highly liked  and 1 
meaning not liked at all. 
Rating 1 2 3 4 5  
The classroom      
The driving      
The observation      
The feedback      
 
Q8: Briefly tell us how this refresher compared with the old 4 day refresher. 
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Appendix 20: Calculation of Simulator Requirements: based on 2-day and 4-day refresher cycles 
Bases of calculations: 
1. Biennial refresher cycle; 
2. Prior to the introduction of simulator enabled training, the refresher programmes for drivers of autonomous and electric traction had durations of four days and three days respectively. The anticipated 
simulator usage rate is calculated in Table 38. This usage pattern was used to determine the scope of simulator supply; 
3. After the introduction of simulator enabled training, the durations of the refresher programmes for drivers of autonomous and electric traction were reduced to two days. The achieved usage rate is 
calculated in Table 39. A summary of the anticipated and achieved utilisation rates is presented in Table 40. 
4. Sufficient equipment must be made available to accommodate drivers' release from the operating core to attend training. The operating core cannot release drivers during the summer holiday period. This 
creates an unavoidable inefficiency. A 'window' of 7 months is used in the calculations to reflect seasonality. 
Table 38: Anticipated Biennial Utilisation 



























availability (432148 days 
multiplied by simulator 
availability) 
Attendance constraint: Due to 
annual leave, drivers are available 
for refresher training during the 







Dublin DMU and 
locomotive 
Refresher 320 4 80 4 320 2 640 1728 1008 63% 37% 
Basic 80 8 10 13 130 2 260   26% 15% 
Remediation 6 1 6 1 6 1 6   1% 0% 
Total utilisation 90% 52% 
Mallow DMU Refresher 100 2 50 4 200 2 400 864 504 79% 46% 
  Basic 0 8 0 13 0 0 0   0% 0% 
  Remediation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1% 0% 
Total utilisation 80% 46% 
Dublin EMU  Refresher 80 3 27 3 81 1 81 864 504 16% 9% 
  Basic 16 8 2 13 26 2 52   10% 6% 
  Remediation 0 1 0 1 0 1 0   0% 0% 
Total utilisation 26% 15% 
Aggregate utilisation with trainee attendance constraints, i.e., trainees available to attend over 
a seven month period each year 
  1440  2016 71%  
Aggregate utilisation without trainee attendance constraints, i.e., if trainees were available to 
attend over a twelve month period each year 
  1440 3456   42% 
  
                                                 
148 365 days/year less (weekends, annual leave, Public Bank Holidays and illness allowance) = 216 days/year or 432 days/2 year cycle 
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Table 39: Achieved Biennial Utilisation Rate 



























availability (432149 days 
multiplied by simulator 
availability) 
Attendance constraint: Due to 
annual leave, drivers are available 
for refresher training during the 







Dublin DMU and 
locomotive 
Refresher 320 3·185 101 2 202 2 404 1728 1008 40% 23% 
Basic 15 8 2 13 26 2 52   5% 3% 
Remediation 6 1 6 1 6 1 6   1% 0% 
Total utilisation 46% 27% 
Mallow DMU Refresher 100 3·185 32 2 64 2 128 864 504 25% 15% 
  Basic 0 8 0 13 0 0 0   0% 0% 
  Remediation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1% 0% 
Total utilisation 26% 15% 
Dublin EMU  Refresher 80 2·875 28 2 56 1 56 864 504 11% 6% 
  Basic 5 8 1 13 13 2 26   5% 3% 
  Remediation 0 1 0 1 0 1 0   0% 0% 
Total utilisation 16% 9% 
Aggregate utilisation with trainee attendance constraints, i.e., trainees available to attend over 
a seven month period each year 
  673  2016 33%  
Aggregate utilisation without trainee attendance constraints, i.e., if trainees were available to 
attend over a twelve month period each year 
  673 3456   19% 
Table 40: Global Summary of Anticipated and Actual Biennial Utilisation 
Duration of refresher Annual leave constraint Global (overall system) usage 
Anticipated usage (based on 
four-day refresher) 
Aggregate usage with trainee attendance constraints, i.e., trainees 
available to attend over a seven month period 
71% (ranging from 90% to 26% depending on the type of simulator 
and location) 
Aggregate usage without trainee attendance constraints, i.e., 
trainees available to attend over a twelve month period 
42% (ranging from 52% to 15% depending on the type of simulator 
and location) 
Actual usage (based on reduced 
ab-initio requirements and two-
day refresher session) 
Aggregate usage with trainee attendance constraints, i.e., trainees 
available to attend over a seven month period 
33% (ranging from 46% to 16% depending on the type of simulator 
and location) 
Aggregate usage without trainee attendance constraints, i.e., 
trainees available to attend over a twelve month period 
19% (ranging from 27% to 9% depending on the type of simulator 
and location) 
Table 41: System Requirements Based on Amended Biennial Usage Pattern 
Type of simulated traction Simulator usage based on 7 month driver availability No. simulators purchased Amended requirements based on reduced ab-initio 
training requirement and shorter refresher programme 
Inchicore (autonomous) 46% 4 2 (plus one additional simulator required for 
locomotive conversion) = 3 
Mallow (autonomous) 26% 2 1 
Inchicore (DART) 16% 2 1 
Total  8 5 
 
                                                 
149 365 days/year less (weekends, annual leave, Public Bank Holidays and illness allowance) = 216 days/year or 432 days/2 year cycle 
